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Since the Preface is in general the part of a PhD thesis that receives most,
sometimes even exclusive, attention from the readers, the importance of its ¯rst
sentence should not be underestimated. I have given myself quite some thought on
the best way to start it in an eloquent and, preferably, erudite way, only to discover
that I was right not to pursue a career as a writer and stick to economics. So I
decided to start in a more conventional way.
The road that you choose in life { or that is given to you, depending on your
point of view { is paved with mistakes and people that provide tokens to help you
¯nd your way. One of my major would-be mistakes would have been to leave Tilburg
University in 1999 after having ¯nished the undergraduate program in Econometrics.
I had ¯nished an internship at the Dutch central bank and my idea was to leave the
"ivory tower" and go for the big bucks and a fruitful professional career that could
be useful for the society that had paid my education for 19 years. Fortunately, Dolf
prevented me from doing so and for that I have to thank him. He convinced me that
I should do a PhD. It has turned out to be the best experience in my life so far.
During my ¯rst year I followed the course "Investment under Uncertainty" which
was taught by Peter Kort and Kuno Huisman. My interest in the course soon re-
sulted in a joint paper with Peter and Kuno and in Peter joining Dolf as my super-
visor. Both did a great job and I thank both Dolf and Peter for many stimulating
discussions and their perfect guidance the past few years. Apart from their profes-
viiviii
sional advice, I greatly enjoyed many, more or less serious, personal discussions.
Apart from Dolf and Peter, the thesis committee consists of people who have been
important in the last few years. Kuno Huisman is the co-author of the chapters in the
¯rst part of this thesis. I thank him for his input and the many pleasant discussions
we had. I speci¯cally mention the conference in Krems in 2002. The courses taught
by Stef Tijs have been a great inspiration during my undergraduate studies. His
enthusiasm has been very important in my decision to start a PhD. Jean-Jacques
Herings's approach to economic problems, using a rigorous mathematical analysis
has been a great example to me. Furthermore, I thank him for his interest in
my work. I met Marco Scarsini at a game theory conference in Stony Brook in
summer 2001. After having spent some pleasant days there he invited me to come
to Pescara and give a seminar there. I greatly acknowledge his hospitality, kindness
and interest in my work. Peter Borm is one of the co-authors of the last chapter
in this thesis. I thank him for the pleasant cooperation, his personal interest in
me, and his con¯dence in my teaching abilities, which gave me the opportunity to
get some experience with teaching lectures. I am honoured that they all agreed to
join the thesis committee. Furthermore, I thank Ruud Hendrickx for our pleasant
cooperation on Chapter 9, his friendship, and his hospitality during our regular
game-nights.
Although writing a PhD thesis is mainly a solitary occupation, I received great
help from many colleagues and friends. Some of them speeded up the process of
thesis writing and some of them slowed this process down considerably. In any way,
they had a positive in°uence on my life. I speci¯cally mention the colleagues from
the department of Econometrics & Operations Research, in particular the "Trie-
angle" group:1 Peter, Henk, Herbert, Ruud, Bas, Ren¶ e, Anja, Willem, Jacob, Bart,
Edwin, Marieke, Hans, and Marcel. They made the co®ee breaks so pleasant that
it interfered with work on numerous occasions. The "Warande-runners" { Arthur,
Bertrand, and Jenke { are thanked for helping me remaining in shape in a pleasant
way. Many pleasant an hour has been spent with fellow PhD students who, after
all, su®er from the same sort of craziness (more or less): Rob, Laurens, Jeroen,
Mark-Jan, Greg, Rosella, Anna, Martyna, Greg, Zhenya, Cate, Laura, Pierre-Carl,
Ste®an, Charles, Vera, and Michaela. Furthermore, I thank my o±cemates, Judith
and Marieke, ¯rst of all for keeping up with me and secondly for providing a relaxed
1All names that appear in this Preface are in random order. If nothing else, my mind is perfectly
capable to act as a random generator.ix
and comfortable atmosphere.
In 1999 I started to take singing lessons to get my thoughts o® my research for
some hours each week. Thank you Frank for providing a nice break during the week.
I also joined the university choir. In ¯rst instance to sing, although gradually the
emphasis shifted to the after-rehearsal-drink in the in-famous Korenbloem. I thank
all regular attendants for the pleasant evenings. In particular I thank Richard who
also convinced me to spend my Thursday evenings eating, singing, and drinking.
No thesis can be written without the support of family and close friends. I thank
my family, my parents, and my brother for their support and their patience with
my absent-mindedness and { sometimes intolerable { bad moods. Rob has been
my companion on numerous wine-and-cheese evenings ever since we lived in Am-
sterdam. I am honoured that my brother, Job, and my best friend, Freddy, have
agreed to act as paranimfen. The last words are dedicated to Jorien who provided
the perfect excuse to quit working day and night and to ¯nish this thesis, which was
starting to grow out of proportions. I am convinced the thesis committee is grateful
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Introduction
Both economists and popular writers
have once more run away with some
fragments of reality they happened
to grasp.
Joseph A. Schumpeter,
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 1942.
1.1 Rational Behaviour and Economics
Never in the history of mankind has there been such an almost unlimited belief in
the abilities of the human mind as in the era of Enlightenment in the ¯rst half of
the eighteenth century. Sciences were booming and also in the arts a new era of
optimism and creativity was dawning with giants like Mozart and Rousseau. In
mathematics, the theory of probability was re¯ned and the laws of probabilistic
reasoning were believed to be good descriptions of human reasoning and decision
making.1 The French Revolution counts as the ultimate result of the Age of Reason
and Enlightenment. It also meant its downfall, ending in an age of terror.2 In the
early nineteenth century also most ¯elds of science abandoned many ideas from the
era of Enlightenment. Oddly enough, in psychology and economics the probabilistic
1In Rousseau (1762, p. 97) one ¯nds: "Calculateurs, c'est maintenant votre a®aire; comptez,
mesurez, comparez".
2For an excellent overview of the French Revolution and the rise and fall of the Age of Reason,
see Schama (1989).
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approach to describing a human being as a fully rational homo economicus remained
popular as ever.
Most of contemporary economics still uses the axiom of rational economic agents,
where agents are believed to maximise expected utility. Expectations are often
assumed to be based on objective probabilities. Expected utility with objective
probabilities has been axiomatised by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Ex-
pected utility can also be based on subjective probabilities, see e.g. Savage (1954).
Along the way some doubts on the rational economic agent was cast, notably by
Allais (1953), Ellsberg (1961), and Tversky and Kahneman (1981) who showed by
means of experiments that in decision making people often violate the axioms un-
derlying (subjective) expected utility theory. If one considers economics to be a
positive science, describing what actually happens, experimental violations of ba-
sic behavioural axioms should be met with a willingness to adapt the behavioural
assumptions underlying economic analysis. If one takes the point of view that eco-
nomics is a normative science, which tries to ¯nd how people should behave, these
violations might not pose a problem. However, even from a methodological point of
view the validity of the (subjective) expected utility paradigm can be questioned.
For example, Laville (2000) argues that optimisation is rhetorically inconsistent. In
another contribution Hermann-Pillath (2001) points at ontological problems in the
standard neoclassical paradigm. He also points out that rivalling theories do not
survive empirical validation tests simply because these theories are tested using neo-
classical ways of measurement. Therefore, a Popperian falsi¯cation of neoclassical
economics is impossible.
One of the ontological issues underlying all human sciences is that they deal with
human beings and their own view of the world and individual beliefs. The human
mind is therefore an integral part of economic science. Hence, to simply discard
the experimental evidence that human minds do not work as machines calculating
optima by stating that economics is a normative science, is an invalid argument.
Any normative issue should fall under the constraints of the human mind. Thus,
economic theory needs to take into account the cognitive, emotional, social and
cultural aspects of their basic ingredient: people.
Numerous contributions have been made in the literature to adapt the rationality
assumption and replace it with the concept of bounded rationality, a notion intro-
duced in psychology by Herbert Simon (cf. Simon (1957)). The concept of bounded
rationality has extended to ¯elds like macroeconomics (e.g. Sargent (1993), Bom¯m1: Introduction 3
and Diebold (1997)), microeconomics (e.g. Radner (1996), Conlisk (1996), Vega-
Redondo (1997)), and game theory (Samuelson (1996), Rubinstein (1998)).
Many di®erent approaches have been used to model bounded rationality. In the
¯eld of evolutionary game theory (cf. Weibull (1995), Samuelson (1997)) one usu-
ally stays close to the biological concept of (Darwinian) evolution. In this literature
players are assumed to behave like machines using pre-programmed strategies.3 The
growth rate of the population playing the most successful strategy is assumed to in-
crease. In such models there is no explicit learning. Modelling learning has been
done using several di®erent approaches. One way is by assuming that players use
some probability distribution over their opponents' strategies based on past obser-
vations. Each player uses this assessment to choose the action which maximises his
own payo® in the next period. This is called ¯ctitious play (cf. Young (1998)). Less
elaborate learning processes are for example models based on heuristic behaviour
like imitation of successful opponents.
Another approach to bounded rationality is case-based decision theory (cf. Gilboa
and Schmeidler (2001)). Here agents are assumed to make decisions on the basis of
similarities with cases from past experience. Yet another approach can be found in
Kosfeld (1999) who uses interacting particle systems to model boundedly rational
decision making.
In analysing the performance of decision rules an important component is the
cognitive and computational burden it imposes on the decision maker. It has been
argued by e.g. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) that heuristic decision making algo-
rithms may even outperform rational inference, taking into account computational
speed and accuracy.4 So, bounded rationality may not be so "bounded" as the name
suggests. From the above it becomes clear that the standard approach to bounded
rationality is mainly focussed at cognitive limitations of human beings. One could
argue, however, that for a substantial part human decision making is culturally and
sociologically determined (cf. Hofstede (1984)). Furthermore, human emotions play
an important role as has recently been argued by Hanoch (2002).
Most models that apply boundedly rational decision making are used to analyse
frequently recurring strategic or economic situations, like for example coordination
3So, this literature strips every form of rationality, thinking, and learning from human beings.
4In economics not only individual decision making is subject to bounded rationality because
of people's limited cognitive possibilities, but also the organisation of economic activity is limited
by computational requirements. A formal computational analysis to economic behaviour and
organisations has recently been advocated by Mount and Reiter (2002).4 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
problems. This is to be expected since humans learn most from frequent interaction
and assign less cognitive abilities to solve these problems. This point can be easily
illustrated by means of an arm-chair analysis of a ¯rm. The ¯rm is frequently
confronted with changes on its output markets to which it has to react with a change
in its production or price policy. This kind of decisions is needed to be made quite
often, implying that managers get so much experience that they develop a "gut-
feeling" resulting in behavioural routines and rules of thumb. However, once in a
while the ¯rm's management needs to make an important investment decision that
determines its medium- or long-run capacity and strategic capabilities. This kind
of decisions needs to be thoroughly analysed. Large ¯rms have entire divisions for
this task. The rationality assumption might not be such a bad proxy for analysing
these decisions.
Due to the above it can be argued that it is reasonable to impose that important
and large scale investment decisions can be analysed by assuming rationality on the
side of the ¯rms, whereas frequent interaction situations should be modelled using a
boundedly rational approach, as is done in this thesis. In Part I models are presented
to analyse the investment decision in a project with an uncertain payo® stream in the
future. In Part II a single market is considered where ¯rms repeatedly compete in
quantities.5 Furthermore, boundedly rational price formation on ¯nancial markets is
modelled. In Part III it is attempted to include strategic (non-cooperative) aspects
in cooperative game theory. Here the rationality discussion enters only implicitly.
1.2 Introduction to Part I
The investment in new markets, products and technologies by ¯rms is an important
part of a ¯rm's competitive edge. In fact, Schumpeter (1942) argues that it is the
most important part of competition in a capitalist system. According to him, a cap-
italist economic structure should be viewed as an evolutionary process. Capitalism
is by de¯nition a form or method of economic change and can never be viewed as
static. A ¯rm that introduces a new product, uses a new technology, or enters a
5The formal analysis of quantity competition dates back to Cournot (1838). His idea of equi-
librium in quantities appears to be the same as the famous Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative
games (cf. Nash (1950b)). It is good to point out that Cournot already assumes ¯rms to be
rational, pro¯t maximising entities. We read (Cournot (1838, p. 83)): "Nous n'invoquerons qu'une
seule hypothµ ese, savoir que chacun cherche µ a tirer de sa chose ou de son travail la plus grande
valeur possible".1: Introduction 5
new market, is therewith creating new forms of industrial organisation. Schumpeter
calls this a process of creative destruction. Any economic analysis should have this
dynamic process as a starting point. The standard neo-classical theory is there-
fore regarded as fundamentally wrong by Schumpeter. The text-book analysis of
oligopoly theory for example tries to explain the well-known moves of ¯rms to set
quantities or prices such as to maximise pro¯ts. That is, one accepts the momentary
situation as it is and does not take into account the changing environment. Even
in the case of a repeated game analysis this is essentially the case. One can read in
Schumpeter (1942, p. 84):
But in capitalist reality[...]it is not that kind of competition which counts
but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the
new source of supply, the new type of organisation[...] { competition
which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes
not at the margins of the pro¯ts and outputs of the existing ¯rms but
at their foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as
much more e®ective than the other as a bombardment is in comparison
with forcing a door[.]
Schumpeter's view was empirically supported by Solow (1957) who found that only
a small fraction of per-capita growth (10% for the U.S. non-farm sector over the
period 1909{1949) was associated with an increase in the ratio of capital to labour.
Hence, technological progress plays an important role.
In macroeconomics the idea of creative destruction has been used extensively in
the literature on endogenous growth (cf. Aghion and Howitt (1998)). Firms engage
in Research and Development (R&D) and once in a while one ¯rm (randomly)
succeeds in introducing a new and better technology. This yields the ¯rm monopoly
rents until another ¯rm takes over. The process that evolves in this way is called
leap-frogging. The quality increments in the technology, due to R&D, are the engine
of economic growth. Since the R&D expenditures are determined endogenously, the
growth rate is endogenous as well.
In his seminal contribution, Arrow (1962) started the microeconomic analysis of
incentives for R&D investments. In general, one considers two distinct areas in this
literature. The ¯rst one deals with the question of the pure bene¯ts of innovation,
like for example monopoly rents due to patents. This problem has been addressed
notably by e.g. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Lee and Wilde (1980), Loury (1979),
and Reinganum (1982). The second strand concerns the strategic timing of the6 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
adoption of new technologies. For an overview of this literature see e.g. Tirole
(1988). The literature that is reviewed there consists of deterministic models of the
timing of adoption. In the past decades there has evolved a substantial literature
on investment under uncertainty. For an overview hereabout see the excellent book
by Dixit and Pindyck (1996).
There are four basic characteristics of investment projects, namely (partly) ir-
reversibility of investment, the possibility of delay of investment, uncertainty about
the pro¯t stream generated by the investment and the presence of competitors who
can make a similar investment. Irreversibility can arise simply because of technical
conditions. For example, marketing and advertisement costs can not be recovered
if a new market entry fails. Furthermore, due to the lemons problem (cf. Akerlof
(1970)) many investments are worthless if one tries to reverse them. Most invest-
ment decisions can be postponed. A ¯rm can buy a machine today or it can buy one
tomorrow. In a deterministic world the possibility of postponement has no value
since it is known from the start what the cash °ows generated by an investment will
be. However, most investment projects exhibit uncertainty about this °ow of cash
streams. This induces an option value for postponing the investment. One can dis-
tinguish two kinds of uncertainty, namely intrinsic uncertainty that will always exist
regardless of the ¯rm having invested or not, and uncertainty that reduces because
of information that becomes available over time. A key feature of the latter kind of
uncertainty is that the information is imperfect. For example, consider the intro-
duction of a new communication technology by a telecom ¯rm. There will always be
uncertainty about the demand for the new service, depending on e.g. the business
cycle, the unemployment rate and so on. On the other hand, there is uncertainty
about the level of structural demand for the new service. Due to marketing research
the ¯rm gains more insight about structural demand, which decreases uncertainty.
Since a marketing survey consists of a sample and not the entire population, the
signals that it provides on the pro¯tability of the investment are imperfect. Finally,
the presence of competitors has an in°uence on the timing of technology adoption.
If a ¯rm postpones investment longer than its competitors it may loose the battle
for customers, have less experience, no bene¯ts from patents and so on. On the
other hand, it has the time to gain more information and adopt when it is very well
prepared, maybe even with a superior technology. In short, a ¯rm has to take into
account the option value of waiting, the costs of waiting due to discounting and
strategic e®ects in determining its optimal time for investment.1: Introduction 7
The real options literature considers the investment problem of a monopolistic
¯rm that faces only intrinsic uncertainty. In this literature investment is seen as
closely linked to an American call option (cf. Merton (1990)). The basic continuous
time real options model is developed in McDonald and Siegel (1986). It assumes that
the pro¯t stream generated by the investment project follows a geometric Brownian
motion and the optimal time for investment is determined by solving an optimal
stopping problem. The main conclusion is that the investment threshold (the value
that needs to be attained for investment to be optimal) is signi¯cantly higher than
when one applies the net present value rule. Applications of the real options ap-
proach can be found in, e.g., Trigeorgis (1996) and Pennings (1998).
The basic model for the strategic timing of investment is given in Fudenberg and
Tirole (1985). It is a deterministic model in continuous time of a duopoly with a
¯rst mover advantage of investment. It is shown that in equilibrium both ¯rms will
try to preempt each other to the point where equilibrium rents are equalised. This
implies that, in expectation, ¯rms get the same value as if they are the second ¯rm
to invest. Recent contributions to this literature have been made by e.g. Stenbacka
and Tombak (1994) who introduce experience e®ects and Hoppe (2000) who analy-
ses the e®ect of second mover advantages on the strategic timing of investment. The
literature combining both the real options and the strategic investment literature
started with the paper by Smets (1991). Recent contribution to the game theoretic
real options literature can be found in, e.g., Nielsen (2002) who shows that competi-
tion does not lead to more delay in investment than monopoly, or Weeds (2002) who
shows that investment is delayed more when ¯rms act non-cooperatively, because of
the fear for preemption. Huisman (2001) extends the standard model to asymmetric
¯rms and analyses the case where there are two consecutive investment projects, the
latter having lower sunk costs than the former, but the point in time at which the
superior technology becomes available is uncertain. For an overview of the literature
on game theoretic real option models see e.g. Grenadier (2000).
The literature on the timing of investment under uncertainty that reduces due to
information streams can be dated back to Wald (1947). He considers the, in essence,
statistical problem of how many (costly) data to collect before taking a decision on
a project with uncertain payo® based on this information. A well-known example is
the introduction of a new drug. The question is how many experiments to conduct
before deciding upon introduction of the drug. Wald proposes to use a Bayesian
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optimal number of observations. For an exposition on this problem see e.g. Berger
(1985). Wald's problem has proven to be notoriously hard to solve.
In Jensen (1982) a model is considered where signals are costless and the project
can either be pro¯table or not. He shows that there exists an optimal threshold
concerning the belief in a pro¯table project, but no analytical solution is provided.
Recently, the paper by D¶ ecamps and Mariotti (2000) solves Wald's problem by
making some simplifying assumptions on the structure of the uncertainty. The
literature on the strategic e®ects of this kind of uncertainty is limited. The most
notable contribution is made by Mamer and McCardle (1987). In that paper, the
impact on the timing of innovation of costs, speed and quality of information arriving
over time is studied for a one-¯rm model as well as for a duopoly. However, due
to an elaborate information structure, Mamer and McCardle (1987) did not obtain
explicit results.
The contribution of Part I is twofold. On the one hand it analyses the problem of
strategic investment under uncertainty with imperfect information streams. As such
it complements papers like Jensen (1982) and Mamer and McCardle (1987). On the
other hand it gives a formal game theoretic underpinning for game theoretic real
option models in general. In Chapter 3, which is based on Thijssen et al. (2001),
a monopolistic ¯rm is considered that has the opportunity to invest in a project
with uncertain pro¯tability. It is assumed that the project can lead to either high
pro¯ts or to low pro¯ts. Randomly over time imperfect signals arrive that give an
indication on the pro¯tability of the investment project. After each arrival of a
signal the ¯rm adjusts its belief on the pro¯tability in a Bayesian way. An analytic
expression for the threshold belief at which investment becomes optimal is attained.
Furthermore, some measures to assess the probability of making a wrong investment
decision by applying this threshold are given and a comparative statics analysis is
conducted. It is shown that the threshold need not be monotonic in the quality and
quantity of the signals.
Chapter 4 introduces the game theoretic tools that are needed to analyse game
theoretic real option models. It is partly based on Thijssen et al. (2002). It is shown
that for preemption games like the one studied in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) the
stochastic counterpart leads to a similar kind of equilibrium. This equilibrium needs
not to be unique, however. Furthermore, it is shown by using simulations that the
standard game theoretic real options model as presented in Smets (1991) leads to
signi¯cantly di®erent predictions than the one-¯rm real options model and the de-1: Introduction 9
terministic timing game model. The welfare implications of strategic considerations
and uncertainty are also assessed. In the standard model there are situations where
both the preemption equilibrium and a joint investment (collusion) equilibrium are
optimal (see Huisman (2001, Chapter 7)). It is well-known that the collusion equilib-
rium is Pareto dominant. Here it is shown that it is also risk dominant (cf. Harsanyi
and Selten (1988)). This is additional theoretical evidence that collusion is likely to
arise in some industries.
In Chapter 5 a duopoly version of the model presented in Chapter 3 is analysed
using the methods developed in Chapter 4. That is, two competing ¯rms are con-
sidered which have the opportunity to invest in a project that can lead to either a
high or a low pro¯t stream. Both ¯rms have the same prior belief in the project
yielding a high pro¯t stream. At random points in time signals arrive that indicate
the pro¯tability of the project. Both ¯rms can observe these signals without costs.
It is assumed that there is a ¯rst mover advantage in the sense that the ¯rm that
invests ¯rst has a (temporary) Stackelberg advantage. Furthermore, it is assumed
that after a ¯rm has invested the true state of the project immediately becomes
common knowledge. Hence, there is an information spillover from the ¯rm that
invests ¯rst to its competitor, yielding a second mover advantage. It is shown that
if the ¯rst mover advantage dominates competition leads to a preemptive equilib-
rium where rents are equalised. If the second mover advantage dominates a war
of attrition occurs. If no investment takes place during the war of attrition (which
happens with positive probability), a preemption equilibrium might arise. So, both
types of interaction { preemption and war of attrition { can occur intermittently.
Welfare e®ects are ambiguous in the preemption case. It can be higher in duopoly,
but there are also cases in which monopoly leads to higher welfare. This chapter is
based on Thijssen (2002b).
Although a step is made in Part I towards a dynamic analysis of capitalist
economies, in order to build a theory that is really in line with Schumpeter (1942)
one should consider models that take both the intrinsic and the vanishing parts
of uncertainty into account. Furthermore, the main shortcoming of the present
literature is that it considers only one or at most two investment projects at a time.
In order to build a truly dynamic model of capitalist economic interaction, one needs
to consider a recurrent pattern of investment opportunities as well as an integration
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Economic growth and development are mainly supply driven in the sense of
Say's observation that all supply leads to its own demand. Firms constantly seek
new worlds to explore in the hope that consumers want to buy their products, giving
them a competitive edge and higher rents. An important observation in capitalist
reality is that ¯rms try to control their environment. That is exactly the reason why
¯rms do not accept the role of one price-taking ¯rm among many equals. Therefore,
it tries to innovate. This can also be accomplished by acquisitions and mergers for
example, which can be seen as investments with an uncertain future pro¯t stream.
This implies that perfect competition is inherently incompatible with a capitalist
society.
1.3 Introduction to Part II
The concept of Nash equilibrium has ¯rmly established itself as one of the most
important work-horse tools in non-cooperative game theory. However, multiplicity
of Nash equilibria poses a considerable conceptual problem, because it is not a priori
clear how players should coordinate on a certain Nash equilibrium. In the literature
it has been argued (cf. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)) that the equilibrium selection
problem is outside the scope of non-cooperative game theory. Another strand of
literature has devoted itself to the introduction of ever more re¯nements of the
Nash equilibrium concept to bring down the number of equilibria (see Van Damme
(1991) for an excellent overview). The main problem with most re¯nements is that
they assume an extreme level of rationality on the side of the players. In his foreword
to Weibull (1995), Ken Binmore remarks that the number of re¯nements has become
so large that almost any Nash equilibrium can be supported as some re¯nement or
another.
A more explicit dynamic and behavioural approach to equilibrium selection seems
needed. In biology game theory has been used to model the evolution of species. This
literature started with the paper by Maynard Smith and Price (1973). In Maynard
Smith (1974, 1982) a population is considered in which members are randomly
matched to play a bimatrix game. A mixed strategy is interpreted as the share
of the population playing a certain (pure) strategy. Basically, it is assumed that
players are programmed to play a strategy. To analyse this model one can use the
concept of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) as introduced by Taylor and Jonker
(1978). In short, a strategy is an ESS if it is stable against small perturbations. The1: Introduction 11
biological story behind it is as follows. Suppose that the entire population plays an
ESS. If the population is invaded by a small group of mutants that plays a di®erent
strategy, then the player with the ESS gets a higher payo® if this player is matched
with a mutant player. One can show that the set of ESS is a, possibly empty, subset
of the set of pure Nash equilibria.
The question how evolution selects an ESS cannot be answered by using the ESS
concept as such since it is essentially a static concept. Evolutionary selection is the
dynamics of the fractions of players playing a certain strategy within a population.
Usually, evolutionary selection is based on the payo®s that players obtain from
repeated play of the game. In a biological setting payo®s can be seen as an indication
of ¯tness. The higher the payo® to playing a certain strategy relative to the average
payo® in the population, the higher the growth rate of the fraction of the population
that is programmed with this strategy. If one models this process in continuous time
the so-called replicator dynamics is obtained (cf. Taylor and Jonker (1978)). It has
been shown that every evolutionary stable strategy is asymptotically stable for the
replicator dynamics.
In economics, the replicator dynamics has been widely applied. Excellent overviews
can be found in e.g. Van Damme (1994), Weibull (1995) and Samuelson (1997).
There are, however, several problems in translating results from biology readily to
economics. Firstly, natural selection by ¯tness should be replaced by a good con-
cept of learning (cf. Crawford (1989)). Secondly, in the replicator dynamics the
frequencies of all strategies that have a higher payo® than average are increasing,
even if they are not a best reply. In general, models of learning assume that only
best-reply actions are played. It has been shown by e.g. Matsui (1992) and Samuel-
son and Zhang (1992) that also under weak monotonicity of the replicator dynamics
most results are preserved. Furthermore, several researchers addressed the question
whether it is possible to ¯nd a learning or imitation process that leads to the repli-
cator dynamics. See for example BjÄ ornstedt and Weibull (1996), Gale et al. (1995)
and Schlag (1998).
The development of explicit learning models has led to a stream of research that
uses the concept of stochastic stability, which is introduced in Foster and Young
(1990). Kandori et al. (1993) consider a model that is close to a discrete time
version of the replicator dynamics. This dynamics is perturbed by stochastic noise,
i.e. with a small but strictly positive probability a player chooses a strategy at
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a dynamic process that can be shown to be an ergodic Markov chain which has a
unique invariant (limit) probability measure. The stochastically stable states are
the strategies that are in the support of the invariant probability measure when the
probability of a mutation converges to zero. It is shown in Kandori et al. (1993)
that for 2 £ 2 symmetric games with two symmetric pure Nash equilibria the risk-
dominant equilibrium is selected (cf. Harsanyi and Selten (1988)). Young (1993)
obtains a similar result for 2 £ 2 symmetric games where players choose optimal
strategies based on a sample of information about what other players have done in
the past. For an overview of the literature on stochastic stability see Vega-Redondo
(1996) or Young (1998).
As Mailath (1992) already noticed, most evolutionary selection mechanisms as-
sume players to be quite stupid. They are assumed to stick to their behaviour even
if it is not pro¯table. One of the purposes of this part of the thesis is to construct
models that allow players to change their behaviour if they experience that it per-
forms poorly relative to the behaviour of other players. As such it has links with
the literature on indirect evolution (cf. GÄ uth and Yaari (1992)), or with papers
like Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) where evolution works directly on preferences.
Another strand of literature where agents can switch between di®erent behavioural
modes uses non-linear switching rules that are based on the results of the respective
behavioural rules. When applied to economic markets this can lead to chaotic price
patterns, as has been shown in, for example, Brock and Hommes (1997) and Droste
and Tuinstra (1998).
In a stochastic stability setting the presence of multiple behavioural rules has
been analysed by e.g. Kaarboe and Tieman (1999) and Schipper (2001). In these
papers, however, behavioural change is exogenous. In this part of the thesis some
models are presented that make the choice between di®erent kinds of behaviour en-
dogenous. The models are applied to an oligopolistic market. The seminal paper
by Vega-Redondo (1997) shows that pro¯t imitation, as has already been advocated
by Alchian (1950), leads to the Walrasian equilibrium6 being the unique stochas-
tically stable state. This is in contrast with the standard analysis that predicts
the Cournot-Nash outcome7. However, some experiments as reported in O®erman
6The Walrasian equilibrium arises when all ¯rms behave as competitive price takers. Firms
produce a quantity such that the price equals their marginal costs. In the absence of ¯xed costs
this implies that all ¯rms have zero pro¯ts.
7In the Cournot-Nash outcome each ¯rm produces the quantity that maximises its pro¯t given
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et al. (2002) suggest that not only the Walrasian equilibrium, but also the cartel
(collusion) equilibrium8 arises during a signi¯cant amount of time.
There is a vast literature on the sustainability of collusion in oligopolistic mar-
kets. One approach is for example to assume incomplete information in a static
setting. If one allows for side payments and information sharing it has been shown
that collusion can be a Bayesian equilibrium, see Roberts (1983, 1985). Kihlstrom
and Vives (1989, 1992) show that an e±cient cartel (i.e. a cartel where the ¯rms
with the lowest costs produce) is possible in a duopoly. An e±cient cartel can also
be sustained as an equilibrium when there is a continuum of ¯rms and costs can be
of only two types. Crampton and Palfrey (1990) show that collusion is still possi-
ble without side payments but with a continuum of cost types, provided that the
number of ¯rms is not too large.
In a dynamic repeated game context cooperative behaviour can be sustained
under a wide variety of assumptions by means of trigger strategies. The sustainabil-
ity of cartels in repeated games, however, is often the result of Folk Theorem-like
results. This reduces the applicability of these results since under a Folk Theorem
almost any outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium by choosing appropriate
strategies. First consider a ¯nite horizon. In general, only the Cournot-Nash equi-
librium is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) in the repeated Cournot game. If
one allows for "-optimising behaviour (cf. Radner (1980)) by agents, one may obtain
a folk theorem saying that there is a trigger strategy that sustains cooperation as
an "-SPE. A second approach is that one models the market in such a way that
there are multiple single-stage equilibria. This approach has been followed by e.g.
Friedman (1985) and Frayss¶ e and Moreau (1985). Benoit and Krishna (1985) show
that if there are two equilibria that can be Pareto ranked a folk theorem holds:
if the (¯nite) time horizon is long enough and ¯rms are patient enough then al-
most any outcome can be sustained as an SPE. In particular, the trigger strategy
where ¯rms play the Pareto superior strategy (i.e. the cartel quantity) as long as
the competitors do the same and otherwise switch to the Pareto inferior quantity,
is an SPE supporting the cartel outcome. A third approach is assuming a market
with a unique one-shot equilibrium, but allowing for a small amount of incomplete
information or "craziness". Here too, a folk theorem applies: any outcome can be
supported as a subgame perfect Bayesian equilibrium given that ¯rms are patient
8In the collusion equilibrium each ¯rm produces the quantity that maximises total industry
pro¯ts. That is, it is the equilibrium that arises if all ¯rms behave cooperatively.14 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
enough (Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)). Also with an in¯nite horizon a Folk Theo-
rem can be obtained stating that any outcome can be sustained if ¯rms are patient
enough (Friedman (1971)). In an in¯nite horizon setting, asymmetries make collu-
sion more di±cult as has been shown by Sherer and Ross (1990, Chapter 8). Finally,
the possibility of communication, possibly cheap talk, makes collusion possible (cf.
Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998)).
In Chapter 6, which is based on Thijssen (2001), a model is developed where
¯rms can choose between two types of behaviour. A ¯rm can either imitate the
quantity of the ¯rm that made the highest pro¯t in the previous period or it can
imitate the quantity of the ¯rm that would generate the highest industry pro¯t if
all ¯rms were to set this quantity. The former kind of behaviour is called pro¯t
imitation and the latter kind exemplary imitation. It is clear that pro¯t imitation is
competitive behaviour while exemplary imitation constitutes cooperative behaviour.
So, at each point in time there is a group of ¯rms that behaves competitively and
a group that behaves cooperatively. It is assumed that within the market there is
a tendency to collusion since all ¯rms realise that collusion yields higher pro¯ts for
all. As long as the di®erence between the cartel pro¯t and the realised industry
pro¯t stays within a certain bound ¯rms behave cooperatively. It is shown that if
behaviour adaptation occurs su±ciently less often than quantity adaptation, then
either the Walrasian or the collusion equilibrium is the unique stochastically stable
state.
In Chapter 7 a model is considered where ¯rms are myopic pro¯t maximisers. In
setting their quantity they use a conjecture on how the competitors react to their
change in quantity. At the behavioural level, ¯rms imitate the conjecture of the ¯rm
that makes the highest pro¯t. So, as in Chapter 6, a dynamic system is obtained
with evolution on two levels: quantity and behaviour. If behaviour adaptation occurs
su±ciently less frequently than quantity adaptation the Walrasian equilibrium is the
unique stochastically stable state. A simulation, however, shows that the collusion
equilibrium can be very persistent. This chapter is based on Thijssen (2002a).
In both chapters, the technique of nearly-complete decomposability is used to
aggregate over the quantity level and to obtain results on the behavioural dynamics
therewith. This technique has been introduced in the economics literature in the
nineteen sixties, notably by Simon and Ando (1961) and Ando and Fisher (1963).
The technique was used to aggregate large input-output models so that these models
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Chapters 6 and 7 show that it is necessary to drop, or at least relax, the pro¯t
imitation rule if one wants to obtain a sustainable cartel. On the other hand, if one
does not assume an inclination to cooperative behaviour in Chapter 6, even the pres-
ence of another behavioural rule can not lead the market away from the Walrasian
equilibrium. This is mainly due to the aggregation technique that is used in these
chapters to obtain analytical results on the stochastically stable states. First, the
limit behaviour of the quantity dynamics is determined for each behavioural con¯g-
uration. These results are then used to aggregate over the quantity dynamics and
obtain results on the behavioural dynamics. This implies that in determining the
equilibrium at the behavioural level only the equilibria in quantities for any (¯xed)
behavioural pattern among the players is relevant. Since Vega-Redondo (1997) al-
ready showed that the Walrasian equilibrium yields the highest relative pro¯t, any
pro¯t-based imitation rule at the behavioural level will lead to the Walrasian equi-
librium. This should not be a reason to discard the aggregation method. It merely
points to a fundamental di±culty in this kind of models, namely the crucial depen-
dence of the results on the speci¯c behavioural assumptions. For example, it might
be the case that if learning is modelled via neural networks, as is often done in the
psychological literature strong results can be obtained.
Furthermore, as can be seen from the simulations in Chapter 7 the "long-run"
in these models can be unconvincingly long, since in the long-run we are all dead as
has already been very astutely remarked by Keynes. Especially for an oligopolistic
market with ¯xed demand and cost functions learning should take place at a rela-
tively high speed. Therefore, this kind of evolutionary analysis could be better used
to analyse large scale social phenomena on di®erent levels. It has been argued for
example in Binmore (1994, 1998) that the evolution of social norms has a short-run,
a medium-run and a long-run component. Using the aggregation technique that is
used in this part and di®erent levels of sophistication on each level one might be able
to analyse in one coherent framework the evolution of social norms. As an example,
on the lowest level agents might behave as myopic optimisers. This models their
day to day social behaviour in the short-run, which is based on their preferences
that are changed in the medium- and long-run. On the second level, the evolution
of preferences takes place, where people might imitate the behaviour of successful
people. Since they are cognitively less aware of this behaviour, modelling it as imi-
tative can be justi¯ed. Over the long-run, preferences are in°uenced on the level of
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In Chapter 8, a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets is consid-
ered. An attempt is made to use globally convergent adjustment processes to model
a boundedly rational route to equilibrium. For non-cooperative games such an ad-
justment process can be found in Van den Elzen and Talman (1991). For general
equilibrium models many price adjustment processes have been proposed. See for
an overview e.g. Van der Laan and Talman (1987) or Herings (1996). In the current
chapter an algorithm developed in Talman and Yamamoto (1989) for stationary
point problems on polytopes is used to follow a path of price adjustments that are
made by a boundedly rational market-maker that myopically maximises the value
of excess demand on the asset markets. The algorithm generated a piece-wise linear
path on a triangulation of the set of no-arbitrage asset prices. The chapter is based
on Talman and Thijssen (2002).
1.4 Introduction to Part III
Game theory has traditionally been divided in non-cooperative theory and cooper-
ative theory. Roughly one can say that non-cooperative theory is the micro branch
of game theory and cooperative theory is its macro branch, as has been remarked
by Aumann (1997). In non-cooperative theory the play of a game is described in
great detail. The strategies of all players are speci¯ed as well as the rules of the
game, the payo®s and the order of play. The purpose is to make predictions on the
outcome of the game. It is assumed that players cannot make binding agreements.
Therefore, any prediction on the outcome of a game should be internally stable.
That is, no player should have an incentive to deviate. This has been formalised by
Nash (1950b) in the so-called Nash equilibrium.
In cooperative theory one abstracts from the speci¯cs of the strategic interaction.
The emphasis lies on the possibilities of cooperation between agents. It is therefore
assumed that agents can make binding agreements. Furthermore, it is assumed that
agents use the same unit of account for payo®s so that utility is transferable. A
cooperative model assumes the payo® to a coalition as a given input. The question
is how the value that the grand coalition (all players together) can achieve should
be divided over all players. The cooperative approach has been used for example
for operations research problems (see Borm et al. (2001) for an overview).
An important part of cooperative theory is concerned with bargaining. The ¯rst
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solution concept. Rubinstein (1982) developed a non-cooperative alternating o®er
game for two players and showed that it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
It is shown in Binmore (1987) that this subgame perfect equilibrium corresponds to
the Nash solution for a certain cooperative bargaining problem. This is an impor-
tant result in the so-called "Nash program". This program aims at underpinning
cooperative solution concepts with non-cooperative games. For an overview of the
Nash program in bargaining theory see e.g. Bolt and Houba (2002).
Just like in transferable utility games, (cooperative) bargaining assumes that
the grand coalition forms. If players disagree they get the so-called "disagreement
outcome". However, an important part of cooperative behaviour and bargaining
is the question how coalitions form and, as a result, which coalitions form. The
literature on coalition formation can also be divided in a non-cooperative part and
a cooperative part. For an overview of the literature see e.g. Montero (2000).
Non-cooperative models of endogenous coalition formation can often be traced back
to Rubinstein (1982). The result is a partition of the set of players in coalitions.
The partition that forms depends crucially on the speci¯cs of the model. One of
these speci¯cs is the exact payo® division between players. For coalition formation
the most important question for a player is what he gains by joining a certain
coalition and not another one. This payo® is also in°uenced by what other players
do. In other words, the payo® of a player is in°uenced by the coalition structure
that eventually arises, i.e. there may be spillovers attached to coalition formation.
Think for example about government formation. The payo® to the parties outside
the government coalition is in°uenced by the parties in the coalition that actually
forms the government. Cooperative models of coalition formation abstract entirely
from the underlying speci¯cs of the bargaining procedure and address questions like
stability of certain partitions. However, an assessment of the stability of certain
coalitions should be partly based on an assessment of the underlying spillovers.
Since non-cooperative models are generally too speci¯c to address stability is-
sues, in Chapter 9 a class of cooperative games is introduced that explicitly includes
coalitional spillovers. Therefore, these games are called spillover games. It is shown
that spillover games can naturally arise from non-cooperative games. Hence, af-
ter having modelled a speci¯c non-cooperative game, one can transform it into a
spillover game to address certain aspects that are speci¯c to coalition formation.
For example, consider a group of countries that wants to ¯nd a solution to envi-
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which yields a non-cooperative game. All these strategic considerations in°uence
the payo®s that coalitions can achieve together as well as the opportunity costs of
not joining a coalition. The resulting spillover game can be used to predict which
coalition will form. In the case of the Kyoto treaty for example, the US ¯nd the
outside option of not joining the coalition apparently more valuable than joining the
coalition.
Some basic properties of spillover games are proved and some applications are in-
troduced, like government formation, public-private connection problems and cartel
formation. A solution concept is proposed based on sequential coalition formation
that gives a value to each player as well as a probability measure on all possible
coalitions. Chapter 9 is largely based on Thijssen et al. (2002).
1.5 Leaving the Arm-Chair
So far, the introduction to the topics which are discussed and analysed in this thesis
has been mainly theoretical in nature. It is about time to leave the comfortable
arm-chair in order to take a stroll in the "real world" to see whether the thesis can
be quali¯ed anything di®erent than as a pure l'art pour l'art exercise. There are
some clear applications of the models presented in this thesis, most of them in the
area of competition policy. Direct application of the models and results presented
in this thesis will in general not be possible, but some of it might shed a di®erent
light on various well-known topics.
Most developed industrial economies have a competition or anti-trust law that
prohibits collusion between ¯rms. The main premise is that competition is better
for total welfare than market power, which is one of the main results from general
equilibrium theory. However, a capitalist economy seems logically incompatible
with perfect competition. In a perfectly competitive market ¯rms are price-takers.
However, by obtaining and exercising market power ¯rms can increase their surplus.
So, there needs to be a legal instrument to block this tendency.9
The models in part I can be used, for example, to make a better assessment of
investment projects under uncertainty by ¯rms. As is shown in Chapter 3, the capi-
9This observation extends to society as a whole. In neo-liberal states the individual is the
focal point of society. Paradoxically, this leads to a political and economic structure where the
individual is anonymous (a "price-taker"). As a reaction, groups of people try to regain in°uence
by forming unions, pressure groups, NGO's and so on. In the Walhalla of neo-liberalism, the USA,
this tendency is vividly put into practise.1: Introduction 19
tal budgeting rule that is used here outperforms the standard net present value rule.
Chapter 5 can be used both as a normative and a positive tool. In a normative sense
it advices ¯rms how to deal with investment under uncertainty and competition. On
the other hand, it can be used in a positive way by for example competition author-
ities. The equilibrium predictions can be used to see if actual investment behaviour
in a particular market is in line with competition or whether there is a reasonable
ground for suspecting collusion. Furthermore, a welfare analysis might show that
competition is less desirable than a monopolistic market structure. In Chapter 4
it is argued that it is possible that a collusion equilibrium is more "stable" than a
preemptive (competitive) equilibrium. Recently, The Netherlands have witnessed a
major scandal on illegal collusion practices between large construction ¯rms with
public tenders. In Part I conditions are given under which collusion is more "sta-
ble" than competition. It might well be that an empirical study of the structure of
these public tenders shows that these conditions are met and that collusion in the
construction industry could have been expected beforehand.
The models in Part II are at ¯rst sight of a more theoretical nature. It is
attempted to determine long-run outcomes in oligopolistic markets depending on
di®erent behavioural rules used by ¯rms. The main contribution of Chapters 6
and 7 is that it provides a possible way to analyse long-run e®ects on di®erent
levels of (economic) interaction. Experimental and empirical research could provide
insights in how ¯rms behave in each level. The theory can then be used to make
predictions on the intrinsic likelihood of collusion in a given market.
Applications of the class of games presented in Part III are readily given. In
Chapter 9 examples like government formation, public-private connection problems
and cartel formation are analysed. A procedure is presented that leads to a predic-
tion on the coalitions that are likely to be formed. The applicability can probably
be extended to other Operations Research problems as well as problems in public
economics and social choice. Bargaining situations dealing with international envi-
ronmental agreements, free-trade agreements, etc. could also be modelled by using
spillover games.20 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONSChapter 2
Mathematical Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Concepts from Topology and Calculus
In this section we review some basic concepts from topology and calculus. Some
basic concepts are assumed knowledge. For more details the reader is referred to
e.g. JÄ anich (1984).
Let (X;T) be a topological space. A subset A ½ X is closed if its complement
is open, i.e. if Ac 2 T. The set A is compact if every open covering of A has a
¯nite subcovering. The topological space (X;T) is said to be connected if there do
not exist two disjoint, non-empty, open sets whose union is X. A subset A ½ X is
connected if the induced topological space is connected. The closure of a set A ½ X,
cl(A), is the smallest closed set containing A. The set A is dense in X if cl(A) = X.
Let (X;T) and (Y;U) be topological spaces. A function f : X ! Y is continuous
if for all U 2 U it holds that f¡1(U) 2 T, i.e. if the inverse of an open set is open.
A correspondence ' : X ! Y is upper semi-continuous (USC) if for all U 2 U it
holds that fx 2 Xj'(x) ½ Ug 2 T. The correspondence is lower semi-continuous
(LSC) if for all U 2 U it holds that fx 2 Xj'(x)\U 6= ;g 2 T. The correspondence
is continuous if it is both USC and LSC.
Theorem 2.1 (Berge's maximum theorem) Let (X;T) and (Y;U) be topolog-
ical spaces. Let ' : X ! Y be a compact-valued, continuous correspondence. Let
f : X £ Y ! I R be a continuous function. Then
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is continuous;





Let (X;d) be a metric space. The open ball around x 2 X with radius r > 0,
B(x;r), is de¯ned by
B(x;r) = fy 2 Xjd(x;y) < rg:
A set A ½ X is bounded if there is an open ball containing A, i.e. if there exist an
x 2 X and r > 0 such that A ½ B(x;r).
Let I R
n denote the n-dimensional Euclidian space for n 2 I N. The non-negative
orthant of I R
n is de¯ned by I R
n
+ = fx 2 I R
nj8i=1;:::;n : xi ¸ 0g and the positive
orthant is denoted by I R
n
++ = fx 2 I R
nj8i=1;:::;n : xi > 0g. The inner product of two
n-dimensional vectors x and y is denoted by xy. The Euclidian norm of x 2 I R
n is
denoted by kxk. A set X 2 I R
n is convex if for all x;y 2 X and all ¸ 2 (0;1) it
holds that ¸x + (1 ¡ ¸)y 2 X. A subset of I R
n is compact if and only if it is closed
and bounded.
A sequence (xk)k2I N in X converges to x 2 X if for all " > 0 there exists a k0 2 I N
such that for all k ¸ k0 it holds that d(xk;x) < ". In I R
n any bounded sequence has
a convergent subsequence.
A set A ½ X is closed in the topology induced by the metric d if the limit of all
convergent sequences in A are in A. A boundary point of A is a point a 2 A such
that for all r > 0 it holds that B(a;r) \ A 6= ; and B(a;r) \ Ac 6= ;. The boundary
of A, @A, is the set of all boundary points of A.
Let X be a connected subset of I R
n that is endowed with the standard topology,
i.e. the topology induced by the Euclidian norm. Let f : X ! I R be a function. The
point d 2 I R is the limit of f when x converges to c 2 X, denoted by lim
x!cf(x) = d, if
8">09±>08x2X : kx ¡ ck < ± ) jf(x) ¡ dj < ":
The function f is continuous in c 2 X if it holds that lim
x!cf(x) = f(c). The function
f is continuous if it is continuous in all c 2 X.
Let X ½ I R and let f : X ! I R be a function. The point d 2 I R is called the left
limit of f when x converges to c 2 X, denoted by lim
x"c
f(x) = d if
8">09±>08x<c : jx ¡ cj < ± ) jf(x) ¡ dj < ":2: Mathematical Preliminaries 23
For simplicity, we denote d = f(c¡). Similarly, the point d 2 I R is called the right
limit of f when x converges to c 2 X, denoted by lim
x#c
f(x) = d if
8">09±>08x>c : jx ¡ cj < ± ) jf(x) ¡ dj < ":
For simplicity we denote d = f(c+). The function f is left-continuous in c 2 X if it
holds that f(c¡) = f(c) and it is right-continuous in c 2 X if f(c+) = f(c) for all















provided that the limit exists. If the (right-) derivative exists for all c 2 X we say
that f is (right-) di®erentiable. In the same way the left-derivative of f in c 2 X,
f0(c¡), can be de¯ned. For a function f : X ! I R with X ½ I R
n the partial











For a function f : X ! I R
m continuity and di®erentiability are de¯ned component-
wise.
Let X and Y be subsets of I R
n. A stationary point of a function f : X ! Y is
a point x¤ 2 X such that for all x 2 X it holds that xf(x¤) · x¤f(x¤). Existence
of a stationary point is established in the following theorem, which is due to Eaves
(1971).
Theorem 2.2 (Stationary Point Theorem) Let X ½ I R
n and let f : X ! I R
n
be a continuous function. If C is a compact and convex subset of X, then f has a
stationary point on C.
A ¯xed point of a function f : X ! Y is a point x 2 X such that x = f(x). Existence
of a ¯xed point of a continuous function f : C ! C, where C is a non-empty, convex
and compact subset of I R is established by Brouwer (1912).
Let X ½ I R
n and Y ½ I R
m and let f : X ! Y and g : X ! Y be functions.
A homotopy is a function h : X £ [0;1] ! Y such that for all x 2 X it holds that
h(x;0) = f(x) and h(x;1) = g(x). The following result is due to Browder (1960).24 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
Theorem 2.3 (Browder's ¯xed point theorem) Let S be a non-empty, com-
pact and convex subset of I R
n and let f : S £ [0;1] ! S be a function. Then the
set Ff = f(x;¸) 2 S £ [0;1]jx = f(x;¸)g contains a connected set F c
f such that
(S £ f0g) \ F c
f 6= ; and (S £ f1g) \ F c
f 6= ;.
2.2 Basic Concepts from Probability Theory
In this section we review some basic concepts from probability theory. Some basic
measure and integration theory is assumed knowledge. Readers that are interested
in a more detailed account are referred to e.g. Williams (1991) or Billingsley (1995).
Let (­;F;P) be a probability space, where ­ is the sample space, F is a ¾-
algebra of events on ­ and P is a probability measure on (­;F). A probability
space is called complete if for all subsets A of a null-set F 2 F it holds that A 2 F.
A statement about outcomes is a function S : ­ ! f0;1g. A statement is said to
be true for ! 2 ­ is S(!) = 1. A statement S about outcomes is true almost surely
(a.s.) if
F := f! 2 ­jS(!) = 1g 2 F and P(F) = 1:
Let B denote the Borel ¾-algebra on I R. A random variable on (­;F;P) is a
function X : ­ ! I R such that for all Borel sets B 2 B it holds that X¡1(B) 2
F. If there can be no confusion about the underlying probability space we will
simply speak about "the random variable X". The ¾-algebra generated by a random
variable X is the ¾-algebra that is generated by the set f! 2 ­jX(!) 2 B;B 2
Bg. A sequence of random variables is independent if the generated ¾-algebras are
independent.
Let X be a random variable. The law of X, LX, is de¯ned by P ±X¡1. One can
show that LX is the unique extension to B of the probability measure FX : I R ! [0;1]
de¯ned on f(¡1;x]jx 2 I Rg by1
FX(x) = LX((¡1;x]) = P(f! 2 ­jX(!) · xg); x 2 I R:
The measure FX(¢) is called the cumulative distribution function (cdf).
Let ¹ and º be two measures on a measurable space (S;A) and let f : S !
[¡1;1] be a A-measurable function. The measure º has a density f with respect
1This stems from the fact that B is the ¾-algebra generated by f(¡1;x]jx 2 I Rg, which implies
that FX can be uniquely extended to the Borel ¾-algebra.2: Mathematical Preliminaries 25





where 1 1A denotes the identity map on A. The measure º is absolutely continuous
with respect to ¹ if the null-sets of ¹ and º coincide. According to the Radon-
Nikodym theorem it follows that if P is absolutely continuous with respect to the






where ¸ denotes the Lebesgue measure. The function f(¢) is called the probability
density function (pdf). The density f(¢) has an atom or positive probability mass
at x 2 I R if f(x) ¡ f(x¡) > 0. Let f and g be two density functions. The density





Let F be the distribution function on [0;1) of a random variable X. The Laplace






Some well-known distribution functions are given below.
1. A random variable X on f0;1;2;:::g is Poisson distributed with parameter





2. A random variable X on (0;1) is exponentially distributed with parameter






3. A random variable X on [a;b], a < b, is uniformly distributed, denoted by
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4. A random variable X on I R is normally distributed with parameters ¹ and ¾,










5. A random variable X on (0;1) is chi-squared distributed with º degrees of
freedom, denoted by X » Â2










0 tx¡1e¡tdt denotes the Gamma function.
Let Z1;:::;Zn be a sequence of independent and identically distributed (iid) random

















The variance of X, V ar(X), is de¯ned as
V ar(X) =
Z
(x ¡ I E(X))
2dF(x):
Let X and Z be random variables and let the ¾-algebra generated by Z be denoted
by ¾(Z). According to Kolmogorov's theorem there exists a random variable Y that







The random variable Y is called a conditional expectation, I E(XjZ), of X given Z.
If Y1 and Y2 are both conditional expectations of X given Z it holds that Y1 = Y2
a.s.
Let (Xn)n2I N be a sequence of independent and identically distributed (iid) ran-
dom variables with distribution functions (Fn)n2I N. The sequence converges in prob-
ability to a random variable X with distribution F, denoted by Xn
p
! X if for all
" > 0 it holds that
lim
n!1P(jXn ¡ Xj > ") = 0:2: Mathematical Preliminaries 27
The sequence converges in distribution to X, denoted by Xn
d ! X if for every set A
with F(@A) = 0 it holds that Fn(A) converges to F(A). The sample mean of a ¯nite
sequence (X1;:::;Xn), ¹ X, is de¯ned by ¹ X = 1
n
Pn
i=1 Xi and the sample variance,
^ ¾2




i=1(Xi ¡ ¹ X)2.
Theorem 2.4 (Central limit theorem) If (Xn)º2I N is a sequence of iid random
variables with mean ¹ and variance ¾2, then it holds that
p
n( ¹ X ¡ ¹)
d ! N(0;¾
2):
Suppose that ¾2 is not known, but that we have an estimator ^ ¾2 such that ^ ¾2 p
! ¾2.
Then it follows that p




In this section we brie°y review some basic facts concerning Markov chains. For a
thorough treatment the reader is referred to e.g. Billingsley (1995) or Tijms (1994).
In the two subsections that follow we introduce two topics that are extensively used
in Part II of the thesis, namely stochastic stability and nearly-complete decompos-
ability.
Let S be a ¯nite set. Suppose that to each pair (i;j) 2 S £ S a nonnegative




Let X0;X1;X2;::: be a sequence of random variables on a probability space (­;F;P)
whose ranges are contained in S. The sequence is a Markov chain if for all n ¸ 1
and for all sequences i0;:::;in for which P(X0 = i0;:::;Xn = in) > 0 it holds that
P(Xn+1 = jjX0 = i0;:::;Xn = in)
= P(Xn+1 = jjXn = in) = pinj:
The pij's are called transition probabilities. The initial probabilities are for all i 2 S,
®i = P(X0 = i).
A stochastic matrix is a non-negative matrix whose row totals equal unity. The
following theorem shows that a Markov chain can be constructed for any stochastic
matrix combined with a vector of initial probabilities.28 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
Theorem 2.5 Suppose that P = [pij] is an S £ S stochastic matrix and that for
all i 2 S, ®i is a non-negative number such that
P
i2S ®i = 1. Then on some
probability space (­;F;P) there is a Markov chain with initial probabilities (®i)i2S
and transition probabilities pij, i;j 2 S.
Let ¢S denote the set of probability measures on S. A probability measure
¹ 2 ¢(S) is called an invariant probability measure if ¹ satis¯es ¹ = ¹P. That is,
if a Markov chain is in state ¹ at time t 2 I N, then it is in state ¹ at time t + 1 as
well a.s. An invariant probability measure is often called a limit distribution since
it describes the long-run behaviour of a Markov chain.
A matrix A is irreducible if there exists a t 2 I N such that I+A+A2+¢¢¢+At > 0,
where I is the identity matrix. A Markov chain is ergodic if the transition matrix P
is irreducible. That is, a Markov chain is ergodic if with positive probability there
exists a path from each state to any other state, such that the connection takes place
in ¯nite time. An important theorem is the so-called ergodicity theorem.
Theorem 2.6 Let (Xt)t2I N be a ¯nite state ergodic Markov chain. Then there exists
a unique invariant probability measure.
The importance of the ergodicity theorem lies in the fact that if a Markov chain is
ergodic, then irrespective of the starting point, the chain converges to the unique
invariant probability measure.
A set of states A ½ S is called a recurrent class if the transition matrix [paa0]a;a02A
is irreducible and if for all a 2 A and for all s 2 SnA it holds that pa;s = 0.
2.3.1 Stochastic Stability
The notion of stochastic stability was ¯rst introduced in Foster and Young (1990).
A stochasticly stable strategy is a strategy that is robust against small random
perturbations. We will formalise this notion, drawing heavily on Young (1998) and
Freidlin and Wentzell (1984). In the remainder, let ­ be a ¯nite set and let T0 be a
{ possibly non-ergodic { transition matrix on ­.
De¯nition 2.1 Let T0 be the transition matrix of a Markov chain and let "¤ > 0.
A set of Markov chains with transition matrices T", 0 < " · "¤, is a family of
regular perturbed Markov chains of the Markov chain with transition matrix T0 if
the following conditions hold:
1. T" is irreducible for all 0 < " · "¤;2: Mathematical Preliminaries 29
2. for all !;!0 2 ­ it holds that lim
"!0T"(!;!0) = T0(!;!0);
3. if T"(!;!0) > 0 for some " > 0, then lim
"!0
T"(!;!0)
"r(!;!0) 2 (0;1) for some r(!;!0) ¸ 0.
Note that r(!;!0) is uniquely de¯ned, since there cannot be two distinct expo-
nents that satisfy the last condition in De¯nition 2.1. Furthermore, it holds that
r(!;!0) = 0 if T0(!;!0) > 0. So, transitions that are possible under T0 have
r(!;!0) = 0. The transitions with a non-zero value for r(¢) are those that depend
crucially on the perturbation part of the chain. Note that the last two conditions
of De¯nition 2.1 require that T"(!;!0) converges to T0(!;!0) at an exponential rate.
Furthermore, each perturbed chain has a unique invariant probability measure due
to the irreducibility of T".
The results in this section rely heavily on the concept of trees.
De¯nition 2.2 Given ! 2 ­, an !-tree H! is a collection of ordered pairs in ­£­
such that:
1. every !0 2 ­nf!g is the ¯rst element of exactly one pair;
2. for all !0 2 ­nf!g there exists a path (!0;!1);(!1;!2);:::;(!s¡1;!s);
(!s;!) in H!.
The set of all !-trees is denoted by H!, ! 2 ­.









which is called the "-resistance of state ! 2 ­. Using Freidlin and Wentzell (1984,
Lemma 6.3.1, p. 177) we obtain that for all 0 < " · "¤ the unique invariant distri-






Since r"(!) is a polynomial in ", the limit distribution ¹ := lim
"#0
¹" is well-de¯ned.
Note that the states in the support of ¹(¢) are precisely those states that have the
lowest rate of convergence to zero if " # 0, i.e. they have the lowest resistance. The
stochastically stable states are de¯ned to be the states in the support of ¹(¢).30 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
De¯ne d(!;!0) to be the number of coordinates which di®er between ! and !0,
i.e. d(!;!0) = jfij!i 6= !0








If T0(!;!0) = 0 one needs the random perturbations to reach !0 from !. Since the
concept of stochastic stability originates from the biological literature, any transition
due to a random perturbation is called a mutation. It describes the change of
strategy of an animal or a species that cannot be explained by the model. The
function c(¢) gives the minimum number of entries of ! that need to be changed
by random perturbations to get to !0. Hence, it gives the minimum number of
mutations. Therefore, c(!;!0) is also called the cost of the transition form ! to !0.
De¯ne for each !-tree H!, the function c(H!) =
P
(!0;!00)2H! c(!0;!00) and the
function S(!) = min
H2H!
c(H). The latter is called the stochastic potential and it gives







Hence, the stochastically stable states are those states whose minimum cost trees






So, the stochastically stable states are the states with minimal stochastic potential.
To simplify the task of ¯nding the stochastically stable states, Young (1993) shows
that one only needs to ¯nd the classes that have minimum stochastic potential
among the recurrent classes of the mutation free dynamics, i.e. of T0. The intuition
behind this result is that for any state outside a recurrent class of T0 there is a path
of zero resistance to one of the recurrent classes. Therefore, the states that are not
in a recurrent class do not add to the stochastic potential.
Summarising, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 2.7 (Young (1993)) Let (T")0<"·"¤ be a family of regular perturbed Markov
chains of T0, and let ¹" be the unique invariant probability measure of T" for each
" 2 (0;"¤]. Then ¹ = lim
"!0¹" exists and ¹ is an invariant probability measure of T0.
The stochastically stable states are those states that are contained in the recurrent
classes of T0 having minimum stochastic potential.2: Mathematical Preliminaries 31
2.3.2 Nearly-Complete Decomposability
This subsection is based on Courtois (1977). Intuitively, a nearly-complete decom-
posable system is a Markov chain where the matrix of transition probabilities can
be divided into blocks such that the interaction between blocks is small relative to
interaction within blocks. In the remainder let Q be an n£n irreducible stochastic
matrix. The dynamic process (yt)t2I N, where yt 2 I R




Note that Q can be written as follows:
Q = Q
¤ + "C; (2.3)



















I, I = 1;:::;N, are irreducible stochastic matrices of order n(I).
Hence n =
PN
I=1 n(I). Therefore the sums of the rows of C are zero. We choose "






















where the kI denotes the k-th element in the I-th block. The parameter " is called
the maximum degree of coupling between subsystems Q¤
I.
It is assumed that all elementary divisors2 of Q and Q¤ are linear. Then the














¸(kI) is the kI-th maximal eigenvalue in absolute value of Q, v(kI) is the corre-
sponding eigenvector normalised to one using the vector norm k¢k1, and s(kI) is the
condition number s(kI) = v(kI)>v(kI). Since Q is a stochastic matrix, the Perron-
Frobenius theorem gives that the maximal eigenvalue of Q equals 1. Therefore, (2.4)
can be rewritten as
Q











If one de¯nes for each matrix Q¤
I in a similar way Z¤(kI), s¤(kI), ¸¤(kI), and v¤(kI),
e.g. ¸¤(kI) is the k-th maximal eigenvalue in absolute value of Q¤
I, then one can ¯nd
















using the fact that v¤
kI(1I) = n(I)¡1 for all kI. The behaviour through time of yt
and y¤











are therefore also speci¯ed by (2.5) and (2.6). The behaviour of yt can be seen
as long-run behaviour whereas y¤
t describes short-run behaviour. The comparison
between both processes follows from two theorems as proven by Simon and Ando
(1961).
Theorem 2.8 For an arbitrary positive real number », there exists a number "»
such that for " < "»,
max
p;q jZpq(kI) ¡ Z
¤
pq(kI)j < »;
for any 2 · k · n(I), 1 · I · N, where 1 · p;q · n.
Theorem 2.9 For an arbitrary positive real number !, there exists a number "!





lJ(1J)®IJ(1K)j < !;2: Mathematical Preliminaries 33










It can be shown that for all I = 1;:::;N, ¸(1I) is close to unity. Therefore
¸t(1I) will also be close to unity for small t. Hence, the ¯rst two terms on the
right-hand side of eq. (2.5) will not vary much for t < T2, for some T2 > 0. The
¯rst term of the right-hand-side of (2.6) does not change at all. Hence, for t < T2
the behaviour through time of yt and y¤
t is determined by the last terms of Qt and
(Q¤)t, respectively. Also, if " ! 0 it can be shown that ¸(kI) ! ¸¤(kI) and from
Theorem 2.8 it follows that Z(kI) ! Z¤(kI), for all k = 2;:::;n(I) and I = 1;:::;N.
This means that for " small and t < T2 the paths of yt and y¤
t are very close.
The eigenvalues ¸¤(kI) are strictly less than unity in absolute value for all k =
2;:::;n(I), and I = 1;:::;N. For any positive real number »1 we can therefore














¯ ¯ ¯ < »1 for t > T
¤
1:










¯ ¯ ¯ < »1 for t > T1:
Theorem 2.8 plus convergence of the eigenvalues with " then ensures that T1 ! T ¤
1
as " ! 0. We can always choose " such that T2 > T1. As long as " is not identical to
zero it holds that ¸(1I) is not identical to unity for I = 2;:::;N.3 Therefore, there












¯ < »3 for t > T3:
This implies that for T2 < t < T3, the last term of Qt is negligible and the path of
yt is determined by the ¯rst two components of Qt. According to Theorem 2.9 it
holds that for any I and J the elements of Z(1K),
ZkI1J(1K);:::;ZkIlJ(1K);:::;ZkIn(J)J(1K);
3If " = 0, all blocks QI are irreducible and then we would have ¸(1I) = ¸¤(1I) = 1 for all I.34 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
depend essentially on I, J and l, and are almost independent of k. So, for any I
and J they are proportional to the elements of the eigenvector of Q¤
J corresponding
to the largest eigenvalue. Since Q¤ is stochastic and irreducible, this eigenvector
corresponds to the unique invariant probability measure ¹¤
J of the Markov chain with
transition matrix Q¤
J. Thus, for T2 < t < T3 the elements of the vector yt, (ylJ)t, will
approximately have a constant ratio that is similar to that of the elements of ¹¤
J.
Finally, for t > T3 the behaviour of yt is almost completely determined by the ¯rst
term of Qt. So, yt evolves towards v(11), which corresponds to the unique invariant
probability measure ¹ of the Markov chain with transition matrix Q. Summarising,
the dynamics of yt can be described as follows.
1. Short-run dynamics: t < T1. The predominant terms in Qt and (Q¤)t are the
last ones. Hence, yt and y¤
t evolve similarly.
2. Short-run equilibrium: T1 < t < T2. The last terms of Qt and (Q¤)t have
vanished while for all I, ¸t(1I) remains close to unity. A similar equilibrium
is therefore reached within each subsystem of Q and Q¤.
3. Long-run dynamics: T2 < t < T3. The predominant term in Qt is the second
one. The whole system moves to equilibrium, while the short-run equilibria in
the subsystems are approximately maintained.
4. Long-run equilibrium: t > T3. The ¯rst term of Qt dominates. Therefore, a
global equilibrium is attained.
The above theory implies that one can estimate ¹(¢) by calculating ¹¤
I for I =
1;:::;N, and the invariant measure ~ ¹ of the process
(~ yt+1)
> = (~ yt)
>P; (2.8)
where (~ yI)t =
Pn(I)
k=1(ykI)t for all I = 1;:::;N, and some transition matrix P. For
t > T2 we saw that
(ykI)t
(~ yI)t ¼ ¹¤
I;k. Hence, the probability of a transition from group
I to group J is given by


















QkIlJ ´ pIJ:2: Mathematical Preliminaries 35
So, by taking P = [pIJ], the process in (2.8) gives a good approximation for t > T2
of the entire process (yt)t2I N. It is shown in Courtois (1977, Section 2.1) that the
error of this approximation is of order O(").
Until now we have not been concerned by how large " can be. It was stated
that for T ¤
1 < t < T2, the original system Q is in a short-run equilibrium close to
the equilibrium of the completely decomposable system Q¤. If this is to occur it
must hold that T ¤
1 < T2. Every matrix Q can be written in the form of eq. (2.3),
but not for all matrices it holds that T ¤
1 < T2. Systems that satisfy the condition
T ¤
1 < T2 are called nearly-complete decomposable systems (cf. Ando and Fisher
(1963)). Since T ¤
1 is independent of " and T2 increases with " ! 0, the condition is
satis¯ed for " su±ciently small. It is shown in Courtois (1977, Section 3.2) that a










2.4 Stochastic Processes in Continuous Time
In this section the most important concepts for stochastic processes in continuous
time are introduced. First, the general concept of a semimartingale, the notions of a
stochastic integral and a stochastic di®erential equation, and the change of variables
formula (also known as Ito's lemma) are presented. Then, some basic stochastic
processes (semimartingales) that are used in the thesis are discussed. Finally, some
notions related to dynamic programming and optimal stopping are described. This
section is based on Protter (1995), Karatzas and Shreve (1991) and Oksendal (2000).
In continuous time the time index, t, is such that t 2 [0;1).
De¯nition 2.3 A ¯ltration, (Ft)0·t·1 is a family of ¾-algebras such that Fs ½ Ft
if s · t. A ¯ltered probability space, (­;F;(Ft)0·t·1;P) is a complete probability
space augmented with a ¯ltration.
In the remainder, it will always be assumed that a ¯ltered probability space
satis¯es the usual hypotheses, i.e.
1. F0 contains all the P-null sets of F;
2. the ¯ltration (Ft)0·t·1 is right-continuous, i.e. Ft =
T
u>t Fu, all t, 0 · t <
1.36 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
In part I of this thesis an important role is played by stopping times.
De¯nition 2.4 A random variable T : ­ ! [0;1] is a stopping time if the event
f! 2 ­jT(!) · tg 2 Ft for all t 2 [0;1].
A stochastic process X on (­;F;(Ft)0·t·1;P) is a collection of random variables
(Xt)0·t·1. The process X is adapted if for all t 2 [0;1) it holds that Xt 2 Ft. The
stochastic processes X and Y are modi¯cations if Xt = Yt a.s. for all t ¸ 0. They
are indistinguishable if a.s. for all t ¸ 0 it holds that Xt = Yt. For all ! 2 ­, the
sample path is the mapping t 7! Xt(!) from [0;1) into I R. For indistinguishable
processes, the sample paths are a.s. identical. For modi¯cations this need not be
the case. This arises from the fact that [0;1) is an uncountable set. For all t ¸ 0,
let Nt be a null set. If X is a modi¯cation of Y this implies that for ! 62 Nt it
holds that Xt(!) = Yt(!). We cannot guarantee, however, that N =
S
t¸0 Nt is a
null set. If two processes are indistinguishable, there is just one null set. One can
show that if X is a modi¯cation of Y and both have right-continuous sample paths
a.s., then X and Y are indistinguishable. A stochastic process is called cadlag if its
sample paths are right-continuous with left limits.4 The following theorem plays an
important role.
Theorem 2.10 Let X be an adapted cadlag stochastic process and let A ½ I R be a
closed set. Then the function T : ­ ! [0;1], which for all ! 2 ­ is de¯ned by
T(!) = infft > 0jXt(!) 2 A or Xt¡(!) 2 Ag;
is a stopping time, where t¡ = lim
¢t"0
t + ¢t. If A is open, then
T(!) = infft > 0jXt(!) 2 Ag;
is a stopping time.
A real-valued, adapted stochastic process X = (Xt)0·t·1 is called a martingale
with respect to the ¯ltration (Ft)0·t·1 if I E(jXtj) < 1 for all 0 · t · 1 and if for
all 0 · s · t · 1 it holds that I E(XtjFs) = Xs, a.s. A martingale is said to be
closed by a random variable Y if I E(jY j) < 1 and Xt = I E(Y jFt), for all 0 · t < 1.
If X is a martingale, then there exists a unique cadlag modi¯cation. We will always
implicitly assume that we use this cadlag modi¯cation.
4The term "cadlag" is an acronym from the French "continu µ a droite, limites µ a gauche".2: Mathematical Preliminaries 37








Uniform integrability is a su±cient condition for a martingale to be closed.
Let X be a stochastic process and let T be a stopping time. The stopped process,
(XT
t )0·t<1 is de¯ned for all 0 · t < 1 by
X
T
t = Xt1 1ft<Tg + XT1 1ft¸Tg:
An adapted cadlag process X is a local martingale if there exists a sequence of
increasing stopping times T1;T2;:::, with lim
n!1Tn = 1 a.s. such that XTn1 1fTn>0g is
a uniformly integrable martingale for all n.
For ! 2 ­, the path (Xt(!))t¸0 is of ¯nite variation if for all t ¸ 0 it holds that
Xt ¡ Xt¡ < 1. X is called a ¯nite variation process (FV) if almost all paths of X
are of ¯nite variation.
Now, the concept of a semimartingale can be introduced. A process H is said to
be simple predictable if H has a representation
Ht = H01 1f0g(t) +
n X
i=1
Hi1 1(Ti;Ti+1](t); t ¸ 0;
where 0 = T1 · ¢¢¢ · Tn+1 < 1, a.s., is a ¯nite sequence of stopping times,
Hi 2 FTi, with jHij < 1 a.s., i 2 f1;2;:::;ng. The collection of simple predictable
processes is denoted by S.






! 0. Let Su denote the topological space induced by uniform con-
vergence.5 Let L
0 denote the set of ¯nite-valued random variables topologised by
convergence in probability. Let X be a stochastic process. De¯ne the linear mapping
IX : Su ! L
0 by




De¯nition 2.5 A process X is a semimartingale if for all t 2 [0;1) it holds that
Xt is cadlag, adapted and IXt : Su ! L0 is continuous.
5In this topology a set S ½ S is closed if for all uniformly convergent sequences in S it holds
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It can be shown that X is a semimartingale if and only if for all t ¸ 0 it holds that,
Xt = X0 + Nt + Bt;
where N is a local martingale and B is a ¯nite variation (FV) process.
Semimartingales turn out to be good integrators. For simple predictable pro-
cesses this is easy to be seen. Let X be a semimartingale. Then the mapping IX
can be seen as the integral of a simple predictable process H with respect to X.
The standard (deterministic) Stieltjes integral is de¯ned as a limit of sums. For FV
processes, one could extend the Stieltjes integral to a meaningful stochastic equiva-
lent. Famous processes like for example the Brownian motion, however, have paths
of in¯nite variation on compacts. The semimartingale seems to be an alternative
way to de¯ne a stochastic integral that comprises some processes of in¯nite varia-
tion on compacts. Let I D denote the space of adapted processes with cadlag paths.
The set I L denotes the set of adapted processes with caglad (left-continuous with
right-limits) paths. A sequence of processes H1;H2;::: is said to converge to a






! 0. If I D is topologised under ucp one can show that this gives
a complete metric space. Furthermore, the space S is dense in I L under the ucp
topology. For H 2 S and X a cadlag process de¯ne the linear mapping JX : S ! I D
by






If X is a semimartingale the mapping JX is continuous (under the ucp topology).
De¯nition 2.6 Let X be a semimartingale. The continuous linear mapping JX :






One of the most useful results on stochastic integration with respect to semi-
martingales is Ito's lemma. Let X be a semimartingale. The quadratic variation





The path by path continuous part is denoted by [X;X]c.2: Mathematical Preliminaries 39
Theorem 2.11 (Ito's lemma) Let X be a semimartingale and let f be a C2 real
valued function. Then f(X) is again a semimartingale and for all t > 0 it holds
that




















An operator F mapping I D
n to I D is functional Lipschitz if for any X, Y in I D
n
the following two conditions are satis¯ed:
1. for any stopping time T, XT¡ = Y T¡ implies F(X)T¡ = F(Y )T¡;
2. there exists an increasing (¯nite) process K = (Kt)t¸0 such that
jF(X)t ¡ F(Y )tj · KtkX ¡ Y k
¤





For functional Lipschitz mappings we have the following result that underlies the
theory of Chapter 4 and which can be found in Protter (1995).
Theorem 2.12 Let Z = (Z1;:::;Zd) be a vector of semimartingales, Z0 = 0 a.s.
and let J 2 I D be an adapted cadlag process. Furthermore, let for all j = 1;:::;d,
the mappings Fj : I D ! I D be functional Lipschitz. Then, for all t > 0 the equation








has a unique solution in I D. Moreover, if J is a semimartingale, then so is X.
An equation of the form (2.10) is called a stochastic di®erential equation and is often
written in di®erential form:






A process X is a strong Markov process if for any subset A, any stopping time
T with P(T < 1) = 1 and all t > 0 it holds that
P(XT+t 2 AjFt) = P(XT+t 2 AjXT):
A strong Markov process satis¯es the re°ection principle, that is it "starts afresh"
at stopping time T. If the process B is strong Markov this means that the process
(BT+t ¡ BT)t¸0 is independent of the ¾-algebra FT. This property turns out to be
useful in calculating some expected values in Chapter 4.40 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
2.4.1 Basic Stochastic Processes
In this subsection two basic stochastic processes are introduced that are used in this
thesis, namely the Poisson process and the geometric Brownian motion.
Let T0;T1;::: be a strictly increasing sequence of positive random variables with
T0 = 0, a.s. Associated with this sequence one can de¯ne the counting process,





Let T = sup
n
Tn be the explosion time of N. If T = 1, a.s., we say that N is a
counting process without explosions.
De¯nition 2.7 An adapted counting process N without explosions is a Poisson pro-
cess if
1. for all 0 · s < t < 1 it holds that Nt ¡Ns is independent of Fs (independent
increments);
2. for all 0 · s < t < 1, 0 · u < v < 1, t ¡ s = v ¡ u it holds that the
distribution of Nt ¡Ns is the same as the distribution of Nv ¡Nu (stationary
increments).
If N is a Poisson process then there exists a ¹ ¸ 0 such that for all t > 0 it holds
that Nt » P(¹t). We will therefore speak of the Poisson process with parameter ¹.
De¯nition 2.8 An adapted process B = (Bt)0·t<1 taking values in I R is a Brown-
ian motion or Wiener process if
1. for all 0 · s < t < 1 it holds that Bt ¡ Bs is independent of Fs;
2. for all 0 · s < t < 1 it holds that Bt ¡ Bs » N(0;t ¡ s).
Existence of Brownian motion is proved in e.g. Karatzas and Shreve (1991). If B
is a Brownian motion there exists a modi¯cation that has continuous sample paths
a.s. We will always assume to use this modi¯cation. Both the Poisson process and
the Brownian motion are examples of semimartingales. Furthermore, the Brownian
motion is strong Markov.2: Mathematical Preliminaries 41
Brownian motions are often used for di®usions. These are stochastic di®erential
equations of the form











where for all r, W r is a Wiener process (Brownian motion).




















where f is a C2 function. The di®usion that is used in this thesis is called the
geometric Brownian motion and is in di®erential form given by
dXt = ®Xtdt + ¾XtdWt:
2.4.2 Optimal Stopping
This subsection describes the basic concepts involved in optimal stopping problems.
For a more elaborate, heuristic introduction the interested reader can consult Dixit
(1993). For a rigorous analysis of optimal stopping problems the reader is referred
to Shiryaev (1978) or Oksendal (2000, Chapter 10).
Let Xt be a Poisson process or a di®usion. An expected value maximising decision
maker has the opportunity to execute a project (e.g. investment in a new machine
or early exercise of an American call option) in an uncertain environment. The
uncertainty is governed by X. Let ¦(X) denote the payo® that the decision maker
gets when he decides to undertake the project in state X. Before the project is
undertaken, the decision maker gets a payo® °ow governed by the function ¼ : I R !
I R. The problem is to determine the optimal time to undertake the project, i.e. to
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The value of the project at time t is denoted by V (Xt). Suppose that the decision
maker has not stopped before time t. Then the value of the project is given by the
maximum of the value of undertaking the project and the value of waiting, i.e.






This is called Bellman's principle of optimality. It can be shown that there exists
a di®erentiable solution that simultaneously satis¯es (2.12) and (2.13). Hence, we
can use (2.13) to ¯nd a solution to (2.12).
If the second argument in (2.13) is larger it is optimal to wait. This is called the
continuation region. Using a Taylor expansion and Ito's lemma, working out the
Bellman principle for the continuation region yields
V (Xt) =¼(Xt)dt + e
¡rdt
³
V (Xt) + I E(dV jXt)
´
=¼(Xt)dt + (1 ¡ rdt + o(dt))
³
V (Xt) + I E(dV jXt)
´
() rdtV (Xt) = ¼(Xt)dt + I E(dV jXt) ¡ rdtI E(dV jXt) + o(dt)






If X is a Poisson process we have
I E(dXt) = ¹dt;
I E((dXt)
2) = ¹dt ¡ 2(¹dt)
2:
For a di®usion we get
I E(dXt) = I E((dXt)
2) = dt:
Therefore, after dividing by dt, the value function in the continuation region should
satisfy
rV (Xt) = ¼(Xt) + 1
dtI E(dV jXt) + 1
dto(dt):
By taking dt # 0 we obtain the Bellman equation




If the termination payo® ¦ is increasing in Xt and if the payo® °ow is constant
one can show that there exists a unique threshold x¤ such that undertaking the
project is optimal for Xt > x¤ and waiting is optimal for Xt < x¤. Since there exists2: Mathematical Preliminaries 43
a di®erentiable solution to (2.13) it should hold that at the optimal stopping time




This is called the value matching condition. Furthermore, one can show that for







holds. These two conditions are often used to calculate the optimal threshold x¤.
2.5 Convex Analysis
This section reviews some of the main de¯nitions and results from convex analysis.
For a concise treatment the reader is referred to Rockafellar (1970).
From Section 2.1 we know that a set C ½ I R
n is convex if for all x;y 2 C and all
¸ 2 (0;1) it holds that ¸x+(1¡¸)y 2 C. That is, a set is convex if the line segment
between any two points of the set lies entirely in the set as well. The intersection of
an arbitrary number of convex sets is convex as well.
Let b 2 I R
nnf0g and ¯ 2 I R. A closed half space is a set of the form
fx 2 I R
njxb · ¯g or fx 2 I R
njxb ¸ ¯g:
If the inequalities are strict we speak of an open half space. The set fx 2 I R
njxb = ¯g
is called a hyperplane. The intersection of ¯nitely many closed half spaces is called
a polyhedron.
Let x1;:::;xm be a sequence of vectors in I R
n and let ¸1;:::;¸m be a sequence
of non-negative scalars such that
Pm
i=1 ¸i = 1. The vector sum
¸
1x
1 + ¢¢¢ + ¸
mx
m;
is called a convex combination of x1;:::;xm. The intersection of all the convex sets
containing a set S = fs1;:::;smg ½ I R
n is called the convex hull of S and is denoted
by conv(S). It can be shown that
conv(S) = fx 2 I R






A set that is the convex hull of ¯nitely many points is called a polytope. Note that
each polytope is a bounded polyhedron.44 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
A subset C of I R
n is a cone if it is closed under positive scalar multiplication,
i.e. ¸x 2 C for all x 2 C and ¸ > 0. Such a set is the union of half-lines emanating
from the origin (which need not be included). It can be shown that a subset of
I R
n is a convex cone if and only if it is closed under addition and positive scalar
multiplication. Let S = fy1;:::;ymg be a ¯nite set of directions in I R
n. The convex
cone generated by S, cone(S), equals the set





i;¸i ¸ 0;yi 2 S;i = 1;:::;mg:
Let C ½ I R
n be a convex set. A vector y 2 I R
nnf0g with the property that
c+¸y 2 C for all c 2 C and all ¸ ¸ 0 is called a direction of C. The recession cone
of C is denoted by re(C) and equals
re(C) = fy 2 I R
nj8x2C8¸¸0 : x + ¸y 2 Cg:
Let S0 be a set of points in C and let S1 be a set of directions of C such that
C = conv(S0) + cone(S1):
The set C is ¯nitely generated if both S0 and S1 are ¯nite sets.
Theorem 2.13 (Carath¶ eodory's Theorem) Let C ½ I R
n be a ¯nitely generated
convex set and let S0 be a ¯nite set of points in C and let S1 be a ¯nite set of
directions of C, such that C = conv(S0) + cone(S1). Then x 2 C if and only if
x = ¸
1x




k+1 + ¢¢¢ + ¸
n+1x
n+1;
for some non-negative scalars ¸1;:::;¸n+1 such that ¸1+¢¢¢+¸k = 1 where x1;:::;xk
are (not necessarily distinct) elements of S0 and xk+1;:::;xn+1 are (not necessarily
distinct) elements of S1.
An important implication of this theorem is that a convex set C is a polyhedron if
and only if it is ¯nitely generated.
2.6 Triangulations
This section brie°y reviews the main concepts needed for the simplicial algorithm
described in Chapter 8. For a more extensive treatment see e.g. Yang (1999). For
a±nely independent vectors x1;:::;xt+1 in I R
n, the convex hull of these points is2: Mathematical Preliminaries 45
called a t-dimensional simplex, denoted by ¾(x1;:::;xt+1). The vectors x1;:::;xt+1
are called the vertices of ¾. A simplex ¿ is a face of ¾ if all the vertices of ¿ are
vertices of ¾. A t ¡ 1-dimensional face of a t-dimensional simplex is called a facet.
A facet ¿ of the simplex ¾ is called the facet opposite the vertex x if x is a vertex of
¾ but not of ¿.
A triangulation, or simplicial subdivision, of a convex set C is a collection of
simplices whose union is C and that nicely ¯t together.
De¯nition 2.9 Let C be a t-dimensional convex set in I R
n. A collection T of t-
dimensional simplices is a triangulation of C if the following conditions hold.
1. C is the union of all simplices in T ;
2. for any ¾1;¾2 2 T it holds that ¾1 \ ¾2 is either the empty set or a common
face of both;
3. for each element x in C there is an open ball around x which intersects only
a ¯nite number of simplices in T .
Let ¾1 and ¾2 be faces of simplices in T . The simplices ¾1 and ¾2 are adjacent if
they share a common facet or if one of them is a facet of the other. A triangulation
of a compact and convex subset of I R
n contains a ¯nite number of simplices.
Let T be a triangulation of a convex set in I R
n. The diameter of a simplex ¾ 2 T
is given by
diam(¾) = maxfkx ¡ ykjx;y 2 ¾g:
The mesh of the triangulation T is de¯ned by
mesh(T ) = sup
¾2T
fdiam(¾)g:
Let a t-dimensional compact and convex subset S of I R
m, a subset T of I R
n, a
triangulation T of S and a function f : S ! T be given. A function ¹ f : S ! I R
n
is a piece-wise linear approximation of f with respect to T if for every vertex w of







when x 2 ¾(w1;:::;wt+1) for some simplex ¾ 2 T and some ¸i 2 I R+, i = 1;:::;t+
1, with
Pt+1
i=1 ¸i = 1, such that x =
Pt+1
i=1 ¸iwi. One can ¯nd in e.g. Munkres46 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
(1975) that when S is compact, for any continuous function f : S ! T and " > 0
there exists a ± > 0 such that for all x;y 2 S with kx ¡ yk1 < ± it holds that
kf(x) ¡ f(y)k1 < ". This implies that a piece-wise linear approximation of a
continuous function can be made arbitrarily precise by choosing the mesh size of the
triangulation small enough.
2.7 Game Theory
Game theory is a mathematical theory that is used to model strategic interaction
between several (economic) agents, called players. Usually, a distinction is made
between non-cooperative and cooperative theory. This distinction dates back to
the ground-breaking contribution of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). In
non-cooperative theory it is assumed that players cannot make binding agreements,
whereas in cooperative theory it is assumed that agents can. The implication of
this distinction is that in non-cooperative theory the emphasis is on the strategies
of players and the consequences of the interaction of strategies on payo®s. In coop-
erative theory one tries to ¯nd ways of dividing a certain surplus (or cost) among
a group of players. Ideally, various division rules satisfy di®erent sets of properties
(axioms). In applications, the modeler can then decide on a division rule by judging
the desirability of the di®erent axioms.
This section describes some concepts from both branches of game theory. For
a mathematically oriented text-book exposition of (mainly non-cooperative) game
theory the reader is referred to Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991) devote a lot of attention to applications in economics.
2.7.1 Non-Cooperative Theory
A game in strategic form is a model of a strategic situation where players make one





where N is the set of players and Ai, i 2 N, is the set of pure actions for player i.
Denote the cartesian product of all Ai by A. The function ui : A ! I R is the utility
function of player i. That is, ui(a) is the payo® to player i if the actions played by
all players are given by a 2 A.
It is assumed that there is no external agency that can enforce agreements be-
tween the players. Therefore, rational players will choose their actions such that it2: Mathematical Preliminaries 47
is unpro¯table for each of them to deviate. Any prediction for the outcome of a
game in strategic form should have this property. The most well-known equilibrium
concept is the Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium states that players will choose
their actions such that unilateral deviations are not bene¯cial. Formally, a Nash
equilibrium is a tuple of actions a¤ 2 A such that for each player i 2 N and for all











A Nash equilibrium in pure actions may not exist for every game in strategic





, where ¢(Ai) is the set of probability dis-
tributions over Ai and Ui :
Q
j2N ¢(Aj) ! I R is the Von Neumann-Morgenstern











A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over a player's pure actions. It de-
scribes the probabilities with which a player plays each of her pure actions. A
mixed Nash equilibrium of a game in strategic form G is a Nash equilibrium of its
mixed extension Gm. The following theorem establishes existence of a mixed Nash
equilibrium for ¯nite games in strategic form.
Theorem 2.14 (Nash (1950b)) Every ¯nite game in strategic form has a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium.
The interpretation of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is not straightforward. The
reader is referred to Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Section 3.2) for a discussion.
In Part I of this thesis, substantial attention is paid to timing games in continuous
time. The concept of subgame perfectness is introduced for stochastic versions of
timing games. Subgame perfectness is best understood in the context of games





, where N is the set of players, H is the set of histories, P is
the player function and for each i 2 N, ui denotes the utility function.
The set of histories, H, satis¯es the following conditions:
² ; 2 H;
² if (ak)k=1;:::;K 2 H and L < K, then (ak)k=1;:::;L 2 H;48 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
² if a sequence (ak)1
k=1 satis¯es (ak)k=1;:::;L 2 H for all L 2 I N, then (ak)1
k=1 2 H.
Each element of H is a history and each component of a history is an action taken
by a player. A history (ak)k=1;:::;K 2 H is terminal if K = 1 or if there is no aK+1
such that (ak)k=1;:::;K+1 2 H. The set of terminal histories is denoted by Z.
The player correspondence P : HnZ ! N assigns to each non-terminal history
a set of players. That is, P(h) are the players who take an action after history h
from the set A(h) = faj(h;a) 2 Hg. Finally, the domain of the utility function is
the set of terminal histories Z.
A strategy of player i 2 N in an extensive form game G is a function si : HnZ !
A that assigns an action in A(h) to each non-terminal history h 2 HnZ for which
i 2 P(h). For each strategy pro¯le s = (si)i2N, the outcome, O(s), is de¯ned to
be the terminal history that results when each players i 2 N plays si. A Nash
equilibrium for the extensive form game G is a tuple of strategies s¤ such that for
all i 2 N and all si 6= s¤





The subgame of an extensive form game G that follows the history h 2 H is
the reduction of G to h. This implies that we take a particular history and look at
the game along this path. For a Nash equilibrium of G it might hold that if the
game actually ends up in a particular history h, that the prescribed equilibrium
play is not optimal any more. That means that the Nash equilibrium contains
incredible threats since the other players know that player i will not stick to her
Nash equilibrium strategy. For extensive form games we therefore need an extra
stability requirement. We focus on subgame perfectness. For a strategy si and a
history h 2 H de¯ne sijh = si(h;h0) for each h0 2 f(h;h0) 2 Hg. A subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) for an extensive form game G is a strategy pro¯le s¤ such that







for every strategy si of player i in the subgame that follows the history h. In discrete
time, any ¯nite game in extensive form has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
2.7.2 Cooperative Theory
A transferable utility (TU) game is a tuple (N;v), where N is the set of players and
v : 2N ! I R is a function, assigning to each coalition S 2 2N a real number v(S)2: Mathematical Preliminaries 49
such that v(;) = 0. The function v is called the characteristic function of the game
and v(S) is the value of coalition S. The idea is that v(S) is the value that coalition
S can attain by cooperating. In TU games one assumes that the value v(S) can be
transferred among the players in S, i.e. they can make binding agreements and they
attach the same utility to v(S).
A TU game is superadditive if for all S;T 2 2N with S \ T = ; it holds that
v(S [ T) ¸ v(S) + v(T):
So, in superadditive games, larger coalitions have a higher value. A TU game is
convex if for all i;j 2 N and S ½ Nnfi;jg it holds that
v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S) · v(S [ fig [ fjg) ¡ v(S [ fjg):
Hence, in a convex game, the marginal contribution of a player to a coalition is less
than her marginal contribution to a larger coalition.
The imputation set of a TU game (N;v) is the set of all individual rational and
Pareto e±cient allocations, i.e.
I(v) = fx 2 I R




The core of a TU game is the set of all imputations that can not be blocked by any
coalition of players, i.e.




The main issue in cooperative game theory is to ¯nd ways to divide v(N). This
is usually done by using the axiomatic method, which boils down to de¯ning a rule
that divides v(N) and showing that this division rule is the only one that satis¯es
certain properties (axioms). We describe two of these solutions below.
Let Gn denote the set of all n-person TU games. A solution to G 2 Gn is a map
f : Gn ! I R
n. A function ¾ : N ! N is a permutation if for all i 2 N there exists
exactly one j 2 N such that ¾(i) = j. So, ¾(1) is the ¯rst player in the permutation,
¾(2) is the second and so on. The set of all permutations on N is denoted by ¦(N).
For ¾ 2 ¦(N), the marginal vector of (N;v) 2 Gn, m¾(v) 2 I R








v(f¾(1)g) if k = 1,
v(f¾(1);:::;¾(k)g) ¡ v(f¾(1);:::;¾(k ¡ 1)g) otherwise.50 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
The permutation ¾ describes the order in which players arrive and the marginal
vector m¾ gives for each player her marginal contribution to the coalition that is









The Shapley value can be seen as the expected marginal value given that each
permutation is equally likely. To characterise the Shapley value we introduce the
following axioms:
1. f : Gn ! I R
n satis¯es e±ciency (EFF) if
P
i2N fi(v) = v(N) for all v 2 Gn;
2. f : Gn ! I R
n satis¯es anonymity (AN) if f(v¾) = ¾¤(f(v)) for all ¾ 2 ¦(N),
where v¾(S) = v(¾¡1(S)) and ¾¤ is such that (¾¤(x))¾(k) = xk for all x 2 I R
n
and k 2 N;
3. f : Gn ! I R
n satis¯es the dummy player property (DUM) if fi(v) = v(fig) for
all dummy players i 2 N, i.e. players i 2 N such that v(S[fig) = v(S)+v(fig)
for all S 2 2Nnfig;
4. f : Gn ! I R
n satis¯es additivity (ADD) if f(v + w) = f(v) + f(w) for all
v;w 2 Gn.
We have the following result due to Shapley (1953).
Theorem 2.15 There is a unique solution f : Gn ! I R
n that satis¯es EFF, AN,
DUM and ADD. This solution is the Shapley value.
For x;y 2 I R
n we say that x is lexicographically smaller than y, x ·L y, if x = y
or if there exists an s 2 f1;2;:::;ng such that xi = yi for all i < s and xs < ys. A
compact subset of I R
n always has a unique lexicographic minimum. For a TU game
(N;v) with I(v) 6= ;, de¯ne for each x 2 I(v) the excess vector µ(x) 2 I R
2N¡1, whose
S-th entry, S 2 2Nn;, is de¯ned by




such that the excesses are written down in a decreasing order. The nucleolus
(Schmeidler (1969)), º(v), is the unique imputation such that µ(º(v)) is the lex-
icographic minimum of the set fµ(x) 2 I R
2N¡1jx 2 I(v)g. Roughly speaking, the2: Mathematical Preliminaries 51
nucleolus minimises the maximal complaint. There do exist technical characteri-
sations of the nucleolus, but they have no economic interpretation. We do know,
however, that if (N;v) has a non-empty core, then º(v) 2 C(v).
If one drops the assumption of transferable utility one can look at non-transferable
utility (NTU) games. An NTU game is a tuple (N;V ), where N is the set of players
and V is a correspondence assigning to each coalition S 2 2Nn; a subset V (S) ½ I R
S
such that for all players i 2 N it holds that V (fig) = (¡1;0] and for all S it holds
that:
1. V (S) is non-empty and closed;
2. V (S) is comprehensive, i.e. if x 2 V (S) and y 2 I R
S such that y · x, then
y 2 V (S);
3. V (S) \ I R
S
+ is bounded.
In an NTU game, if a coalition S forms, all payo® vectors x 2 V (S) are attainable
giving player i 2 S the payo® xi.
In Part III we use concepts of convexity that are closely linked to the equivalent
notions for NTU games. For an overview of NTU convexity, see Hendrickx et al.
(2002). An NTU game (N;V ) is superadditive if for all S;T ½ N such that S 6= ;,
T 6= ;, S \ T = ; it holds that
V (S) £ V (T) ½ V (S [ T):




¾(k) = maxfx¾(k)jx 2 V (f¾(1);:::;¾(k)g);
8i2f1;:::;k¡1g : x¾(i) = M
¾
¾(i)(V )g:
An NTU game (N;V ) is coalition merge convex if it is superadditive and if for
all U ½ N, U 6= ;, and all S & T ½ NnU, S 6= ;, it holds that for all
p 2 fx 2 V (S)j8i2S : xi ¸ 0;6 9y2V (S) : y > xg;
all q 2 V (T) and all r 2 V (S [ U) such that rS ¸ p, there exists an s 2 V (T [ U)
such that si ¸ qi for all i 2 T and si ¸ ri for all i 2 U.
An NTU game (N;V ) is individual merge convex if it is individually superaddi-
tive and if for all k 2 N, all
p 2 fx 2 V (S)j8i2S : xi ¸ 0;6 9y2V (S) : y > xg;52 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
all q 2 V (T) and all r 2 V (S[fkg) such that rS ¸ p there exists an s 2 V (T [fkg)
such that si ¸ qi for all i 2 T and sk ¸ rk. It is shown in Hendrickx et al. (2002)




The E®ect of Information Streams
on Capital Budgeting Decisions
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter a ¯rm is considered that faces the decision whether or not to invest in
a project. The project's pro¯tability is not known beforehand. However, imperfect
signals arrive over time indicating the project either to be good or bad. These signals
cause the ¯rm to update its valuation of the project. The aim is to determine the
timing of investment as well as the e®ects of the quantity and the quality of the
signals on the investment decision.
The problem can for example be the adoption of a technological innovation whose
e®ectiveness is unknown. One can also think of a ¯rm having the opportunity to
enter a new market which involves sunk investment costs. The uncertainty can
then for instance be caused by unknown consumer interest, e.g. demand can be
favourable or not. Consider for instance the telecommunication sector where there is
one company that can supply a new service to its customers. However, the company
is uncertain about the possible success of the new service. Occasionally, the ¯rm
receives signals from which it can deduce information concerning the pro¯tability of
the new service. Here we can think of market performance of related products and
also of more general economic indicators that may in°uence the market performance
of the new service. Another example is given by a pharmaceutical ¯rm that is
developing a new drug. Test results are coming in indicating whether the drug is
e®ective or not.
This situation is modelled by considering a project that can be either good or
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bad. If the project is bad, the optimal strategy is to refrain from investment. Since
the ¯rm incurs sunk costs when investing in the project, a loss is su®ered in case
the project is bad and the ¯rm invests. At irregular intervals, however, the ¯rm
receives a signal about the quality of the project. The signals indicate whether the
project is good or bad, but it is known to the ¯rm that the signals are imperfect.
The points in time at which signals arrive are unknown beforehand. Every time the
¯rm receives a signal, it updates its belief that the project is good in a Bayesian way.
Therefore, by delaying investment and waiting for more signals to arrive, the ¯rm
can predict with higher accuracy whether the market is good or bad. This induces
an option value of waiting. The question is how many good signals relative to bad
signals the ¯rm needs to observe, to justify investment in the project. We show that
this is equivalent to ¯nding a critical level for the belief that the project is good,
given the available signals. This belief turns out to depend critically on the quality
of the signal, i.e. the probability with which the signals re°ect the true state of the
world, as well as the frequency at which signals occur over time.
The signals are modelled as two correlated binomially distributed random vari-
ables. The ¯rst one models the arrival of signals while the latter models its type,
i.e. indicating that the project is good or bad. As soon as the ¯rm has invested, the
true state of the world is revealed.
This chapter is related to several strands of literature. First of all, the model
has strong similarities with the standard real options model as developed by Mc-
Donald and Siegel (1986) and for which Dixit and Pindyck (1996) develop the basic
framework. It is important to note that the way we deal with uncertainty in our
model di®ers crucially from this literature. Within our framework more information
becomes available over time, whereas in the standard real-options literature uncer-
tainty is constant over time caused by, for instance, price uncertainty in an existing
market. In other words, whereas our model is a decision problem with incomplete
information where nature determines the state of the world only at the beginning
with information arriving to resolve uncertainty, the framework typically used in the
literature is a decision problem with complete information, where nature determines
the state of the world at each consecutive point in time. More formally, the stochas-
tic processes in these models have stationary increments that are independent of
the past. Examples of processes that are often used are Brownian motion, Poisson
process, and L¶ evy processes. In contrast, the increments of the stochastic process
that we consider are path-dependent and non-stationary. We allow for the variance3: Information Streams and Capital Budgeting 57
of the stochastic process to decrease over time. This implies that the standard tools
(cf. Oksendal (2000)) cannot be used in our framework.
A second branch of literature to which our chapter is related is the R&D lit-
erature. In her seminal paper, Reinganum (1981) develops a model of dynamic
R&D competition. In that model technological innovations arrive via a Poisson pro-
cess and the in°uence of patents is analysed. Again, the stochastic process driving
the innovation process has stationary increments that are independent of the past.
The paper by Malueg and Tsutsui (1997) introduces learning into the Reinganum
framework and is therefore more closely related to this chapter. In the endogenous
growth literature, Aghion and Howitt (1992) use a similar framework as Reinganum
to model Schumpeterian growth.
The contributions mentioned above all consider a stream of technological inno-
vations where there is uncertainty about when these innovations become available.
Moscarini and Smith (2001) consider a situation where a single decision maker faces
a project whose future stream of cash °ows is uncertain. Information is modelled
by a geometric Brownian motion that serves as a continuous time approximation of
discrete time information in the sense that the di®usion process can be interpreted
as a running sample mean of observations. The di®usion has an unknown mean
that depends on the (unknown) state of nature and a variance that, at some costs,
can be controlled by the decision maker. So the decision maker faces an optimal
stopping problem, i.e. when to invest (if at all), as well as an optimal control prob-
lem, i.e. how much to invest in R&D. The main di®erence with our approach is the
way uncertainty is modelled. Due to the higher complexity of the stochastic process
used here, we assume, in contrast to Moscarini and Smith (2001), that information
is obtained without costs.
The way we model uncertainty is closely related to Jensen (1982). The main
di®erence is that in Jensen's model, signals only give information on the probability
of the project being good. This probability is considered to be an unknown param-
eter. In each period one receives a signal about its true value. This signal is used to
update the beliefs, just as in our model, i.e. the belief is a conditional probability
based on past information. In short, one forms a belief on the belief in a good
project. However, in Jensen's model, a good signal not only increases the belief in a
good project, but it also increases the ¯rm's probabilistic belief in receiving a good
signal in the next period. In other words, the ¯rm not only updates its belief but
also the odds of the coin nature °ips to determine the project's pro¯tability. In58 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
our model it holds that the quality of the signal is independent of past realisations,
i.e. the investor exactly knows the odds of the coin that nature °ips. Due to this
simpli¯cation the analysis of our framework provides an explicit expression for the
critical value of the belief in a good project at which investing is optimal, contrary to
Jensen (1982) who could only show existence. Furthermore, it allows us to simulate
the investment problem and the e®ects of the model parameters on the investment
timing. We show that the probability of investment within a certain time interval
not necessarily increases in the quantity and the quality of signals. Another counter-
intuitive result we obtain is that, given that the project is good, the expected time
before investment need not be monotonous in the parameter governing the Poisson
arrivals of signals. In other words, it is possible that investment is expected to take
place later when the expected number of signals per time unit is higher.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 the formal model is described.
After that, the optimal investment decision will be derived in Section 3.3. In Sec-
tion 3.4 an error measure for analysing the performance of capital budgeting rules
in this model of investment under uncertainty is introduced. The decision rule from
Section 3.3 will be interpreted using some numerical examples in Section 3.5. In
the ¯nal section some conclusions are drawn and directions for future research are
discussed.
3.2 The Model
Consider a ¯rm that faces the choice of investing in a certain project. The project
can be either good (denoted by H), leading to high revenues, UH, or bad (denoted by
L), leading to low revenues UL.1 Without loss of generality we assume that UH > 0
and UL = 0. The sunk costs involved in investing in the project are given by I > 0.
Furthermore, it is assumed that there is a constant discount rate, 0 < r < 1.
When the ¯rm receives the option to invest, it has a prior belief about the
investment project being good or bad. The ex ante probability of high revenues is
given by
I P(H) = p0;
for some p0 2 (0;1).
Occasionally, the ¯rm receives a signal indicating the project to be good (an
h-signal) or a signal indicating the project to be bad (an l-signal). The probabilities
1The revenues represent an in¯nite discounted cash °ow.3: Information Streams and Capital Budgeting 59
with which these signals occur depend on the true state of the project. It is assumed
that a correct signal always occurs with probability ¸ > 1
2, see Table 3.1. In this
table, the ¯rst row (column) lists the probabilities in case of a good project (good
signal) and the second row (column) in case of a bad project (bad signal).
h l
H ¸ 1 ¡ ¸
L 1 ¡ ¸ ¸
Table 3.1: Probability of a signal indicating a good or bad market, given the true
state of the project.
As soon as the ¯rm invests in the project, the state of the market is revealed.
In reality this may take some time, but we abstract from that. The signals' arrivals
are modelled via a Poisson process with parameter ¹ > 0 (see Section 2.4.1). The
Poisson assumption is made to make the model analytically tractable when using
dynamic programming techniques as described in Section 2.4.2. Hence, denoting the





1 with probability ¹dt,
0 with probability 1 ¡ ¹dt,
with
n(0) = 0:







1 with probability ¸ if H and 1 ¡ ¸ if L,
0 with probability 1 ¡ ¸ if H and ¸ if L,
and
g(0) = 0:60 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
It is assumed that the ¯rm knows the values of ¹ and ¸. For notational convenience
the time index will be suppressed in the remainder of the chapter. The belief that
revenues are high, i.e. that the project is good, given the number of signals n and
the number of h-signals, g · n, is denoted by p(n;g). Now, the conditional expected
payo® of the ¯rm if it invests can be written as,
I E(Ujn;g) = p(n;g)(U
H ¡ I) ¡ (1 ¡ p(n;g))I:
The structure of the model is such that with respect to the signals there are two
main aspects. The ¯rst one is the parameter which governs the arrival of the signals,
¹. This parameter is a measure for the quantity of the signals, since 1=¹ denotes
the average time between two signals. The other component is the probability of
the correctness of the signal, ¸. This parameter is a measure for the quality of the
signals. For the model to make sense, it is assumed that ¸ > 1
2.2 In this chapter
learning { or belief updating { takes place by using the Bayesian approach. This,
together with the condition ¸ > 1
2, implies that in the long-run the belief in high
revenues converges to one or to zero if the market is good or bad, respectively. As
will be shown in Section 3.3, quantity and quality together determine the threshold
belief in a good project the ¯rm needs to have in order for investment to be optimal.
3.3 The Optimal Investment Decision
The uncertainty about the true state of the project and the irreversibility of invest-
ment induce an option value of waiting for more signals. In this section we will
show how to ¯nd the critical level for p(n;g) at which the ¯rm is indi®erent between
investing and waiting, while taking into account the option value of waiting. After
having determined the critical level we know that it is optimal to invest as soon as
p(n;g) exceeds this level.
First, we explicitly calculate p(n;g). To simplify matters considerably, de¯ne
k := 2g ¡ n, the number of good signals in excess of bad signals, and ³ :=
1¡p0
p0 , the
2This assumption is not as strong as it seems, for if ¸ < 1
2 the ¯rm can perform the same
analysis replacing ¸ with 1 ¡ ¸. If ¸ = 1
2 the signals are not informative at all and the ¯rm would
do best by making a now-or-never decision, using its ex ante belief p(0;0) = p0.3: Information Streams and Capital Budgeting 61
unconditional odds of the project being bad. By using Bayes' rule we obtain that:
p(n;g) =
I P(n;gjH)I P(H)
I P(n;gjH)I P(H) + I P(n;gjL)I P(L)
=
¸g(1 ¡ ¸)n¡gp0
¸g(1 ¡ ¸)n¡gp0 + (1 ¡ ¸)g¸n¡g(1 ¡ p0)
=
¸g
¸g + ³(1 ¡ ¸)2g¡n¸n¡g
=
¸2g¡n
¸2g¡n + ³(1 ¡ ¸)2g¡n
=
¸k
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k ´ p(k); k 2 I Z:
(3.1)
For further reference, we extend the domain of p(k) in a natural way to the real
line. The critical level of k where the ¯rm is indi®erent between investing and not
investing in the project is denoted by k¤ 2 I R. Note that at any arrival of an h-
signal k increases with unity and at any arrival of an l-signal k decreases with unity.
Hence, enough h-signals must arrive to reach the critical level. The critical level of
the conditional belief in high revenues is denoted by p¤ = p(k¤).
Suppose that the state of the process at a particular point in time is given by
k. For the moment assume that k is a continuous variable. Then there are three
possibilities. First, k might be such that k ¸ k¤ and hence, p(k) ¸ p¤. Then it is
optimal for the ¯rm to directly invest in the project. In this case the value of the
project for the ¯rm, denoted by ¦, is given by
¦(k) = U
Hp(k) ¡ I: (3.2)
A second possibility is that, even after a new h-signal arriving, it is still not
optimal to invest, i.e. k < k¤¡1. We assume that pricing with respect to the objec-
tive probability measure implies risk-neutrality concerning the information gathering
process. Then the value function of the opportunity to invest for the ¯rm, denoted
by V1(¢), must satisfy the following Bellman equation3:
rV1(k) = 1
dtI E(dV1(k)); k < k
¤: (3.3)
Departing from this equation the following second order linear di®erence equation




p(k)(¸V1(k + 1) + (1 ¡ ¸)V1(k ¡ 1))+
+ (1 ¡ p(k))(¸V1(k ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ ¸)V1(k + 1)) ¡ V1(k)
¤
() (r + ¹)V1(k) = ¹
£
(2p(k)¸ + 1 ¡ ¸ ¡ p(k))V1(k + 1)+
+ (p(k) + ¸ ¡ 2p(k)¸)V1(k ¡ 1)
¤
; k < k
¤ ¡ 1:
(3.4)
Eq. (3.4) states that the value of the option at state k must equal the discounted
expected value an in¯nitesimal amount of time later. Using eq. (3.1) it holds that
2p(k)¸ + 1 ¡ ¸ ¡ p(k) =
¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k (3.5)
and
p(k) + ¸ ¡ 2p(k)¸ =
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1)
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k : (3.6)
Substituting eqs. (3.5) and (3.6) in (3.4), and de¯ning F(k) := (¸k+³(1¡¸)k)V1(k),
yields
(r + ¹)F(k) = ¹F(k + 1) + ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)F(k ¡ 1): (3.7)













¯ + ¸(1 ¡ ¸) = 0: (3.8)








¹ + 1)2 ¡ 4¸(1 ¡ ¸): (3.9)
Note that Q(0) = ¸(1 ¡ ¸) > 0 and Q(1 ¡ ¸) = ¡ r
¹(1 ¡ ¸) · 0. Since the graph of
Q is an upward pointing parabola we must have ¯1 ¸ 1¡¸ and 0 < ¯2 < 1¡¸ (see
Figure 3.1). The value function V1(¢) is then given by
V1(k) =
F(k)




¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k; (3.10)
4It should be noted that for all ¸ it holds that 4¸(1 ¡ ¸) · 1. Since equality holds i® ¸ = 1=2,
the homogeneous equation indeed has two real roots for any ¸ 2 (1=2;1].3: Information Streams and Capital Budgeting 63
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1 ¡ ¸ +
¯2 ¯1
Figure 3.1: Graph of Q.
where A1 and A2 are constants. Here it is important to note that when the number
of l-signals relative to h-signals tends to in¯nity the value of the ¯rm converges to
zero, i.e. lim
k!¡1
V1(k) = 0. This implies that we only need to consider the larger root
¯1, so that A2 = 0.5
In the ¯nal case, k¤ ¡ 1 · k < k¤. Here, the value of k is such that it is not
optimal to invest in the project right away. However, if the following signal is an
h-signal, it will be optimal to invest. In this region the value function is denoted by
V2(¢). Analogous to eq. (3.3) it follows that
rV2(k) = ¹
£
p(k)(¸¦(k + 1) + (1 ¡ ¸)V1(k ¡ 1)) + (1 ¡ p(k))
(¸V1(k ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ ¸)¦(k + 1)) ¡ V2(k)
¤
() (r + ¹)V2(k) = ¹
£
(2p(k)¸ + 1 ¡ ¸ ¡ p(k))¦(k + 1)+
+ (p(k) + ¸ ¡ 2p(k)¸)V1(k ¡ 1)
¤
; k
¤ · k < k
¤:
(3.11)






Hp(k) ¡ (¸p(k) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ p(k)))I







If an h-signal arrives, the process jumps to the region where k ¸ k¤ and if an l-
signal arrives the process jumps to the region where k < k¤. Therefore the value V2
is completely determined by V1(k ¡ 1) and ¦(k + 1). The value function V (¢) then
5This stems from the fact that 0 < ¯2 < 1 ¡ ¸, so in V1(k) the term ¯k
2 dominates (1 ¡ ¸)k if




> > > <
> > > :
V1(k) if k < k¤ ¡ 1
V2(k) if k¤ ¡ 1 · k < k¤
¦(k) if k ¸ k¤;
(3.13)
where V1(k), V2(k) and ¦(k) are given by (3.10), (3.12) and (3.2), respectively.
To determine A1 and k¤ we solve the continuity condition lim
k!k¤¡1
V1(k) = V2(k¤¡
1) and the value-matching condition lim









(r + ¹(1 ¡ ¸))
¡ rI(¸
k¤
+ ³(1 ¡ ¸)
k¤
) ¡ ¹I(¸³(1 ¡ ¸)
k¤
+ (1 ¡ ¸)¸
k¤
)]:








¯1(r + ¹)(r + ¹(1 ¡ ¸)) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)(r + ¹(1 + ¯1 ¡ ¸))
¯1(r + ¹)(r + ¹¸) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)(r + ¹(¯1 + ¸))
: (3.15)









From eq. (3.16) it is obtained that k¤ decreases with p0. Hence, less additional
information is needed when the initial belief in high revenues is already high.
Next, we check whether the optimal belief p¤ is a well-de¯ned probability. The
following proposition establishes this result, which is proved in Appendix A. It
furthermore shows the link between this approach and the traditional net present
value rule (NPV). Note that the critical belief under the latter approach is obtained
by solving I E(Ujk) = 0, which yields pNPV = I
UH.
Proposition 3.1 For UH ¸ I it holds that p¤ · 1. Furthermore, p¤ > pNPV.
6Note that, despite the fact that k is an integer variable, the continuity and the value matching
conditions should hold because the critical level k¤ can be any real number. Since the realisations
of k are discrete, the ¯rm invests as soon as k = dk¤e.3: Information Streams and Capital Budgeting 65
So, the result that is obtained in the standard real option model, namely that
the criterion for investment to be undertaken is less tight under NPV than under
the real option approach, carries over to this model. The reason is the existence of
a value of waiting for more information to arrive that reduces uncertainty.
Using eq. (3.14), one can obtain comparative static results. These are stated in
the following proposition, the proof of which is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 3.2 The threshold belief in a good project, p¤, increases with I, r and
¸ and decreases with UH.
The fact that p¤ increases with r is caused by the so-called net present value e®ect.
If r increases, future income is valued less so that the net present value decreases.
Therefore, the ¯rm is willing to wait longer with investment until it has more infor-
mation about the actual state of the project. An increase in ¸ leads to an increase
in p¤, which can be explained by the fact that ¸ is a measure for the informativeness
of the signal. Therefore, it is more worthwhile to wait for another signal, which
implies a higher level of p¤. This does not necessarily imply that one should wait
for more signals to arrive, a point which we elaborate upon in Section 3.5. It is
impossible to get a knife-edged result on the comparative statics with respect to ¹,
although simulations suggest that in most cases p¤ increases with ¹, which con¯rms




An important question the ¯rm faces is how likely it is that it makes a wrong
decision, in the sense that it invests while the project is bad. This question can be
answered quantitatively by calculating the probability that k¤ is reached while the
project is bad. In order to do so, de¯ne
P
(k¤)(k) := I P(9t¸0 : kt ¸ k
¤jk0 = k;L) (3.17)
Of course, for k ¸ k¤ it holds that P (k¤)(k) = 1. A second order linear di®erence
equation can be obtained governing P (k¤)(k). Notice that starting from k, the process
reaches either k ¡1 or k +1 with probabilities ¸ and 1¡¸, respectively, given that
the project is bad. Therefore, one obtains
P
(k¤)(k) = (1 ¡ ¸)P
(k¤)(k + 1) + ¸P
(k¤)(k ¡ 1): (3.18)
7See also Appendix B.66 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
Using the boundary conditions P (k¤)(k¤) = 1 and lim
k!¡1









Hence, the probability of a wrong decision decreases when the quality of the signals
increases. Since k0 = 0, the ex ante probability of a wrong decision is given by
P (k¤)(0).
The error measure P (k¤)(¢) gives a worst-case scenario: the probability that a
¯rm engages in an investment that has low pro¯tability. Another error measure
would be given by the probability that the ¯rm forgoes an investment that would
have generated a high pro¯t stream, i.e. the probability that k¤ is not reached
within a certain time T given that the project is good. Note however that since
¸ > 1
2 this probability converges to zero for T ! 1. For any ¯nite time T it is
possible to calculate the probability that the ¯rm has not invested before T given
that the project is good. In order to calculate this probability, denote for all k the
probability density function of the distribution of the ¯rst passage time through k
















where Ik(¢) denotes the modi¯ed Bessel function with parameter k. This is the
unconditional density of ¯rst passage times. Given the ¯rst passage time distribution
it holds for all 0 < T < 1 and k¤ > 0 that
~ P
(k¤)(T) := I P(:9t2[0;T] : kt ¸ k
¤jk0 = 0;H)






Since there is a positive probability mass on the project being bad, the expecta-
tion of the time of investment does not exist. However, conditional on the project
being good, one can calculate the expected time of investment using the conditional
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3.5 Economic Interpretation
As an example to see how UH and UL arise, consider a market where inverse demand





Y ¡ q if q · Y and H
0 otherwise;
where q is the quantity supplied. There is only one supplier so that the ¯rm is a
monopolist. The costs of producing q units are given by the cost function
C(q) = cq; c ¸ 0:
The pro¯t of producing q units is then equal to
¼(q) = P(q)q ¡ C(q):
Suppose for a moment that the project is good, i.e. that demand is high. Then











Solving for q using the ¯rst order condition yields the optimal output level q¤ = Y ¡c
2 ,







If the project is bad it is optimal not to produce at all. Hence, the revenue if demand
is zero, UL, equals,
U
L = 0: (3.23)
In Proposition 3.2 comparative statics results are given. To get some feeling for
the magnitude of several e®ects we consider some numerical examples. Consider a
market structure as described above with parameter values as denoted in Table 3.2.
So, the discount rate r is set at 10%. The probability of a correct signal is 0.8 and
on average four signals arrive every period.
Based on these parameter values the value function is calculated as function of
k and depicted in Figure 3.2.9 From this ¯gure one can see that the NPV rule
9In interpreting Figure 3.2, notice that realisations of k are discrete, although k¤ can be any
real number (see Footnote 6).68 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
Y = 8 r = 0:1
c = 5 ¹ = 4
I = 12 ¸ = 0:8
p0 = 1
2
Table 3.2: Parameter values















Figure 3.2: Value function. The dashed line denotes the NPV.
prescribes not to invest at the moment the option becomes available (k = 0). In
fact, in order to invest, the NPV rule demands that the NPV must be positive so
that the belief of the ¯rm in high market demand should at least be approximately
0.53 (kNPV ¼ 0:10). However, our approach speci¯es that the ¯rm's belief should
exceed p¤ ¼ 0:96. This may seem an extremely high threshold, but it implies that
the ¯rm invests as soon as k = 3, since k¤ ¼ 2:23. The NPV rule prescribes that,
in absence of l-signals, only one h-signal is needed, while under our approach the
¯rm invests after three h-signals (net from l-signals). From eq. (3.19) it is obtained
that the probability of investing in a bad project while using the optimal approach
equals P (k¤)(0) = 0:00156. Application of the NPV rule gives P (kNPV )(0) = 0:25.
Hence, the probability of making a wrong decision using the optimal approach is
negligible, while it is reasonably large when the NPV rule is used. The other error
measure, ~ P k¤(¢), is depicted in Figure 3.3 for di®erent values of T. One observes
that the error of the second type converges rapidly to zero. The probability of not
having invested by period 6 given that the project is good is already negligible.
Using the same parameters we can determine how the critical value k¤ changes
with ¸. From Proposition 3.2 we can conclude that the critical level for the believe3: Information Streams and Capital Budgeting 69


















Figure 3.3: Probability that investment has not taken place before time T given
that the project is good.
in a good project increases with the quality of the signal ¸, as one can also see in
the left-hand panel of Figure 3.4. If ¸ is higher, then the informativeness of a signal




























Figure 3.4: Comparative statics of p¤ and k¤ for ¸.
is higher. So, it is more attractive for the ¯rm to demand a higher certainty about
the goodness of the market. This belief however, is reached after fewer signals as
can be seen from the right-hand panel of Figure 3.4.
If one takes Y = 50, c = 10, I = 500, p0 = 0:5, ¸ = 0:8, r = 0:1 and ¹ = 7,
one obtains pNPV = 0:125. Since p0 = 1=2 this implies kNPV < 0. Hence, the
¯rm invests immediately at time 0 if it applies the NPV rule. So, if the project is
bad, the ¯rm invests in the bad project with probability 1. Applying our decision
rule gives p¤ = 0:842, implying that the ¯rm invests if k = 2. The probability of70 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS


















Figure 3.5: Comparative statics of expected time of investment given a good project
for ¹ with ¸ = 0:7 ¯xed.
a wrong decision then becomes P 2(0) = 0:06. Again, our approach greatly reduces
this probability compared to the NPV rule.
Consider an example where the demand and cost parameters are such that UH =
50, I = 30, r = 0:1 and p0 = 0:5. First, we consider the situation where the project
is good. Using the conditional ¯rst passage time density in eq. (3.21) one can
calculate the expected time until investment takes place as a function of ¹ and ¸,
cf. Figures 3.5 and 3.6. One can see that both functions are not continuous and

















Figure 3.6: Comparative statics of expected time of investment given a good project
for ¸ with ¹ = 4 ¯xed.
the expected time of investment is not monotonic with respect to ¹. This stems
from the fact that the realisations of k are discrete. Hence, for certain combinations3: Information Streams and Capital Budgeting 71
of ¹ and ¸, the threshold jumps from dk¤e to dk¤e + 1. If p¤ increases in ¹ (as it
usually does), k¤ is also increasing in ¹. If, as a result, dk¤e increases with unity,
one additional good signal (in excess of bad signals) is needed before it is optimal to
undertake the project. This implies that the expected time before investment jumps
upwards. Immediately after a jump, the expected time decreases continuously with
¹, as intuition suggests, until the threshold jumps again.
Concerning the comparative statics with respect to ¸ we already observed that
an increase in p¤ can lead to a decrease in k¤. This implies that for certain values
of ¸ the threshold dk¤e decreases with unity. As soon as this happens, there is a
downward jump in the expected time of investment. So, for ¸ the discreteness of k
works in the same direction as the increase of the quality of the signals.
We also analyse the comparative statics of the probability of investment before
time T = 20 with respect to the parameters ¹ and ¸ using the unconditional ¯rst






























































Figure 3.7: Comparative statics of the probability of investment before T = 20 for
¸ and ¹.
is not monotonically increasing in ¹ and ¸. Particularly, one can see from Figure 3.8
that, taking ¸ = 0:7, the comparative statics for ¹ are both non-continuous and non-
monotonic. The explanation for this behaviour is the same as for the comparative
statics of the expected time of investment given a good project. Note, however, that
the increase in the probability of investment after each jump increases less fast. This
is due to the fact that a higher threshold needs to be reached.72 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
















































Figure 3.8: Comparative statics of the probability of investment before T = 20 with
¸ = 0:7 for ¹.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter a situation was analysed where a ¯rm has the opportunity to invest in
a project. Initially, the pro¯tability of the project is unknown, but as time passes the
¯rm receives signals about the pro¯tability of the investment. There are two types of
signals: one type indicating the project to be pro¯table and the other type indicating
it to be unpro¯table. The present chapter di®ers from the standard literature on
investment under uncertainty (see Dixit and Pindyck (1996)) in that uncertainty
diminishes in the course of time. The ¯rm has a { subjective { a priori belief about
the pro¯tability of the project. A posterior belief about the pro¯tability is obtained
in a Bayesian way each time a signal arrives. It turns out that it is optimal for the
¯rm to invest as soon as its belief in a pro¯table project exceeds a certain critical
level. An analytical expression for this critical level is provided and it is seen that
this level depends crucially on the reliability and the quantity of the signals and
the ¯rm's discount rate. Given the initial belief in a good project the critical level
can be translated in a number of signals indicating a good project net from signals
indicating a bad project. In other words, from the critical belief it can be derived
how many "good" signals in excess of "bad" signals are needed before it is optimal
for the ¯rm to invest.
An interesting extension of the present model is to look at what happens when
the ¯rm is not a monopolist, but if there are rivalling ¯rms to invest in the same
project. This requires using game theoretic concepts in the present setting. In3: Information Streams and Capital Budgeting 73
the standard real options framework such an analysis has been carried out by e.g.
Huisman (2001), Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) and Boyer et al. (2001). For
the framework presented in this chapter, the necessary strategy and equilibrium
concepts are presented in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 a duopoly setting is analysed.
Another topic for further research is to include costs for receiving the signals.
In this way one obtains a model for optimal sampling, closely related to statistical
decision theory. For the standard real options model this has been done by Moscarini
and Smith (2001). An interpretation of such a model could be that a ¯rm can decide
once about the intensity and quality of R&D, leading to a combination of ¹ and ¸.
If one assumes a cost function for ¹ and ¸ one can solve a two stage decision problem
where the ¯rst stage consists of determining R&D intensity and quantity, while the
second stage consists of the timing of investment. In fact, this chapter solves the
second stage. With simulations one could solve the ¯rst stage, using our analysis as
an input. Since the value stream depends on the (rather complicated) ¯rst passage
density of the threshold, analytical results can probably not be found. One could
even try to extend the model to a situation where the ¯rm can continuously adjust
its R&D intensity and quality, adding again to the complexity of the problem.
Finally, one could extend the idea of diminishing uncertainty. For instance,
one could consider a market where two ¯rms are competing in quantities or prices,
with imperfect information about each each other's cost functions. Gradually, ¯rms
receive signals on each other's behaviour from which they infer the opponent's cost
function, which then in°uences their strategies.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 3.1
Denote the denominator of ª by d(ª). Analogously, we denote the numerator of ª
by n(ª). Using ¯1 ¸ 1 ¡ ¸, we obtain that
n(ª) = ¯1(r + ¹)(r + ¹¸) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)(r + ¹(¯1 + ¸))
¡ ¹(2¸ ¡ 1)[¯1(r + ¹) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)]
· ¯1(r + ¹)(r + ¹¸) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)(r + ¹(¯1 + ¸))
¡ ¹(2¸ ¡ 1)[r(1 ¡ ¸) + ¹(1 ¡ ¸)
2]
< d(ª):
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Hence, ª < 1.
If r = 0, it holds that ¯1 = ¸. Therefore,
n(0) = ¸¹
2(1 ¡ ¸) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)¹ = 0:
Furthermore, using that ¯1 ¸ 1 ¡ ¸ and
@¯1
@r > 0, it can be obtained that
dn(ª)
dr





r(¹(2 ¡ ¸) + r) + ¹
2(1 ¡ ¸)
2¢









So, ª > 0 and p¤ is a well-de¯ned probability. Furthermore, since UH > I and










B Proof of Proposition 3.2
Simple calculus gives the result for UH and I. To prove the proposition for r, ¹,
and ¸, let us ¯rst derive the comparative statics of ¯1 for these parameters. First,









From Figure 3.1 one can see that @Q
@¯1 > 0. Furthermore, @Q
@r = ¡
¯1
¹ < 0. Hence, it
must hold that
@¯1
@r > 0. In a similar way one obtains
@¯1
@¹ < 0 and
@¯1
@¸ > 0.
The numerator and denominator of ª can be written in the following form:
n(ª) = ´(r;¹;¸) ¡ 2¹(1 ¡ ¸)³(r;¹;¸);
d(ª) = ´(r;¹;¸) ¡ 2¹(1 ¡ ¸)º(r;¹;¸);3: Information Streams and Capital Budgeting 75
where
´(r;¹;¸) = ¯1(r + ¹)(r + ¹¸) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)(r + ¹(¯1 + ¸));
³(r;¹;¸) = ¯1(r + ¹) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸);
º(r;¹;¸) = r(1 ¡ ¸) + ¹(1 ¡ ¸)
2:
Since ª > 0, this implies that to determine the sign of the derivative of ª with re-
spect to one of the parameters, one only needs to compare the respective derivatives












@r < 0 and
@p¤
@r > 0.
For ¸ a similar exercise can be done, yielding
@³(¢)
@¸














@¸ > 0. ¤











¹ + 1)2 ¡ 4¸(1 ¡ ¸)
:















¹ + 1)2 ¡ 4¸(1 ¡ ¸)
¡ ¸(1 ¡ ¸);
@º(¢)
@¹
= (1 ¡ ¸)
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2(r + ¹) ¡ ¹r(r + ¹)
¢q
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¹ + 1)2 ¡ 4¸(1 ¡ ¸) ¸
r(r + ¹)2 ¡ ¹3¡
( r
¹ + 1)2 ¡ 4¸(1 ¡ ¸)
¢
¹(¹2 ¡ r2) ¡ 2¹3(1 ¡ ¸)
:
Since the last inequality does not always hold, a knife-edged result for ¹ cannot be
obtained.Chapter 4
Symmetric Equilibria in Game
Theoretic Real Option Models
4.1 Introduction
The timing of an investment project is an important problem in capital budgeting.
Many decision criteria have been proposed in the literature, the net present value
(NPV) rule being the most famous one. In the past twenty years the real options
literature emerged (cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1996)) in which uncertainty about the
pro¯tability of an investment project is explicitly taken into account. In the standard
real option model the value of the investment project is assumed to follow a geometric
Brownian motion. By solving the resulting optimal stopping problem one can show
that it is optimal for the ¯rm to wait longer with investing than when the ¯rm uses
the NPV approach.
A natural extension of the one ¯rm real option model is to consider a situation
where several ¯rms have the option to invest in the same project. Important ¯elds
of application of the game theoretic real options approach are R&D competition,
technology adoption and new market models. Restricting ourselves to a duopoly
framework, the aim of this chapter is to propose a method that solves the coor-
dination problems which arise if there is a ¯rst mover advantage that creates a
preemptive threat and, hence, erodes the option value. In the resulting preemption
equilibrium, situations can occur where it is optimal for one ¯rm to invest, but not
for both. The coordination problem then is to determine which ¯rm will invest.
This problem is particularly of interest if both ¯rms are ex ante identical. In the
literature, several contributions (see Grenadier (2000) for an overview) solve this co-
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ordination problem by making explicit assumptions which are often unsatisfactory.
In this chapter, we propose a method, based on Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), to
solve the coordination problem endogenously.
The basic idea of the method is that one splits the game into a timing game
where the preemption moment is determined and a game that is played either as
soon as the preemption moment has been reached, or when the starting point is such
that it is immediately optimal for one ¯rm to invest but not for both. The outcome
of the latter game determines which ¯rm is the ¯rst investor. The ¯rst game is
a game in continuous time where strategies are given by a cumulative distribution
function. The second game is analogous to a repeated game in which ¯rms play a
¯xed (mixed) strategy (invest or wait) until at least one ¯rm invests.
As an illustration a simpli¯ed version of the model of Smets (1991) that is pre-
sented in Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Section 9.3), is analysed. In the preemption
equilibrium situations occur where it is optimal for one ¯rm to invest, but at the
same time investment is not bene¯cial if both ¯rms decide to do so. Nevertheless,
contrary to e.g. Smets (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1996), we ¯nd that there are
scenarios in which both ¯rms invest at the same time, which leads to a low payo® for
both of them. We obtain that such a coordination failure can occur with positive
probability at points in time where the payo® of the ¯rst investor, the leader, is
strictly larger than the payo® of the other ¯rm, the follower. From our analysis it
can thus be concluded that Smets' statement that "if both players move simulta-
neously, each of them becomes leader with probability one half and follower with
probability one half" (see Smets (1991, p. 12) and Dixit and Pindyck (1996, p. 313))
need not be true.
The point we make here extends to other contributions that include the real
option framework in duopoly models. These papers, such as Grenadier (1996),
Dutta et al. (1995), and Weeds (2002), make unsatisfactory assumptions with the
aim to be able to ignore the possibility of simultaneous investment at points of time
that this is not optimal. Grenadier (1996, pp. 1656-1657) assumes that "if each
tries to build ¯rst, one will randomly (i.e., through the toss of a coin) win the race",
while Dutta et al. (1995, p.568) assume that "If both [¯rms] i and j attempt to
enter at any period t, then only one of them succeeds in doing so".
In a recent paper, Weeds (2002) uses Markov strategies resulting in two di®erent
investment patterns, where in one of them the ¯rms invest sequentially. In these
asymmetric preemption equilibria one of the ¯rms is the ¯rst mover with probability4: Symmetric Equilibria in Game Theoretic Real Option Models 79
one. This implies that the probability of a coordination failure is always zero. In
that paper, this result holds because of the assumption that the value of the starting
point of the geometric Brownian motion is lower than the value corresponding to
the preemption point. For more general stochastic processes and arbitrary starting
points this claim needs not be true. In our framework the two di®erent outcomes
that Weeds (2002) reports can be obtained by one pair of symmetric strategies,
thereby solving the coordination problem endogenously. Furthermore, we show our
result for more general stochastic processes.
In this chapter we extend the strategy spaces and equilibrium concepts as in-
troduced in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) to a stochastic framework. In a recent
paper, Boyer et al. (2001) make a similar attempt. Their adaptation however is less
suitable to model war of attrition situations as could arise in stochastic analogues
of e.g. Hendricks et al. (1988) or models in which both preemption and war of
attrition equilibria can arise (see Chapter 5).
Furthermore, we provide some evidence that supports the simultaneous mod-
elling of uncertainty and strategic interaction. Since game theoretic real option
models lead to more conceptual and analytical complexities than both one-¯rm real
option models and deterministic investment timing games, it is necessary to provide
some evidence of its usefulness. We do so by making several comparisons using the
basic game theoretic real option model by Smets (1991). Firstly, we analyse the dif-
ferent equilibrium scenarios that arise from deterministic models and the model with
uncertainty. By using simulations we show that in a substantial number of cases the
stochastic model predicts a di®erent equilibrium type than its deterministic coun-
terpart. Secondly, we analyse the option value under competition. Theoretically it
is clear that competition erodes the option value. Huisman (2001) shows that the
option value can even become negative in a preemption equilibrium. However, for
the model to be of interest it should be the case that the option value is signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero. Furthermore, the option value should be signi¯cantly di®erent
from the option value in the monopoly case. We show that in preemption equilibria
this is indeed the case. Finally, we analyse welfare e®ects in game theoretic real
option models. To do so, we ¯rst introduce an appropriate welfare concept. Then,
again by using simulations, we show that the stochastic model leads to signi¯cantly
di®erent welfare predictions as opposed to the deterministic model. In fact, we show
that welfare is signi¯cantly higher in the deterministic model. Again, this is some
evidence that game theoretic real option models are worth studying.80 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
The contents of the chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2 the equilibrium concept
is presented and a symmetric equilibrium is derived, which is applied to the Dixit
and Pindyck (1996, Section 9.3) model in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 we perform a
simulation study to show that game theoretic real option models lead to substantially
di®erent results than simpler models. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The General Model
The setting of the game is as follows. Two identical ¯rms1 i = 1;2 both have access
to an identical investment project. In the market there is some idiosyncratic risk
or uncertainty about for example the pro¯tability of the investment project. This
creates an option value for the ¯rms to postpone investment. On the other hand,
strategic considerations push ¯rms not to wait too long.
This section introduces the equilibrium notions and accompanying strategy spaces
for timing games under uncertainty. We follow the approach that was introduced in
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) for the deterministic counterpart.
In most contributions to the literature, uncertainty is modelled by means of a
geometric Brownian motion. We use a more general approach which has a geometric
Brownian motion as a special case. Let (­;F;(Ft)0·t·1;P) be a ¯ltered probability
space satisfying the usual hypotheses.2 With respect to the ¯ltration (Ft)0·t·1 on
(­;F;P), let (Jt)0·t<1 be an adapted cadlag process and let (Z1;:::;Zd) be a
vector of semimartingales with for all j = 1;:::;d, Z
j
0 = 0 a.s. Furthermore, let for
all j = 1;:::;d, Fj : I D ! I D be mappings that are functional Lipschitz. Then we
know from Theorem 2.12 that there is a unique semimartingale (Yt)0·t<1, which,
for all ! 2 ­, is the solution to the stochastic di®erential equation3








In the remainder, Y will be the stochastic process that governs the uncertainty about
the pro¯tability of the investment project. Examples of stochastic processes that
can be used are the geometric Brownian motion or the more general L¶ evy process.
1Even with non-identical ¯rms, the coordination problem that is analysed in this chapter can
arise as is shown in Pawlina and Kort (2001).
2For technical details, see Section 2.4.
3In the remainder, let for t 2 [0;1), t¡ be de¯ned by t¡ = lim
¢t"0
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Given the stochastic process (Yt)t¸0 we can de¯ne the payo® functions for the
¯rms. If there is a ¯rm that invests ¯rst while the other ¯rm does not, the ¯rm that
moves ¯rst is called the leader. When it invests at time t its discounted pro¯t stream
is given by L(Yt). The other ¯rm is called the follower. When the leader invests at
time t the optimal investment strategy of the follower leads to a discounted pro¯t
stream F(Yt). If both ¯rms invest simultaneously at time t, the discounted pro¯t
stream for both ¯rms is given by M(Yt). It is assumed that L(¢), F(¢) and M(¢) are
continuous and di®erentiable functions.
4.2.1 The Equilibrium Concept
As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), the aim is to ¯nd an equilibrium that is the
continuous time analogue of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.4 To de¯ne the
strategy spaces and equilibrium concept we extend and slightly adapt the concepts
introduced in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) in a path-wise way, i.e. we consider the
paths (Yt)t¸0 that arise for each ! 2 ­.5 First we de¯ne a simple strategy for the
subgame starting at t0 ¸ 0.
De¯nition 4.1 A simple strategy for player i 2 f1;2g in the subgame starting at




i ) : [t0;1) £ ­ !
[0;1] £ [0;1], such that for all ! 2 ­
1. G
t0
i (¢;!) is non-decreasing and right-continuous with left limits;
2. ®
t0
i (¢;!) is right-continuous with left limits;
3. if ®
t0
i (t;!) = 0 and t = inffu ¸ t0j®
t0
i (u;!) > 0g, then the right-derivative of
®
t0
i (t;!) exists and is positive.
Denote for given ! 2 ­ the set of simple strategies of player i in the subgame
starting at t0 by Ss













Given t0 ¸ 0 and ! 2 ­, for i = 1;2, G
t0
i (t;!) is the probability that ¯rm i
has invested before or at time t ¸ t0. The function ®
t0
i (¢;!) describes a sequence
of atoms and is therefore called the atom function. The atom function gives ¯rms
4For a description of subgame perfect equilibrium in discrete time, see Section 2.7.1.
5The equilibrium concept of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) is also linked to the concept used by
Simon (1987a) and Simon (1987b).82 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
the opportunity to coordinate in cases where investment by at least one ¯rm is
optimal. Let t ¸ t0 be the ¯rst point in time for some ! 2 ­ and t0 ¸ 0, at which
investment is pro¯table for exactly one of the two ¯rms. G
t0
i (t;!) ¡ G
t0
i (t¡;!) = 1
for i = 1;2 leads to investment by both ¯rms a.s. which is suboptimal. Hence,
if one only uses the cumulative distribution function (as in Dutta and Rustichini
(1995) for example) symmetric strategies will lead to a suboptimal outcome a.s. In
discrete time this problem does not exist because one can model a procedure in
which a game is repeated just until one ¯rm invests. In continuous time this cannot
be done, basically because it is not known what is meant by "last period" and "next
period". See Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) for an extensive discussion.
The atom function replicates discrete time results that are lost by modelling in
continuous time (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1985, p. 390)). To see this, we leave
the continuous time setting for a moment, ¯xing the value of the stochastic process
for some t ¸ t0 and consider the following game in discrete time, as depicted in













Figure 4.1: Payo®s and actions in the bimatrix game. Firm 1 is the row player and
¯rm 2 the column player.
and does not invest with probability 1¡®i until at least one of the ¯rms has invested,
given that the realisation of the stochastic process remains constant. Let ¢t be the
size of a period and let T¢ be such that for some constant T 2 I N, T¢=¢t = T.
Then if we take ¢t = 1 we get for instance that the probability that both ¯rms
invest simultaneously before time T, denoted by I P(1;2jT), is given by
I P(1;2jT)
= ®1®2 + (1 ¡ ®1)(1 ¡ ®2)®1®2 + ¢¢¢ + (1 ¡ ®1)
T¡1(1 ¡ ®2)
T¡1®1®2:
Letting ¢t # 0 we get a result that is independent of T and that represents the
probability that ¯rms invest simultaneously at any time ¿ ¸ t0 in our continuous4: Symmetric Equilibria in Game Theoretic Real Option Models 83
time model,















®1 + ®2 ¡ ®1®2
< 1:
(4.2)
Returning to the continuous time model, de¯ne for all ! 2 ­ the time of the





1 if ®i(t;!) = 0, 8t ¸ t0,
infft ¸ t0j®i(t;!) > 0g otherwise,
and ¿(t0;!) = minf¿1(t0;!);¿2(t0;!)g. In the continuous time setting it is assumed
that at time ¿(t0;!), the game depicted in Figure 4.1 is played, where ¯rm i invests
with probability ®
t0
i (¿;!) > 0. The value of the atom function therefore measures
the intensity of the ¯rm's willingness to invest. Furthermore, it is assumed that
playing the game consumes no time6 and if ¯rm 1 chooses row 2 and ¯rm 2 chooses
column 2 the game is repeated instantaneously. As soon as at least one ¯rm has
invested this game is over and time continues. So, at time ¿ at least one ¯rm invests.
It can be the case that only one ¯rm invests, but it is also possible that both ¯rms
invest simultaneously. Note that from eq. (4.2) it follows that with symmetric
strategies ®
t0
1 (¿;!) = ®
t0
2 (¿;!) = ® we get
I P(1;2j¿) =
®2




Hence, if ® > 0 the probability that both ¯rms invest simultaneously is strictly
positive. This is not in accordance with many contributions in the literature where
(unsatisfactory) assumptions are made to sustain the claim that only one ¯rm invests
(e.g. Weeds (2002) and Grenadier (1996)).
To summarise, simple strategies allow for several investment strategies of ¯rm i 2
f1;2g. Firstly, the cumulative distribution function G
t0
i (¢;!) allows for continuous
investment strategies (used in war of attrition models). Secondly, it allows for
isolated atoms that are used for example in Chapter 5. Finally, via the atom function
®t0(¢;!), there is the possibility of a sequence of atoms that results in investment
6This implies that Yt(!) remains constant and that there is no discounting.84 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
by at least one ¯rm a.s. The atom function plays an important role in preemption
games as will be clear from the next subsection.
Our de¯nition of simple strategies di®ers from Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).
Firstly, the cumulative distribution function in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) is con-
ditional on the fact that no ¯rm has invested yet. This implies that in their approach
simple strategies do not describe the behaviour of each ¯rm for the entire range of
time. As soon as ¯rm i has invested, the simple strategy cannot describe ¯rm
j's strategy anymore. Furthermore, it implies that the strategy of a ¯rm depends
on the strategy of the other ¯rm which is conceptually undesirable, because each
¯rm must in principle be able to choose its strategy without taking into account
the strategy of its competitor. Secondly, Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) take the
following restriction on the atom function in their de¯nition of simple strategies:
®
t0
i (t;!) > 0 ) G
t0
i (t;!) = 1, which results from G
t0
i (¢;!) being the cumulative
distribution function of a conditional distribution. However, it is not guaranteed
that ¯rm i invests with probability one if its atom function is strictly positive. This
requirement also implicates that the investment strategy of ¯rm i cannot be de-
scribed by simple strategies if ¯rm j has invested. The analysis in Fudenberg and




i (¢;!))i=1;2 pair to describe a preemption situa-
tion in a deterministic analogue to our stochastic model. They conclude that at the
preemption moment (to be made precise later) one ¯rm invests and the other waits.
However, since G
t0





i (¢;!))i=1;2 pair cannot describe the strategy of the ¯rm that has
not invested at the preemption moment. In our model, the cumulative distribution
G
t0
i (¢;!) is unconditional and hence can describe a ¯rm's strategy for the entire time
span.
Let ! 2 ­. The expected discounted value for ¯rm i = 1;2 of the subgame
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where ¸i(t;!) = G
t0





















































if ¿i(t0;!) > ¿j(t0;!); and
Wi(¿;st0(!)) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
M(Y¿(!)) if ®
t0
i (¿;!) = ®
t0




i (¿;!)(1 ¡ ®
t0
j (¿;!))L(Y¿(!)) + ®
t0













i (¿;!) + ®
t0






if 2 > ®
t0
i (¿;!) + ®
t0










j )0(¿;!) if ®
t0
i (¿;!) = ®
t0
j (¿;!) = 0,
(4.4)
if ¿i(t0;!) = ¿j(t0;!).
In the last case, thus where ¿i(t0;!) = ¿j(t0;!), the function Wi(¢) has been
obtained by using limiting arguments similar to the one used in eq. (4.2). For
®i(¢) = ®j(¢) = 0, Wi(¢) has been derived by applying L'Hopital's rule. Here one
uses the assumptions on existence and positivity of the right-derivative of the atom
function ®(¢).
The de¯nition of simple strategies does not a priori exclude the possibility that
both ¯rms choose an atom function ® that turns out to be inconsistent with the
cumulative distribution function G. In equilibrium it should naturally be the case
that inconsistencies of this kind do not occur. Therefore, we introduce the notion
of ®-consistency.86 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS








i=1;2 for the subgame starting
at t0 ¸ 0 is ®-consistent if for i = 1;2 it holds that for all ! 2 ­ and t ¸ t0,
®
t0
i (t;!) ¡ ®
t0
i (t¡;!) 6= 0 ) G
t0













i (t;!) + ®
t0






De¯nition 4.2 requires that at time ¿(t0;!) the jump in the cumulative distribution
function for both ¯rms should be equal to the probability that the ¯rm invests by
playing the game as depicted in Figure 4.1. Note that if ®
t0
i (t;!) ¡ ®
t0
i (t¡;!) 6= 0
and ®
t0
i (t;!) = 1, then ®-consistency implies that G
t0
i (t;!) = 1.
A Nash equilibrium for the subgame starting at t0 is then de¯ned as follows.




!2­, s¤(!) 2 Ss(t0;!), all
! 2 ­, is a Nash equilibrium for the subgame starting at t0 if for all ! 2 ­, s¤(!)
is ®-consistent and
8i2f1;2g8si2Ss




To de¯ne subgame perfect equilibrium, the notion of closed loop strategy is needed.
De¯nition 4.4 A closed loop strategy for player i 2 f1;2g is for all ! 2 ­ a












i(t;!) for all t ¸ 0 that satis¯es the following intertem-
poral consistency conditions for all ! 2 ­:
1. 80·t·u·v<1 : v = inff¿ > tjY¿ = Yvg ) Gt
i(v;!) = Gu
i (v;!);
2. 80·t·u·v<1 : v = inff¿ > tjY¿ = Yvg ) ®t
i(v;!) = ®u
i (v;!).
For all ! 2 ­, the set of closed loop strategies for player i 2 f1;2g is denoted
by Scl





The intertemporal consistency conditions di®er from their deterministic counter-
parts in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). Taking their conditions without adaptation
implies that one requires that for each ¯rm the probability of having invested before
time v starting at time t equals the probability of not having invested before time u4: Symmetric Equilibria in Game Theoretic Real Option Models 87
starting from t times the probability of having invested before time v starting at time
u. This is not a sensible requirement in the stochastic case. Consider for example a
situation with one ¯rm such that investment yields higher revenues for higher values
of Y . So, the probability of investment is monotonic in Y . Let 0 · t · ¿ · u · v
and suppose that for certain ! 2 ­, Y is strictly increasing on [t;¿], strictly decreas-
ing on (¿;u] and strictly increasing on (u;v] and that Yt = Yv. Consider a simple
strategy with Gt(t;!) = 1=4 and Gt(¿;!) = Gt(u;!) = Gt(v;!) = 1=2. Intertem-
poral consistency in the Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) sense would then imply that
Gu(v;!) = 0, whereas one would expect Gu(v;!) = Gt(t;!) = 1=4. That is, due to
randomness, ¯rst passage times are important, not time as such.
A subgame perfect equilibrium is now de¯ned in the standard way.




!2­, ¹ s(!) 2 Scl(!), all
! 2 ­, is a subgame perfect equilibrium if for all t 2 [0;1), the corresponding












is a Nash equilibrium for the subgame
starting at t.
Since we have de¯ned strategies and equilibria path-wise we will, for notational
convenience, in the remainder drop ! as an argument.
4.2.2 Preemption Games
The coordination problem that we want to consider arises in cases where there exists
an incentive to be the ¯rst mover. These games are called preemption games, because
there is an incentive to preempt the competitor. Apart from the assumptions already
made we introduce ¯ve additional assumptions:
1. there exists a unique YF such that L(Y ) = F(Y ) = M(Y ) for all Y ¸ YF and
F(Y ) > M(Y ) for all Y < YF;
2. L(0) < F(0);
3. F(¢) is strictly increasing for Y < YF;
4. L(¢) ¡ F(¢) is strictly quasi-concave on [0;YF).
Note that in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), L(¢), F(¢) and M(¢) are functions of time,
whereas in this model they are functions of the value of the stochastic process Y .
Because of these assumptions there exists a unique YP · YF such that L(Y ) <
F(Y ) for all 0 · Y < YP, L(YP) = F(YP), and L(Y ) > F(Y ) for all YP < Y < YF.88 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
Furthermore, de¯ne YL to be the location of the maximum of the discounted leader
value.8 It is assumed that YL > YP, i.e. no war of attrition arises. For the remainder
de¯ne the following stopping times T t
P = inffu ¸ tjYu ¸ YPg and T t
F = inffu ¸
tjYu ¸ YFg.9
In case ¯rms are identical, coordination on a non-symmetric equilibrium is hard
to establish in a noncooperative setting. Therefore, we concentrate on equilibria
that are supported by symmetric strategies.10 In Appendix A the following theorem
is proved.
Theorem 4.1 There is a subgame perfect equilibrium with symmetric strategies,
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) if T t
P · u < T t
F,







> > > <
> > > :











) if T t
P · u < T t
F,
1 if u ¸ T t
F.
(4.6)
Moreover, if Y has continuous sample-paths a.s. the strategies in (4.5) and (4.6)
constitute the unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium.





P at least one ¯rm invests. Note that it may well be possible that T
t0
P = t0,
i.e. that Y0 ¸ YP. This is a case that cannot be analysed in the framework of e.g.
8In case of exogenous ¯rm roles, i.e. where the ¯rms know beforehand which one of them is the
¯rst investor, it is optimal for the leader to invest at the moment t that Yt = YL, when Y0 · YL.
9The existence of YL and YF need not be assumed but can be obtained from solving optimal
stopping problems. For the general semimartingale case existence is not readily guaranteed. If the
solution to eq. (4.1) satis¯es the Markov property and some other technical conditions, existence
and uniqueness of YL and YF can be obtained (see e.g. Shiryaev (1978)).
10The focus on symmetric strategies is, however, not a priori clear. There is a growing literature
on equilibrium selection started by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) that shows that in games with
symmetric players, asymmetric equilibria can survive (cf. Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1998)).4: Symmetric Equilibria in Game Theoretic Real Option Models 89
Weeds (2002). The probability with which ¯rm i invests is determined by the atom
function and corresponds with the jump in the function G
t0
i (¢) which implies that
the strategies satisfy the ®-consistency condition of De¯nition 4.2. The probability
of investment at time T
t0
P is determined by balancing the three possible scenarios:
¯rm 1 invests and ¯rm 2 does not, ¯rm 2 invests and ¯rm 1 does not, and both ¯rm




P ) is such that ¯rm i's expected value
equals F(YT
t0
P ) which is the value that it can guarantee anyway. This property is
called the principle of rent equalisation. Note that if YT
t0




P ) = 0
since L(YP) = F(YP). The atom function is increasing in L(¢)¡F(¢) and decreasing
in L(¢)¡M(¢). This can be explained by the fact that if the ¯rst mover advantage,
L(¢) ¡ F(¢), increases it becomes more attractive to become the leader, i.e. ¯rms
will increase the intensity of their sequence of atoms. Conversely, if the di®erence
between the leader payo® and the payo® of mutual investment increases, ¯rms are
less willing to risk mutual investment and therefore they decrease the intensity of
the sequence of atoms. If t ¸ T
t0
F both ¯rms have invested with probability one.
4.3 The Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Section 9.3)
Model
In this section we apply the equilibrium concept introduced in the previous section to
the model analysed in Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Section 9.3).11 This model considers
an investment project with sunk costs I > 0. After the investment is made, the ¯rm
can produce one unit of product at any point in time. Since the number of ¯rms
is two, market supply is Q 2 f0;1;2g. The price, P, is given by inverse market
demand D(Q) multiplied by a shock Y which follows a geometric Brownian motion
process. So, P = Y D(Q). In Figure 4.2 the three value functions are plotted. If the
leader invests at Y < YF the follower's value is maximised when the follower invests
at YF.
In the remainder of this chapter we will only consider the subgame starting at
t0 = 0. Therefore, we will, for notational convenience, drop the time superscripts for
strategies and stopping times. The equilibrium outcome depends on the value Y0,
which is the initial value of (Yt)0·t<1. To determine the outcomes, three regions have
to be distinguished. The ¯rst region is de¯ned by Y0 · YP: If we restrict ourselves
11This model is a simpli¯ed version of the model of Smets (1991) and is also extensively analysed










Figure 4.2: Value functions in the Dixit and Pindyck model.
to symmetric equilibrium strategies, it follows from Theorem 4.1 that there are
three possible equilibrium outcomes. In the ¯rst outcome ¯rm 1 is the leader and
invests at YP and ¯rm 2 is the follower and invests at YF. Note that in this case
the symmetric equilibrium strategies lead to an asymmetric equilibrium outcome. In
this particular outcome ¯rm 1 is the ¯rst one to invest in the repeated game depicted
in Figure 4.1. The second outcome is the symmetric counterpart: ¯rm 2 is the leader
and invests at YP and ¯rm 1 is the follower and invests at YF. The third possibility
is that both ¯rms invest simultaneously at YP, i.e. both ¯rms invest in the same
round of the repeated game depicted in ¯gure 4.1. However, this equilibrium arises
with probability zero. To see this, note that since a geometric Brownian motion
has continuous sample-paths and at YP it holds that L(YP) = F(YP), it can be
concluded from eq. (4.6) that ®(¿) = ®(TP) = 0. Now it directly follows from eq.
(4.3) that the probability of joint investment is zero. Using the same kind of limiting
argument as in eq. (4.2), we obtain that the probability that player i is the only
one who invests at t = ¿, I P(ij¿), is given by
I P(ij¿) =
®i(¿)(1 ¡ ®j(¿))
®i(¿) + ®j(¿) ¡ ®i(¿)®j(¿)
: (4.7)
By applying L'Hopital's rule, while imposing symmetry, one then obtains that in4: Symmetric Equilibria in Game Theoretic Real Option Models 91
equilibrium










So, with equal probability either ¯rm becomes the leader. Due to the de¯nition of
YP, i.e. L(YP) = F(YP), it follows that the expected value of each player equals
Vi(¿; ¹ s
¿) = Wi(¿; ¹ s
¿) = 1
2(L(YP) + F(YP)) = F(YP):
In the second region it holds that YP < Y0 < YF: There are three possible
outcomes. Firstly, since L(Y ) exceeds F(Y ) in case Y 2 (YP;YF), it can be obtained
from eq. (4.6) that ®1(0) > 0. Due to ¿ = 0 and eq. (4.7) we know that with
probability
®1(0)(1 ¡ ®2(0))
®1(0) + ®2(0) ¡ ®1(0)®2(0)
;
¯rm 1 invests at t = 0 and ¯rm 2 invests at TF. A second scenario is given by the
symmetric counterpart of the ¯rst scenario. Finally, equation (4.2) implies that the
¯rms invest simultaneously at t = 0 with probability
®1(0)®2(0)
®1(0) + ®2(0) ¡ ®1(0)®2(0)
> 0;




®i(0)(1 ¡ ®j(0))L(Y0) + ®j(0)(1 ¡ ®i(0))F(Y0) + ®i(0)®j(0)M(Y0)
®i(0) + ®j(0) ¡ ®i(0)®j(0)
= F(Y0);
where the latter equation follows from eq. (4.6). Since there are ¯rst mover advan-
tages in this region, each ¯rm is willing to invest with positive probability. However,
this implies via eq. (4.2) that the probability of simultaneous investment, leading
to a low payo® M(Y0), is also positive. Since the ¯rms are both assumed to be risk
neutral, they will ¯x the probability of investment such that their expected value
equals F(Y0), which is also their payo® if they let the other ¯rm invest ¯rst.
When Y0 is in the third region [YF;1), according to eqs. (4.2) and (4.6) the
outcome exhibits joint investment at Y0. The value of each ¯rm is again F(Y0).92 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
4.4 The Interaction of Competition and Uncer-
tainty
In this section we describe some consequences of the simultaneous modelling of
strategic interaction and investment uncertainty. To do so, we consider the basic
game theoretic real option model as described in Smets (1991) and Huisman (2001,
Chapter 7). First, we brie°y describe that model and its results. For further details
the reader is referred to Huisman (2001, Chapter 7). Then we address the issue of
equilibrium selection in the presence of multiple equilibria. We also compare the
resulting equilibria of the model with uncertainty and its deterministic counterpart.
From the previous section it might be clear that the presence of strategic interaction
erodes the option value of waiting with investment. By performing a simulation we
test whether in a preemption equilibrium the option value signi¯cantly di®ers from
zero and from the option value in the monopoly case. We conclude this section
by comparing welfare results for the model with uncertainty and the deterministic
model.
In the standard game theoretic real option model there are two ¯rms who have
the opportunity to invest in the same project at sunk costs I > 0. Both ¯rms are
assumed to be risk-neutral and have the same discount rate 0 < r < 1. At time
t ¸ 0 the pro¯t °ow of ¯rm i 2 f1;2g equals
YtDNiNj;





0 if ¯rm k has not invested,
1 if ¯rm k has invested.
Uncertainty is captured by the stochastic process (Yt)t¸0 which is assumed to follow
a geometric Brownian motion, i.e.
dYt = ¹Ytdt + ¾Ytdwt;
Y0 = y;
where y > 0, 0 < ¹ < r is the trend, ¾ > 0 is the volatility, and (wt)t¸0 is a
Wiener process, i.e. dwt
iid » N(0;dt). The following restrictions are made on the
deterministic part of the pro¯t °ow:
D10 > D11 > D00 > D01: (4.9)4: Symmetric Equilibria in Game Theoretic Real Option Models 93
Furthermore, it is assumed that there is a ¯rst mover advantage, i.e.
D10 ¡ D00 > D11 ¡ D01: (4.10)










r¡¹ Y ¯1 +
Y D01
r¡¹ if Y < YF,
Y D11
r¡¹ ¡ I if Y ¸ YF,
where ¯1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation 1
2¾2¯2 +(¹¡ 1
2¾2)¯ ¡r = 0.
It can be shown that ¯1 > 1. The optimal (unique) threshold for investment of the















¶¯1 YF(D11 ¡ D10)
r ¡ ¹
:
The preemption threshold YP is a value such that L(YP) = F(YP). It can be shown
that it is unique and that it satis¯es 0 < YP < YF.
Suppose that one of the ¯rms is assigned the leader role, i.e. the other ¯rm
cannot invest earlier than this ¯rm. In this case, the competitive pressure is taken
away and the leader can determine the optimal investment threshold YL. It can be







where it holds that L(YL) > L(YP).
Suppose that both ¯rms decide to invest simultaneously at time Tµ, where
Tµ = infft ¸ 0jYt ¸ µg;















if Y < µ,
Y D11
r¡¹ ¡ I if Y ¸ µ.
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This threshold is unique as well and it satis¯es YJ > YP. For further reference,
de¯ne the stopping times TP = infft ¸ 0jYt ¸ YPg, TF = infft ¸ 0jYt ¸ YFg,
TL = infft ¸ 0jYt ¸ YLg, and TJ = infft ¸ 0jYt ¸ YJg.
To describe the equilibria of the investment game, we distinguish two scenar-
ios. In the ¯rst scenario, there exists Y 2 (0;YF) such that L(Y ) ¸ J(Y;YJ). In
this scenario we have a situation similar to the model described in Section 4.3, i.e.
the unique symmetric equilibrium is supported by the strategies described in The-
orem 4.1. In the other scenario, L(Y ) < J(Y;YJ) for all Y 2 (0;YF). In this case
a preemption equilibrium still exists, but there is also a continuum of joint invest-
ment equilibria. The closed loop strategies that support the latter subgame perfect









0 if s < T ¤,
1 if s ¸ T ¤,
for any T ¤ 2 [T t
S;T t
J], where T t
S = inffs ¸ tjYt ¸ YSg and
YS = minfµj8Y ¸0 : J(Y;µ) ¸ L(Y )g:
















In order to avoid the problem of simultaneous investment that can arise in the
preemption equilibrium we assume for the remainder of this section that ! 2 ~ ­ =
f! 2 ­jY0 < YPg.
4.4.1 Equilibrium Selection
Consider the scenario where both the preemption and the joint investment equilibria
exist, which occurs when f > g. It can be shown that the equilibrium where both
¯rms invest at TJ is Pareto dominant. In many contributions12 it is assumed that
this is the equilibrium that ¯rms coordinate on, because of the Pareto dominance.
However, it is argued in the equilibrium selection literature (cf. Harsanyi and Selten
12Cf. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), Huisman (2001), and Pawlina and Kort (2001).4: Symmetric Equilibria in Game Theoretic Real Option Models 95
(1988)) that Pareto dominance is not the correct criterion to select equilibria. The
Pareto dominant equilibrium is the equilibrium whose outcome is most bene¯cial
for all players together. That is, if ¯rms could make binding agreements on the
timing of investment they would choose the Pareto dominant equilibrium. However,
antitrust law forbids binding agreements of this type. Therefore, another equilibrium
selection mechanism should be applied in the presence of multiple equilibria. In
this subsection we use the concept of risk dominance that has been introduced in
Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
Consider the symmetric bimatrix game depicted in Figure 4.3, where the payo®s




Figure 4.3: A symmetric 2x2 game.
strategy Nash equilibria with payo®s (a;a) and (b;b). Suppose that a > b, i.e. the
equilibrium with payo®s (a;a) is Pareto dominant.
Suppose that each player is uncertain about the action of the other player and
that they both have a non-informative prior, that is, they attach equal probabilities
to the other player playing each strategy. The expected payo® of playing action J is
then equal to a+c
2 while the expected payo® of playing action P equals d+b
2 . Suppose
that b¡c > a¡d. Then an expected utility maximiser will never choose action J, i.e.
action P is risk dominant. In general, an equilibrium is risk dominant if and only if
it maximises the product of the gains from unilateral deviation. Furthermore, from
the evolutionary game theory literature it is known that in 2x2 games it holds that
under the replicator dynamics (cf. Samuelson (1997, Chapter 2)) or under adaptive
learning (cf. Young (1998, Chapter 4)), the risk dominant equilibrium has the larger
basin of attraction. That is, it is more likely to survive evolutionary pressure in the
long-run.
The concept of risk dominance is an equilibrium selection device that is based
on individual preferences and not, as is the case with Pareto dominance, on group
preferences. Therefore, risk dominance seems to be a more appropriate selection
tool. However, we will show that in the basic game theoretic real option model the
Pareto dominant and risk dominant equilibria coincide.
If, somehow, the ¯rms can coordinate on any joint investment equilibrium they96 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
will coordinate on investing at time TJ. Therefore, we consider a strategy game
where both ¯rms can choose between playing either the optimal joint investment
strategy, i.e. investment at time TJ or the preemption strategy as described in
Theorem 4.1. We denote the ¯rst strategy by J and the latter by P. Let Vi(si;sj),
si;sj 2 fJ;Pg, denote the expected value for ¯rm i when ¯rm i plays si and ¯rm
j plays sj. This gives the following values for a, b, c and d in Figure 4.3. If both













If both ¯rms play strategy P, then, since ! 2 ~ ­, one ¯rm becomes the leader with
probability 1/2 at time TP while the other ¯rm becomes the follower. Therefore,


















If ¯rm i plays strategy J while ¯rm j plays strategy P, then ¯rm j will invest at



























Since L(YP) = F(YP) we have that b = c = d. Combining this with the following
lemma leads to the conclusion that the strategy game has two pure Nash equilibria,
namely (J;J) and (P;P).
Lemma 4.1 In the strategy game the following holds for all i 2 f1;2g:
Vi(J;J) > Vi(P;J):4: Symmetric Equilibria in Game Theoretic Real Option Models 97
Proof. Let the starting point of the geometric Brownian motion be given by y.

































where the integrals are calculated in Appendix B. Using this result we obtain that





































which proves the lemma. ¤
Since b = c = d it now follows immediately that a¡d > b¡c, which implies that
the equilibrium (J;J) is risk dominant. In the remainder we will therefore identify
a scenario with f > g with the joint investment equilibrium (J;J) as opposed to a
scenario with f < g which we identify with the equilibrium (P;P).
4.4.2 The Impact of Uncertainty on Equilibria
In this subsection we analyse the impact of uncertainty on the equilibrium outcome
of the investment timing game. To do so, we consider two situations: a deterministic
one which is characterised by setting ¾ = 0, and a stochastic case which is charac-
terised by ¾ = 0:2. Note that with ¾ = 0, applying L'Hopital's rule gives ¯1 = r
¹.
As has been mentioned before, there are two possible equilibria, joint investment or
preemption, depending on f and g.
To gain insight on the impact of uncertainty we simulate both models (¾ = 0 and
¾ = 0:2) 10000 times. For each simulation run we check for both models whether
a preemption equilibrium or a joint investment equilibrium results (by comparing f
and g). Then we calculate the percentage of cases in which a di®erent equilibrium
type is obtained.98 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
The simulation procedure is as follows. In each simulation run we (pseudo)-
randomly sample a value for D10, D11, D00 and D01 from the interval [10;200]
such that conditions (4.9) and (4.10) are satis¯ed. The sunk investment cost, I, is
randomly sampled from the interval [100;500]. As parameter values we take r = 0:1
and ¹ = 0:06. After 10000 runs we obtain that in 33.82% of the simulations the
presence of uncertainty gives a di®erent equilibrium prediction. This gives some
evidence that the addition of uncertainty to the standard deterministic investment
timing game can lead to more accurate equilibrium predictions.
4.4.3 The E®ect of Competition on the Value of Waiting
As has been observed before, the presence of competition can lead to an erosion of the
option value of waiting with investment. In a joint adoption equilibrium, the option
value is fully taken into account. In a preemption equilibrium, however, competitive
pressure makes the option of waiting less valuable. This is obvious since one can
show that the preemption point is reached earlier a.s. than the optimal time of
investment when the competitive pressure is taken away by exogenously determined
leader and follower roles (see Huisman (2001, Chapter 7) for a detailed exposition
of this point). In Huisman (2001, Chapter 7) it is also shown that ¯rms can make
an investment with a negative present value, implying a negative option value. The
present value of investment at YP equals L(YP) ¡
YPD00
r¡¹ .
We test whether in the preemption equilibrium the option value is signi¯cantly
(at 95%) di®erent from the case without competition, i.e. the case where one ¯rm
is exogenously assigned the leader role. In order to perform this test we simulate
1000 scenarios in a similar way as described above, with the restriction that we only
sample scenarios where f < g, i.e. scenarios where the preemption equilibrium is
the unique symmetric equilibrium. In each simulation run we calculate the values of
L(YP)¡
YPD00
r¡¹ , which are stored in a vector x, and L(YL)¡
YLD00
r¡¹ , which are stored
in a vector y. It is assumed that the entries in x are iid draws from a distribution
with unknown mean ¹x = I E(L(YP) ¡
YPD00
r¡¹ ) and unknown variance ¾2
x. Similarly,
we assume that y consists of iid draws from a distribution with unknown mean
¹y = I E(L(YL)) and unknown variance ¾2
y. We test the null hypothesis
H0 : ¹x = ¹y:4: Symmetric Equilibria in Game Theoretic Real Option Models 99
The central limit theorem gives that
p









where n is the number of observations, ¹ x is the sample mean of x and ¹ y is the
sample mean of y. Since it is assumed that both series are sampled from independent
distributions, taking the convolution of both distributions gives that under the null
hypothesis it holds that,
p






De¯ne the test statistic
T =
n(¹ x ¡ ¹ y)2
^ ¾2







i=1(xi¡¹ x)2 is the sample variance of x and ^ ¾2
y is the sample variance





The critical value at 0:95 is given by 3.84. In our simulation we ¯nd T = 4159:21,
which implies that the null hypothesis is rejected at 95%.
Testing the null hypothesis
H0 : I E(L(YP) ¡
YPD00
r¡¹ ) = 0;
gives a value T = 220:03 (where ¹ y and ^ ¾2
y are set to zero). So, at 95% we ¯nd
evidence that the option value in case of competition is signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero and signi¯cantly di®erent from the monopoly option value.
4.4.4 The E®ect of Uncertainty on Welfare Predictions
To assess the welfare e®ects of uncertainty in the investment timing game, we
consider, for simplicity, the case of a new market model, i.e. we assume that
D01 = D00 = 0. Since consumer surplus is contained in total welfare, we have
to specify a demand function. To do so, assume that the market is characterised by
an inverse demand function P : I R+ ! I R+ and a cost function C : I R+ ! I R+ such
that
P(q) = b ¡ aq; b > 0;a > 0;q · b
a;
C(q) = cq; 0 < c < b:100 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
If only one ¯rm is active on the market it operates as a monopolist, so that
D10 = max
q fP(q)q ¡ cqg:
Solving this optimisation problem yields the monopoly quantity qm = b¡c
2a , the
monopoly price pm = b+c
2 and D10 =
(b¡c)2
4a .
If both ¯rms are active it is assumed that they engage in quantity competition
leading to a Cournot equilibrium, i.e. for i 2 f1;2g it holds that
D11 = max
qi
fP(qi + qj)qi ¡ C(qi)g:
Solving this problem gives the duopoly quantity qd = b¡c
3a , the duopoly price pd =
b+2c
3 and D11 =
(b¡c)2
9a . Note that D10 > D11 which implies that there is a ¯rst mover
advantage.
The following lemma shows that in a new market model the joint investment
scenario does not arise.
Lemma 4.2 In a new market model (D01 = D00 = 0) it holds that f < g.
Proof. Denote x =
D10
D11 and de¯ne (cf. (4.11) and (4.12))
h(x) = f ¡ g = ¯1(x ¡ 1) + 1 ¡ x
¯1; x ¸ 1:
Note that h(1) = 0. Furthermore, we have for all x > 1,
h
0(x) = ¯1(1 ¡ x
¯1¡1) < 0;
since ¯1 ¡ 1 < 0. Hence, h(x) < 0 for all x > 1. ¤
Note that the demand function equals D(p) = b
a ¡ 1
ap. The consumer surplus
if one ¯rm is active or if both ¯rms are active are denoted by CSm and CSd,



























Let ! 2 ~ ­. In the preemption equilibrium the expected discounted consumer surplus
equals
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where y is the starting point of the geometric Brownian motion. The integrals are
calculated in Appendix B. The expected producer surplus is given by



















































Expected welfare is now de¯ned by
I E(W(y)) = I E(CS(y)) + I E(PS(y)):
In order to test whether the addition of uncertainty leads to signi¯cantly di®erent
welfare predictions, we simulate a vector of 1000 welfare results under certainty
(¾ = 0), denoted by W c, and a vector of 1000 welfare results under uncertainty
(¾ = 0:2), denoted by W u. For each series it is assumed that the observations are




We test the null hypothesis that I E(W c) = I E(W u), i.e.
H0 : ¹c = ¹u:
De¯ne the test statistic
T =
n( ¹ W c ¡ ¹ W u)2
^ ¾2
c + ^ ¾2
u
;
where n is the number of observations, ¹ W c and ¹ W u are the sample means of W c and
W u, respectively, and ^ ¾2
c and ^ ¾2
u are the sample variances of W c and W u, respectively.





In each simulation run we randomly sample values b 2 [20;60], c 2 [20;60],
a 2 [0:5;5] and I 2 [100;500] in such a way that both D10 and D11 are in the
interval [10;200]. The geometric Brownian motion is sampled from ~ ­, i.e. y < YP.
The parameter values are chosen at r = 0:1 and ¹ = 0:06. This results in T = 60:66,
which implies that the null hypothesis is rejected at 95%. So, the welfare predictions102 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
from the stochastic model are signi¯cantly di®erent from the predictions of the
deterministic model.
Testing the null hypothesis
H0 : ¹u ¸ ¹c;
using the standard test yields a value of 7:79 > 1:96. This implies that welfare
under uncertainty is signi¯cantly lower than under certainty. There are two opposing
e®ects. On the one hand, ¯rms are less willing to invest under uncertainty which
lowers consumer surplus. On the other hand, uncertainty takes away some of the
competitive pressure which is bene¯cial for the producer surplus. Our simulation
shows that the former e®ect signi¯cantly outweighs the latter e®ect.
4.5 Conclusion
At present, only a few contributions deal with the e®ects of strategic interactions on
the option value of waiting associated with investments under uncertainty.13 How-
ever, due to the importance of studying the topic of investment under uncertainty
in an oligopolistic setting, it can be expected that more papers will appear in the
immediate future. This chapter shows that taking both uncertainty and compe-
tition into account leads to signi¯cantly di®erent results for e.g. equilibrium and
welfare predictions, than treating both aspects separately. Furthermore, we propose
a method to solve a coordination problem frequently occurring in such oligopoly
models. This is especially important, since in those papers that already exist this
coordination problem is not treated in a satisfactory way. For instance, Weeds (2002)
explicitly makes the assumption that the stochastic process always starts at a value
lower than the preemption value, i.e. Y0 < YP. Furthermore, her result does not
hold for stochastic processes with non-continuous sample-paths. In Nielsen (2002),
Grenadier (1996) and Dutta et al. (1995) it is assumed that at the preemption point
only one ¯rm can succeed in investing. There are two reasons for this assumption
to be unsatisfactory. Firstly, in all these contributions the ¯rms are assumed to be
identical so there is no a priori ground for this assumption. Secondly, the ¯rms can
invest simultaneously if it is optimal for both, so it seems unsatisfactory to exclude
this possibility simply because of the fact that it is not optimal for both ¯rms to
invest.
13For a survey see Grenadier (2000).4: Symmetric Equilibria in Game Theoretic Real Option Models 103
The reason for our outcomes to be more realistic is the following. When there is
an incentive to be the ¯rst to invest, i.e. if Y is such that L(Y ) > F(Y ) > M(Y )
both ¯rms are willing to take a risk. Since they are both assumed to be risk neutral
they will risk so much that their expected value equals F, which equals their payo®
if they allow the other ¯rm to invest ¯rst. Employing the results of Section 4.2
learns that in this case there is a positive probability that both ¯rms invest exactly
at the same time, leaving them with the low payo® M. In our framework, this risk is
explicitly taken into account by the ¯rms, as opposed to most contributions in this
¯eld. In order to obtain realistic conclusions in game theoretic real option models
it is inevitable that all aspects concerning the option e®ect and the strategic aspect
should be taken into account.
Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 4.1
First notice that since Y is a semimartingale and hence right-continuous, conti-
nuity of L(¢), F(¢) and M(¢) implies that every G-function and every ®-function
is right-continuous. Also, the strategy (¹ st)0·t<1 satis¯es the intertemporal consis-
tency conditions of De¯nition 4.4. Hence, the closed loop strategies are well-de¯ned.
Furthermore, for all t ¸ 0, ¹ st satis¯es ®-consistency.
Let t ¸ 0. The expected value of ¹ st for player i can be obtained by considering
three cases.
1. Y¿ ¸ YF
This implies that ®t
i(¿) = ®t
j(¿) = 1. The expected value is then given by
Vi(t; ¹ st) = M(Y¿) = F(YTt
P).
2. YP < Y¿ < YF
This implies that ®t
i(¿) = ®t
j(¿) = ® 2 (0;1]. The expected value then equals
Vi(t; ¹ s






(1 ¡ ®)L(Y¿) + (1 ¡ ®)F(Y¿) + ®M(Y¿)
i
= F(YTt
P):104 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
3. Y¿ = YP
This implies that ®t
i(¿) = ®t
j(¿) = ®(¿t) = 0. The expected value is given by
Vi(t; ¹ s







since YP is de¯ned such that L(YP) = F(YP).
So, Vi(t; ¹ st) = F(YTt
P).
Take any strategy for player i, (Gt
i;®t























Consider the following cases:
1. ¿i < ¿j
In this case Wi(¿; ~ st) = L(Y¿) = L(Y¿i). Hence, V i(t; ~ st) · F(YTt
P), since for
all u < T t
P(= ¿j) it holds that F(Yu) > L(Yu).
2. ¿i > ¿j




















































































3. ¿i = ¿j, ai ´ ®t
i(¿) 6= ®t
j(¿) ´ aj4: Symmetric Equilibria in Game Theoretic Real Option Models 105
In this case we obtain that, given that ¯rm j plays its equilibrium strategy aj,
Wi(t; ~ s
t) =
ai(1 ¡ aj)L(Y¿) + aj(1 ¡ ai)F(Y¿) + aiajM(Y¿)
ai + aj ¡ aiaj
=
1
ai(L(Y¿) ¡ M(Y¿)) + (1 ¡ ai)(L(Y¿) ¡ F(Y¿))
£
h
ai(F(Y¿) ¡ M(Y¿))L(Y¿) + (1 ¡ ai)(L(Y¿) ¡ F(Y¿))F(Y¿)



















Therefore, we conclude that Vi(t; ~ st) · Vi(t; ¹ st). Hence, ¹ st is a Nash equilibrium for
the subgame starting at time t.
The uniqueness result is proved in the following way. Let t0 ¸ 0 be the starting
point of a subgame. We only consider symmetric strategies. First, we show that if
t ¸ T
t0
F , then it should hold that Gt0(t) = ®t0(t) = 1. Then we show that for t < T
t0
P
it should hold that Gt0(t) = ®t0(t) = 0. Thirdly, we show that ¿ = T
t0
P . Finally, we
calculate the equilibrium value of ®t0(¿).
Let t ¸ T
t0
F and suppose that in a symmetric equilibrium ®t0(T
t0
F ) < 1. Then
there is a positive probability that no ¯rm invests at time T
t0
F . If a ¯rm deviates and
invests, it obtains L(YT
t0
F ), which is strictly larger than the value of waiting, since the
optimal investment threshold, YL, is such that YL < YF due to strict quasi-concavity
of L(¢) ¡ F(¢). Hence, postponing investment reduces the value for a ¯rm due to
discounting and thus ®t0(t) = 1. Taking into account ®-consistency this implies that
for all t ¸ T
t0
F we should have ®t0(t) = Gt0(t) = 1.
If t < T
t0
P it is strictly dominant to set Gt0(t) = ®t0(t) = 0. Suppose this strategy
is not chosen. Then if a ¯rm deviates it gets the leader role with positive probability,
leading to a lower expected payo® since F(Yt) > L(Yt).
Suppose ¿ > T
t0
P . The expected payo® at time ¿ for each ¯rm is given by
1 ¡ ®
2 ¡ ®




Because of intertemporal consistency it should hold that ¿ is the stopping time for
some value YS that satis¯es YS > YP. Therefore, Y approaches YS from below on106 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
the interval [t0;¿). Since Y has continuous sample paths and L(Yt) > F(Yt) and




F ), this implies that there exists an " > 0 such that
(1 ¡ ®)(L(Y¿) + F(Y¿)) + ®M(Y¿)
2 ¡ ®
<
2(1 ¡ ®)L(Y¿¡") + ®L(Y¿¡")
2 ¡ ®
=L(Y¿¡"):
Hence, investing at ¿ ¡ ", by which the payo® L(Y¿¡") is obtained, gives a higher
expected value. Therefore, ®t0(T
t0
P ) > 0. The corresponding jump in Gt0(T
t0
P ) follows
from ®-consistency. At time T
t0
P at least one ¯rm invests. By de¯nition it is optimal
for the follower to invest at T
t0








Finally, the atom at T
t0
P should be such as to simultaneously maximise for i 2
f1;2g the expected value, which equals (cf. (4.4))
®i(1 ¡ ®j)L(YT
t0
P ) + (1 ¡ ®i)®jF(YT
t0
P ) + ®i®jM(YT
t0
P )
®i + ®j ¡ ®i®j
; (4.13)





P ) ¡ ®jF(YT
t0








P ) + (1 ¡ ®i)®jF(YT
t0





Imposing symmetry ®i = ®j = ® yields
(1 ¡ ®)L(YT
t0
P ) ¡ F(YT
t0
P ) + ®M(YT
t0



















P ) + (1 ¡ ®j)(L(YT
t0




(®i + ®j ¡ ®i®j)3 < 0;
for all ®i;®j > 0. Hence, the solution in (4.14) gives indeed a maximum. ¤
B Some Integrals
In this appendix we calculate some of the integrals that are used in the text. Let in
the following (Yt)t¸0 be a geometric Brownian motion with starting point Y0 = y.4: Symmetric Equilibria in Game Theoretic Real Option Models 107
Let ¯1 be the positive root of the quadratic equation 1
2¾2¯2+(¹¡ 1
2¾2)¯¡r = 0 and
let D denote the instant payo® °ow. Furthermore, let TP and TF be the stopping
times of YP and YF, respectively, such that TP < TF a.s. It can be obtained from




























De¯ne S(Y ) for all Y · YF by







Suppose that Yt < YF. Then, in a small time interval [t;t + dt], YF will not be
reached a.s. Therefore, because of the strong Markov property14 of the geometric
Brownian motion, S(Y ) should satisfy
S(Y ) = e
¡rdtI E
¡





¡rdtI E(dS) = 0: (4.15)
Applying Ito's lemma15 on the expectation results in
I E(dS) = I E
³
[¹Y S













Using this result and a Taylor series expansion on e¡rdt at ¡rdt = 0, eq. (4.15)
becomes
S(Y ) = (1 ¡ rdt + o(dt))
³
S(Y ) + ¹Y S












00(Y )dt ¡ rS(Y )dt + o(dt) = 0:
Dividing by dt and letting dt # 0 results in the following second order di®erential
equation
¹Y S




00(Y ) ¡ rS(Y ) = 0:
14See Section 2.4.1.
15See Section 2.4.1.108 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
The general solution of this equation is given by
S(Y ) = A1Y
¯1 + A2Y
¯2;




2 + (¹ ¡ 1
2¾
2)¯ ¡ r = 0:
Note that if Y ! 0, then dY ! 0. This leads to the boundary condition S(0) = 0.


































































Two main forces that in°uence a ¯rm's investment decision are uncertainty about the
pro¯tability of the investment project and the behaviour of potential competitors,
having an option to invest in the same project. Most of the literature on optimal
investment deals with either aspect. The real options theory concerns itself with
investment decisions under uncertainty (cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1996)). In this
literature nature chooses a state of the world at each point in time, in°uencing
the pro¯tability of the investment project. The problem is then to ¯nd an optimal
threshold level of an underlying variable (e.g. price or output value of the ¯rm),
above which the investment should be undertaken. A recent contribution in this
area dealing with technology adoption is Alvarez and Stenbacka (2001) who include
the opportunity to update the technology with future superior versions.
In the strategic interaction literature a number of models has been developed,
dealing with di®erent situations such as patent races and new technology adoption.
In general, a distinction can be made between two types of models. First, there
are preemption games in which two ¯rms try to preempt each other in investing
(cf. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). The equilibrium concept used in such games is
developed in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). Another class is the war of attrition,
which is ¯rst introduced by Maynard Smith (1974) in the biological literature and
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later adopted for economic situations (cf. Tirole (1988)). Originally, the war of
attrition describes two animals ¯ghting over a prey. Only one animal will win the
prey whereas both animals incur some costs of ¯ghting. In an economic context one
can think of two ¯rms considering adopting a new technology. Both know that for
one ¯rm it would be optimal to invest, but neither wants to be the ¯rst to invest,
since waiting for an even newer technology would be better. The equilibrium concept
used in this type of game is introduced in Hendricks et al. (1988).
The literature combining both aspects is small indeed, see Grenadier (2000) for
a survey. A ¯rst attempt to combine real option theory with timing games was
made in Smets (1991). Huisman (2001) provides some extensions to this approach
and applies this framework to technology adoption. Recent contributions have been
made by e.g. Boyer et al. (2001) and Weeds (2002).
This chapter extends the strategic real options literature in the direction of im-
perfect information. In a one-¯rm-model dealing with technology adoption Jensen
(1982) was the ¯rst to introduce uncertainty and imperfect information. In Mamer
and McCardle (1987) the impact on the timing of innovation of costs, speed and
quality of information arriving over time is studied for a one-¯rm model as well as
a duopoly. However, due to a more elaborate information structure, Mamer and
McCardle (1987) did not obtain explicit results. Hoppe (2000) considers a duopoly
framework in which it is a priori uncertain whether an investment project is prof-
itable or not. As soon as one ¯rm invests, the true pro¯tability of the project
becomes known. This creates an informational spillover that yields a second mover
advantage. The probability with which the project is pro¯table is exogenously given,
¯xed and common knowledge. The framework we use here has been discussed exten-
sively in Chapter 3 for the one ¯rm case. The probability of success is updated over
time due to information that becomes available via signals that arrive according to
a Poisson process. The signal can either be good or bad: in the ¯rst case it indicates
that the project is pro¯table, whereas in the latter case investment yields a loss.
However, the signals may not provide perfect information. Only with a certain ¯xed
probability the signal gives the correct information. For simplicity, it is assumed
that the signals can be observed without costs. They can be thought of for example
as arising from media or publicly available marketing research.
As an example of the duopoly model with signals, consider two soccer scouts who
are considering to contract a player. In order to obtain information on the player's
quality both scouts go to matches in which the wanted player plays. If he performs5: Strategic Investment and Information Spillovers 111
well, this can be seen as a signal indicating high revenues, but if he performs poorly,
this is a signal that the investment is not pro¯table. This induces an option value of
waiting for more signals to arrive and hence getting a better approximation of the
actual pro¯tability of the project.
In this chapter it is shown that, depending on the prior beliefs on the pro¯tability
of the project and the ¯rst and second mover advantages, either a preemption game
or a war of attrition arises. The latter occurs if the information spillover exceeds the
¯rst mover Stackelberg e®ect. In the reverse case a preemption game arises. Even
both types of games may occur in the same scenario. Suppose that the information
spillover prevails and that the prior beliefs are such that a war of attrition arises.
With positive probability it would be the case that no ¯rm makes the investment.
Over time new signals arrive that in°uence the belief in the pro¯tability of the
project. Then it may happen { if enough good signals arrive { that at a certain point
in time the ¯rst mover advantage outweighs the information spillover, which induces
a preemption game. As soon as this happens, one of the ¯rms or both ¯rms invest in
equilibrium. The observation that a game of technology adoption under uncertainty
is a preemption game or a war of attrition dates back to Jensen (1992a). However,
where Jensen (1992a) examines a two-stage adoption game, the present chapter
provides an extension of these results to the case of an in¯nite horizon continuous
time framework. Moreover, as has been mentioned before, in our framework both
types of games can occur within the same scenario. The equilibrium concept that
we use has been discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
From the theory of industrial organisation it is well-known that competition does
not necessarily lead to a social optimum. For example, Spence (1976) and Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) show that monopolistic competition leads to an equilibrium number
of ¯rms in an industry that is too low from a social welfare perspective. Also Mankiw
and Whinston (1986) develop a model in which competition can yield a number of
¯rms operating in the industry that is either too high or too low from a social welfare
point of view. In this chapter we show that the presence of uncertainty concerning
the pro¯tability of a new market can strengthen the e®ect of having lower social
welfare under competition. However, it can go either way. Three e®ects are at work
here, the ¯rst two of which are standard arguments. Firstly, the dead-weight loss
in monopoly is higher than in the case of duopoly. Secondly, the total sunk costs
in a duopoly are higher than in monopoly. Finally, in the duopoly case there can
be a preemption e®ect, which induces ¯rms to invest too soon from a social welfare112 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
perspective, since at that speci¯c time the economic prospects are too uncertain for
an investment to be undertaken optimally. In order to facilitate welfare analysis
a measure for ex ante expected total surplus is introduced that incorporates the
distribution of ¯rst passage times through the various critical levels for monopoly
and duopoly.
The present chapter is related to D¶ ecamps and Mariotti (2000) in which also a
duopoly model is considered where signals arrive over time. Di®erences are that in
D¶ ecamps and Mariotti (2000) only bad signals exist and that signals are perfectly
informative. This means that after receiving one signal the game is over since the
¯rms are sure that the project is not pro¯table, while in our framework it could
still be possible that the project is good. In D¶ ecamps and Mariotti it holds that,
as long as no signal arrives, the probability that the project is good continuously
increases over time. Furthermore, the ¯rms are assumed to be asymmetric, which
also induces uncertainty regarding the players' types, whereas we consider identical
¯rms. This implies that D¶ ecamps and Mariotti need to apply the Bayesian equi-
librium concept, whereas in our model this is not the case. Another implication is
that the coordination problem between the two ¯rms that is analysed in our frame-
work is not present in D¶ ecamps and Mariotti (2000). This coordination problem
concerns the issue of which ¯rm will be the ¯rst to invest in the preemption equi-
librium.1 Another duopoly paper where information arrives over time is Lambrecht
and Perraudin (2003). In that paper, the information relates to the behaviour of
the competitor: each ¯rm has a certain belief about when the other ¯rm will invest
and this belief is updated by observing the other ¯rm's behaviour.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2 the model is described. Then,
in Section 5.3 we analyse the model for the scenario that the ¯rm roles, i.e. leader
and follower, are exogenously determined. In Section 5.4 the exogenous ¯rm roles
are dropped and the model is analysed for the case where the ¯rms are completely
symmetric. In Section 5.5 a welfare measure is introduced and welfare e®ects are
discussed. Finally, in Section 5.6 some conclusions will be drawn.
5.2 The Model
The model presented in this section describes a new market situation where two
identical ¯rms have the opportunity to invest in a project with uncertain revenues.
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Time is continuous and indexed by t 2 [0;1). The project can be good (denoted
by H) or bad (denoted by L). The ¯rm that is the ¯rst to invest becomes the leader
if the other ¯rm does not invest at the same point in time. The other ¯rm then
automatically becomes the follower. A second possibility is that both ¯rms invest
at exactly the same point in time. After investment has taken place by at least
one ¯rm the state of the project becomes immediately known to both ¯rms. Hence,
this creates a second mover advantage. If the ¯rms do not invest simultaneously,
the follower decides on investment immediately after the true state of the project
is revealed. It is assumed that this does not take any time. So, if one ¯rm invests
at time t ¸ 0, the follower will either invest at time t as well or not invest at all.
We distinguish this case from the case of mutual investment where both ¯rms also
invest at the same time t ¸ 0, but without one of the ¯rms having the second mover
advantage.2 That is, in case of mutual investment both ¯rms are at the time of
investment uncertain as to the true state of the project.
In case the project is good the leader's revenues equal UH
L > 0. If the project is
bad the leader's revenues equal UL
L = 0. The sunk costs of investment are given by
I > 0. If the project is good, the follower will immediately invest as well and get
revenues UH
F > 0. The follower will also incur the sunk costs I. It is assumed that
UH
L > UH
F > I. Hence, there is a ¯rst mover advantage if the project turns out to
yield high revenues and investment is pro¯table for both ¯rms. If the project is bad
the payo® for the follower equals UL
F = UL
L = 0. So, if the project is bad the follower
observes this due to the second mover advantage and thus refrains from investment.
This implies that in case of a bad project only the leader incurs a loss that is equal
to the sunk costs of investment. To see who is in the best position, the leader or
the follower, the second mover advantage has to be compared with the ¯rst mover
advantage of being the leader.
If both ¯rms invest simultaneously and the project turns out to be good, both
receive UH
M > 0, where UH
F < UH
M < UH
L . The revenues can be seen as an in¯nite
stream of payo®s ¼i







i = H;L, j = L;M;F. Example 5.1 illustrates this framework.
2The assumption that the follower reacts immediately might seem unrealistic, but is not very
restrictive. If for example there is a time lag between investment of the leader and the follower this
only has an in°uence on the payo®s via extra discounting by the follower. The important point is
that the game ends as soon as one ¯rm has invested, because then the decision of the other ¯rm
is made as well. The fact that actual investment may take place at a later date is irrelevant.114 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
Example 5.1 Consider a new market for a homogeneous good. Two ¯rms have
the opportunity to enter the market, that can be either good or bad. Let market
demand be given by P(Q) = Y ¡ Q for some Y > 0 if the market is good (H) and
by P(Q) = 0 if the market is bad (L). The cost function is given by C(q) = cq,
for some 0 · c · Y . It is assumed that if the ¯rms invest they engage in quantity




M = 0. Suppose that there is one ¯rm that invests in the
market ¯rst. This ¯rm then is the Stackelberg leader.3 In case the market is good




rqF[P(qL + qF) ¡ c];
where r is the discount rate. This yields qF =
Y ¡c¡qL
2 . Using this reaction, the leader
maximises its stream of pro¯ts. Solving the corresponding maximisation problem
yields qL = Y ¡c
2 , which results in qF = Y ¡c







16r , respectively. In case both ¯rms invest simultaneously, the Cournot-
Nash outcome prevails. Straightforward computations yield U H
M =
(Y ¡c)2





It is assumed that both ¯rms have an identical belief p 2 [0;1] in the project
being good that is common knowledge. If the leader invests at a point in time where
the belief in a good project equals p, the leader's ex ante expected payo® equals
L(p) = p(U
H
L ¡ I) + (1 ¡ p)(¡I) = pU
H
L ¡ I:
The follower only invests in case of a good project. Therefore, if the leader invests










3It is assumed that ¯rms can only set capacity once, thereby ¯xing the production level forever.
This resolves the commitment problem mentioned in Dixit (1980).
4For our framework it is not essential that the ¯rst mover has an in¯nite Stackelberg advantage.
The main point is that it should be the case that the ¯rst mover has a higher discounted present
value if the market is good. If for example after a certain point in time the market has a standard
Cournot structure, then the discounted present value for the leader is still higher.5: Strategic Investment and Information Spillovers 115
De¯ne by pM the belief such that the ex ante expected pro¯t for the follower equals
the ex ante expected pro¯t of mutual investment, i.e. pM is such that F(pM) =
M(pM). Note that, when p ¸ pM, both ¯rms will always invest simultaneously, i.e.





L(p) if p < pM;
M(p) if p ¸ pM;





F(p) if p < pM;
M(p) if p ¸ pM;




















Figure 5.1: Payo® functions.
At the moment that the investment opportunity becomes available, both ¯rms
have an identical prior belief about the project yielding high revenues, say p0, which
is common knowledge. Occasionally, the ¯rms obtain information in the form of
signals about the pro¯tability of the project. These signals are observed by both
¯rms simultaneously and are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process with
parameter ¹ > 0. Information arriving over time will in general be heterogeneous
regarding the indication of the pro¯tability level of the project. We distinguish two
types of signals as in Chapter 3: a signal can either indicate high revenues (an h-
signal) or low revenues (an l-signal). A signal revealing the true state of the project
occurs with the common knowledge probability ¸ > 1
2, see Table 5.1.5
5Without loss of generality it can be assumed that ¸ > 1
2, since if the converse holds we can116 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
h l
H ¸ 1 ¡ ¸
L 1 ¡ ¸ ¸
Table 5.1: Conditional probabilities of h- and l-signals.
Let n denote the number of signals and let g and b be the number of h-signals
and l-signals, respectively, so that n = g+b. Given that at a certain point in time n
signals have arrived, g of which were h-signals, the ¯rms then calculate their belief
in a good project in a Bayesian way. De¯ne k = 2g¡n = g¡b, so that k > 0 (k < 0)
indicates that more (less) h-signals than l-signals have arrived. After de¯ning the
prior odds of a bad project as ³ =
1¡p0
p0 , it is obtained from (3.1) that the belief in
a good project is a function of k and is given by
p(k) =
¸k
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k: (5.1)
Note that the inverse of this function gives the number of h-signals in excess of








5.3 Exogenous Firm Roles
Before we turn to the more interesting case where it is endogenously determined
which ¯rm invests ¯rst, we now look at the simpler case of exogenous ¯rm roles.
There are two cases. The former being that only ¯rm 1 is allowed to be the ¯rst
investor and the latter being the symmetric counterpart. Suppose that only ¯rm 1
is allowed to be the ¯rst investor. Then, ¯rm 1 does not need to take into account
the possibility that ¯rm 2 preempts. Firm 2 can choose between the follower role,
i.e. waiting to incur the second mover advantage, and investing at the same time
as ¯rm 1, i.e. without waiting for the true state of the project to become known.
These two cases can lead to di®erent forms of competition. For example, in the ¯rst
case ¯rm 1 is the Stackelberg leader and in the second case quantity competition
rede¯ne the h-signals to be l-signals and vice versa. Then a signal again reveals the true state
of the project with probability 1 ¡ ¸ > 1
2. If ¸ = 1
2 the signal is uninformative and the problem
becomes a deterministic one since the information arriving over time has no in°uence on the ¯rms'
decision processes.5: Strategic Investment and Information Spillovers 117
can lead to a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Firm 1 should invest at the moment that
its belief in a good project exceeds a certain threshold. From Chapter 3 it follows








¯(r + ¹)(r + ¹(1 ¡ ¸)) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)(r + ¹(1 + ¯ ¡ ¸))










¹ + 1)2 ¡ 4¸(1 ¡ ¸):
Hence, as soon as p exceeds pL, the leader invests. Then, the follower immediately
decides whether or not to invest, based on the true state of the project that is
immediately revealed after the investment by the leader. Note that pL will not
be reached exactly, since the belief p(k) jumps along with the discrete variable k.
Hence, the leader invests when p = p(dkLe), where kL = k(pL).
The above story only holds if p(dkLe) < pM. If the converse holds, ¯rm 1 knows
that ¯rm 2 will not choose the follower role, but will invest immediately as well
yielding UH
M instead of UH
L if the project turns out to be good. Therefore, the




M=I ¡ 1) + 1
:
Note that since UH
L > UH
M it holds that ~ pL > pL.
When p0 is contained in the region (pM;1], both ¯rms will immediately invest,
yielding for both a discounted payo® stream UH
M ¡ I if the project is good, and ¡I
if the project is bad. Here the belief is such that the follower prefers to receive the
mutual investment payo® rather than being a follower, implying that it takes the
risk of making a loss that equals the sunk costs of investment when the project value
is low.
5.4 Endogenous Firm Roles
Let the ¯rm roles now be endogenous. This implies that both ¯rms are allowed to
be the ¯rst investor. De¯ne the preemption belief, denoted by pP, to be the belief118 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS







Note that pP < pM. As soon as p reaches pP (if ever), both ¯rms want to be the
leader and try to preempt each other, which erodes the option value. It does not
vanish completely, however, since L(pP) > 0. Furthermore, de¯ne kP = k(pP). For
the analysis an important part is played by the positioning of kL, which can be















Note that if kL > kP then dkLe ¸ dkPe. The right-hand side of the second inequality
in (5.4) can be seen as the relative price that the follower pays for waiting to obtain
the information spillover if the market is good. Since ª decreases with ¸ and usually
with ¹ (cf. Proposition 3.2), ª increases with the value of the information spillover.
For if ª is low, then this implies that the quality and the quantity of the signals
are relatively high. Therefore, if a ¯rm becomes the leader it provides relatively less
information to its competitor for low values of ª compared to when ª is high. So,
expression (5.4) implies a comparison between the ¯rst mover advantage and the
second mover advantage. In what follows we consider the two cases: dkLe ¸ dkPe
and dkLe < dkPe.
5.4.1 The Case Where the Leader Advantage Outweighs the
Information Spillover
Suppose that dkLe ¸ dkPe. This implies that ¯rms try to preempt each other in
investing in the project. We apply the equilibrium concept introduced in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1985), which is extended for the present setting involving uncertainty in
Chapter 4, to solve the game. The application of this equilibrium concept requires
the use of several stopping times. De¯ne for all starting points t0 ¸ 0, T
t0
P =
infft ¸ t0jpt ¸ pPg and T
t0
M = infft ¸ t0jpt ¸ pMg, where pt ´ p(kt) and kt is the




P a.s. for all
t0 ¸ 0. In what follows we consider three di®erent starting points, namely pt0 ¸ pM,
pP · pt0 < pM and pt0 < pP.
If pt0 ¸ pM the value of mutual investment is greater than or equal to the value
of being the second investor. If pt0 > pM this implies that no ¯rm wants to be5: Strategic Investment and Information Spillovers 119
the follower and hence that both ¯rms will invest immediately. If pt0 = pM ¯rms
are indi®erent between being the follower and simultaneous investment. Note that
whether or not pM > pL is irrelevant, since if it were not the case, then no ¯rm would
be willing to wait until pL is reached, because of the sheer fear of being preempted
by the other ¯rm.
Next, let pP · pt0 < pM be the starting point of the game. Both ¯rms try
to preempt in this scenario, since the value for the leader is higher than the value
for the follower. This implies that in a symmetric equilibrium6 each ¯rm invests
with a positive probability. Here both ¯rms want to be the ¯rst investor, since
the expected Stackelberg leader payo® is su±ciently large, or the belief in a good
project is su±ciently high, so that it is optimal to take the risk that the project
has a low payo®. On the other hand, if the ¯rms invest with positive probability,
the probability that both ¯rms simultaneously invest is also positive. This would
lead to the mutual investment payo®. However, this payo® is not large enough for
simultaneous investment as such to be optimal since t0 < T
t0
M. We conclude that
there is a trade-o® here between the probability of being the leader on the one hand
and the probability of (a suboptimal) simultaneous investment on the other hand.
As is proved in Proposition 5.1 below, the intensity with which the ¯rms invest
equals
L(p)¡F(p)
L(p)¡M(p). Hence, this intensity increases with the ¯rst mover advantage and
decreases with the di®erence between the leader and the mutual investment payo®.
The latter makes sense because if this di®erence is large the ¯rms will try to avoid
simultaneous investment by lowering their investment intensity.
From Chapter 4 we know that it is optimal if one of the two ¯rms invests as
soon as the preemption region is reached. This means that if this happens the game
depicted in Figure 4.1 is played. Hence, since immediately after investment by the
leader the follower decides on investment, the game ends exactly at the point in
time where the preemption region is reached. Again, the position of pL is of no
importance, since the leader curve lies above the follower curve, implying that both
¯rms will try to become the leader.
The last region is the region where pt0 < pP. As long as t0 · t < T
t0
P , the leader
curve lies under the follower curve, and since in this case kL ¸ kP, pL has not been
reached yet. Hence, no ¯rm wants to be the leader and both ¯rms abstain from
investment until enough h-signals have arrived to make investment more attractive
6Since the ¯rms are identical, a symmetric equilibrium seems to be the most plausible candidate.
See Footnote 10 in Chapter 4 for a more elaborate discussion of this point.120 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
than waiting.
Formally, the above discussion can be summarised in a subgame perfect equi-
librium. Subgame perfectness for game theoretic real option models is described in
detail in Section 4.2. The strategies used in these timing games consist of a func-
tion Gt0(¢), where G
t0
i (t) gives the probability that ¯rm i has invested before and
including time t ¸ t0, and an intensity function ®t0(¢). The intensity function serves
as an endogenous coordination device in cases where it is optimal for one ¯rm to
invest but not for both. In coordinating ¯rms make a trade-o® between succeeding
in investing ¯rst and the risk of both investing at the same time.





L ¡I , then a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
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) if T t
P · s < T t
M,
1 if s ¸ T t
M.
(5.6)
For a proof of this proposition, see Appendix A.
5.4.2 The Case Where the Information Spillover Outweighs
the Leader E®ect
Suppose that pL < pP. Now the problem becomes somewhat di®erent. Let t0 ¸ 0.
For t > T
t0
P the game is exactly the same as in the former case. The di®erence arises
if t ¸ t0 is such that pt 2 [pL;pP). In this region it would have been optimal to invest
for the leader in case the leader role had been determined exogenously. However,
since the leader role is endogenous and the leader curve lies below the follower curve,
both ¯rms prefer to be the follower. In other words, a war of attrition (cf. Hendricks
et al. (1988)) arises. Two asymmetric equilibria of the war of attrition arise trivially:
¯rm 1 invests always with probability one and ¯rm 2 always with probability zero,
and vice versa. However, since the ¯rms are assumed to be identical there is no a
priori reason to expect that they coordinate on one of these asymmetric equilibria.5: Strategic Investment and Information Spillovers 121
We know that the game ends as soon as T
t0
P is reached. Note however that before
this happens pL can be reached several times, depending on the arrival of h- and
l-signals. Note that p only changes if a new signal arrives. There is a war of attrition
for k 2 K = fdkLe;:::;dkPe ¡ 1g. To keep track of the points in time where a war
of attrition occurs, de¯ne the following increasing sequence of stopping times: T
t0
1 =
infft ¸ t0jpt = dpLeg, T
t0





: pt = p(k)g, n = 1;2;3;:::,
with the corresponding levels of h-signals in excess of l-signals kn = k(pT
t0
n ). Note
that n is the number of signals that have arrived up until and including time T t0
n
since the ¯rst time the war of attrition region has been reached.
To ¯nd a symmetric equilibrium we argue in line with Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991) that for a symmetric equilibrium it should hold that for each point in time,
the expected revenue of investing directly equals the value of waiting a small period
of time dt and investing when a new signal arrives.7 The expected value of investing
at each point in time depends on the value of k at that point in time. Let kt 2 K
for some t ¸ t0. Denoting the probability that the other ¯rm invests at belief p(kt)
by °(kt), the expected value of investing at time t equals
V1(pt) = °(kt)M(pt) + (1 ¡ °(kt))L(pt): (5.7)
The value of waiting for an in¯nitesimal small amount of time equals the weighted
value of becoming the follower and of both ¯rms waiting, i.e.
V2(pt) = °(kt)F(pt) + (1 ¡ °(kt))~ V (pt); (5.8)
where ~ V (p) is the value of waiting when both ¯rms do so. Let °(¢) be such that
V1(¢) = V2(¢).
To actually calculate °(k) for all k 2 K, we use the fact that only for certain
values of p the probability of investment needs to be calculated. These probabilities
are the beliefs that result from the signals, i.e. for the beliefs p such that p = p(k),
k 2 K. For notational convenience we take k as dependent variable instead of p.
For example, we write V (k) instead of V (p(k)). To calculate the isolated atoms {
the probabilities of investment { in the war of attrition, °(¢), the value of waiting
~ V (¢) needs to be determined. It is governed by the following equation:
~ V (k) =e
¡rdtf(1 ¡ ¹dt)~ V (k) + ¹dt[p(k)(¸V1(k + 1) + (1 ¡ ¸)V1(k ¡ 1))+
+ (1 ¡ p(k))(¸V1(k ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ ¸)V1(k + 1))]g:
(5.9)
7It might seem strange that a ¯rm then also invests when a bad signal arrives. Note however
that it is always optimal for one ¯rm to invest in the war of attrition region.122 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
Eq. (5.9) arises from equalising the value of ~ V (k) to the value an in¯nitesimally small
amount of time later. In this small time interval, nothing happens with probability
1¡¹dt. With probability ¹dt a signal arrives. The belief a ¯rm has in a good project
is given by p(k). If the project is indeed good, an h-signal arrives with probability
¸, and an l-signal arrives with probability 1 ¡ ¸. Vice versa if the project is bad.
If a signal arrives then investing yields either V1(k + 1) or V1(k ¡ 1). After letting
dt # 0 and substituting eqs. (5.1) and (5.7) into eq. (5.9) it is obtained that
~ V (k) =
¹
r + ¹
h¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k
¡
°(k + 1)M(k + 1) + (1 ¡ °(k + 1))
L(k + 1)
¢
+ ¸(1 ¡ ¸)
¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k
¡
°(k ¡ 1)M(k ¡ 1)




Substituting eq. (5.10) into eq. (5.8) yields, after equating eqs. (5.8) and (5.7) and
rearranging:
ak°(k) + bk = (1 ¡ °(k))(ck°(k + 1) + dk°(k ¡ 1) + ek); (5.11)
where





¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k
¡







¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k
¡






³¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k L(k + 1)
+ ¸(1 ¡ ¸)
¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k L(k ¡ 1)
´
:
To solve for °(¢) note that if k < dkLe, no ¯rm will invest, since the option value of
waiting is higher than the expected revenues of investing. Therefore °(dkLe) = 0.
On the other hand, if k ¸ dkPe the ¯rms know that they enter a preemption game,




P) can be obtained from Proposition 5.1. Note
that it is possible that dkPe = dkMe. Then the game proceeds from the war of
attrition directly into the region where mutual investment is optimal. This happens
if T t
M = T t
P. In this case the expected payo® is governed by M(¢). For other values5: Strategic Investment and Information Spillovers 123
of k, we have to solve a system of equations, where the k-th entry is given by eq.
(5.11). The complete system is given by
diag(°)A° + B° = b; (5.12)
where diag(¢) is the diagonal operator, ° = (°(dkLe¡1);:::;°(dkPe)), b = (0;edkLe¡
bdkLe;:::;ek ¡ bk;:::;edkPe¡1 ¡ bdkPe¡1;1),
A =
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
4
0 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 0
ddkLe 0 cdkLe 0 :::::::::::: 0
. . . ... ... ... . . .
0 ::: dk 0 ck ::: 0
. . . ... ... ... . . .
0 ::::::::: 0 ddkPe¡1 0 cdkPe¡1
0 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 0
3





6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
4
1 0 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 0
¡ddkLe adkLe + edkLe ¡cdkLe ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 0
. . . ... . . .
0 ::: ¡dk ak + ek ¡ck ::: 0
. . . ... . . .
0 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ¡ddkPe¡1 adkPe¡1 + edkPe¡1 ¡cdkPe¡1
0 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 0 1
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
5
:
The system of equations (5.12) cannot be solved analytically. However, for any spe-
ci¯c set of parameter values, a numerical solution can be determined. The following
lemma shows that a solution always exists. The proof can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 5.1 The system of equations (5.12) has a solution. Furthermore, °(k) 2
[0;1] for all k 2 K.
De¯ne nt = supfnjT t0
n · tg to be the number of signals that has arrived up until
time t ¸ t0. In the following proposition a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
is given.124 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
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) if T t
P · s < T t
M,
1 if s ¸ T t
M.
(5.14)
The proof of Proposition 5.2 can be found in Appendix C.
An illustration of the case where the second mover advantage outweighs the ¯rst
mover advantage can be found in the following example.
Example 5.2 As an example consider a situation whose characteristics are given in
Table 5.2. For this example the preemption belief is given by pP = 0:87. The minimal
UH
L = 13:3 r = 0:1
UH
F = 13 ¹ = 2
UH
M = 13:2 ¸ = 0:7
I = 2 p0 = 0:5
Table 5.2: Parameter values.
belief that an exogenous leader needs to invest optimally is given by pL = 0:51. Using
eq. (5.2) this implies that a war of attrition arises for k 2 f1;2g. Solving the system
of equations given in (5.12) yields the vector of probabilities with which each ¯rm
invests in the project. It yields °(1) = 0:4547 and °(2) = 0:7613.
From this example one can see that the probability of investment increases rapidly
and is substantial. Both ¯rms know that, given that the project is good, it is better
to become the leader. So, as the belief in a good project increases, both ¯rms invest
with higher probability.5: Strategic Investment and Information Spillovers 125
5.5 Welfare Analysis
Welfare e®ects resulting from investment under uncertainty have been reported by
e.g. Jensen (1992b) and Stenbacka and Tombak (1994). In both papers the timing
of investment does not depend on the arrival of signals. In these papers the un-
certainty comprises the time needed to successfully implement the investment, i.e.
the time between investment and the successful implementation of the investment is
stochastic. The models in Jensen (1992b) and Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) allow
for the critical levels to be explicit points in time. In our model, the critical level
is not measured in units of time but measured as a probability, i.e. a belief. To
perform a welfare analysis, however, it is necessary to incorporate the time element
in the model.
Suppose for the sake of convenience that p0 < pP < pL, i.e. a symmetric subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game is given in Proposition 5.1. This equilibrium implies
that as soon as dkPe is reached, at least one ¯rm invests and the game ends. Given
the belief in a good project p 2 [pP;pM), the probability of mutual investment,
denoted by b(p), is given by8
b(p) =
L(p) ¡ F(p)
L(p) ¡ 2M(p) + F(p)
:
Let CSl
M denote the discounted value of consumer surplus if the project is l 2 fL;Hg
and simultaneous investment takes place. Furthermore, let CSH
S and CSL denote
the discounted stream of consumer surplus in the Stackelberg equilibrium if the
project is good, and the discounted stream of consumer surplus if the project is bad
and one ¯rm invests, respectively.
If the critical number of h-signals in excess of l-signals is given by k ¸ 0 with
¯rst passage time t, the expected discounted total surplus if the project gives high
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8Cf. (4.2) in Section 4.2.126 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
The expected total surplus with critical level k and ¯rst passage time t is then given
by
W(k;t) = p(k)ES
H(k;t) + (1 ¡ p(k))ES
L(k;t):
So far, there is no di®erence with the ideas in Jensen (1992b) and Stenbacka and
Tombak (1994). To incorporate the uncertainty regarding the ¯rst passage time
through k, we de¯ne the ex ante expected total surplus W(k) to be the expectation
of W(k;t) over the ¯rst passage time through k. That is,









where fk(¢) is the pdf of the ¯rst passage time through k.










where ¡(¢) denotes the gamma function. The pdf of the ¯rst passage time through
k ¸ 0 can now be established as is done in the following proposition, the proof of
which can be found in Appendix D.
Proposition 5.3 Let k0 = 0 a.s. The probability density function fk(¢) of the ¯rst












for all t ¸ 0.
It is assumed that a social planner faces the same uncertainty about the project
being good or bad as the ¯rms do. A social planner maximising ex ante expected
total surplus therefore has to determine a critical level for k. Note that, because
of the sunk costs I > 0, in the case of non-decreasing returns to scale it is always
optimal for the social planner to have one active ¯rm. Denoting the maximal sum
of discounted consumer and producer surplus if investment takes place at critical
level k with ¯rst passage time t by Wsoc(k;t), the social planner maximises ex ante
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From the standard theory of industrial organisation it is well-known that monopoly
gives lower social welfare than competition. However, in the following example it is
shown that in the presence of uncertainty this need not hold. In the remainder let
CSmon and Wmon denote the present value of the in¯nite °ow of consumer surplus
and the ex ante expected total surplus, respectively, in the case of a monopolist.
The critical level of investment for the monopoly case is obtained from (3.14).
Example 5.3 (Example 5.1 continued) Reconsider the case of a new market
model with a±ne inverse demand and linear costs as given in Example 5.1. Con-
sider the parametrisation as given in Table 5.3. From Example 5.1 we can con-
Y = 10 r = 0:1
c = 5 ¹ = 4
I = 12 p0 = 0:4
Table 5.3: Parameter values.
clude that the monopoly price is given by Pmon = Y +c
2 , the price in case of mu-
tual investment is given by PM = Y +2c
3 , and the price in the Stackelberg case is
given by PS = Y +3c
4 . Given that the market is good, the °ow of consumer surplus
is then given by
R Y
PP P ¡1(p)dp = 1





2(Y ¡ Pmon)2dt =
(Y ¡Pmon)2







32r , and CSL
mon = CSL
M = CSL = 0.
If ¸ = 0:8, then in the duopoly case a Nash equilibrium occurs. This happens
because kP < kM · dkPe. The ex ante expected total surplus in case of a duopoly
is given by Wduo = 32:16. For the monopoly case we get Wmon = 29:75 and for the
social planner Wsoc = 41:68.
Now consider the situation where uncertainty increases in the sense that the
signals become less informative. As an example we take ¸ = 0:6. In this case too,
duopoly leads to mutual investment. Furthermore we get: Wmon = 25:25, Wduo =
20:20, and Wsoc = 36:56. Hence, in case of a monopoly the ex ante expected total
surplus is higher than for a duopoly.
From Example 5.3 it can be concluded that comparing social welfare under
monopoly and duopoly leads to ambiguous results caused by opposing e®ects. First,
as is well-known from the industrial organisation literature (e.g. Tirole (1988)), the
dead-weight loss is highest under monopoly. Second, more ¯rms entering the market128 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
reduces the dead-weight loss but, on the other hand, the total amount of sunk in-
vestment costs is increased, which has a negative e®ect on the welfare level. Third,
social welfare is in°uenced by the timing of investment. Tempted by the Stackelberg
advantage (if it outweighs the information spillover), the leader in a duopoly might
invest too soon in the sense that the payo® in the new market is too uncertain.
In the above analysis only the preemption case is considered. From a mathemati-
cal point of view the advantage of considering the preemption case is that one knows
that the game stops as soon as the preemption level is reached. This allows for the
use of the distribution of the ¯rst passage time in the de¯nition of ex ante expected
total surplus. In case the information spillover outweighs the Stackelberg e®ect a
war of attrition arises. To make a comparable welfare analysis for this case one has
to consider all possible paths for the arrival of signals. So, not only the distribution
for the ¯rst passage time, but also the distribution of all passage times have to be
considered, conditional on the fact that the preemption value is not reached. Such
an analysis is not analytically tractable. However, one could estimate the ex ante
expected total surplus by use of simulations. Also in this case ambiguous results
regarding the welfare e®ects of monopoly and duopoly can be expected, depending
on the position of the critical investment level for a monopolist relative to pL. An
additional e®ect concerning the welfare comparison of monopoly and duopoly in
case of a war of attrition is the free rider e®ect. In a duopoly both ¯rms like the
other to invest ¯rst so that it does not need to take the risk that the project has
low value. Consequently ¯rms invest too late, leading to a lower consumer surplus.
5.6 Conclusions
Non-exclusivity is a main feature that distinguishes real options from their ¯nancial
counterparts (Zingales (2000)). A ¯rm having a real investment opportunity often
shares this possibility with one or more competitors and this has a negative e®ect
on pro¯ts. The implication is that, to come to a meaningful analysis of the value of
a real option, competition must be taken into account.
This chapter considers a duopoly where both ¯rms have the same possibility
to invest in a new market with uncertain payo®s. As time passes uncertainty is
gradually resolved by the arrival of new information regarding the quality of the
investment project in the form of signals. Generally speaking, each ¯rm has the
choice of being the ¯rst or second investor. A ¯rm moving ¯rst reaches a higher5: Strategic Investment and Information Spillovers 129
market share by having a Stackelberg advantage. However, being the second investor
implies that the investment can be undertaken knowing the payo® with certainty,
since by observing the performance in the market of the ¯rst investor it is possible
to obtain full information regarding the quality of the investment project.
The outcome mainly depends on the speed at which information arrives over
time. If the quality and quantity of the signals is su±ciently high, the information
advantage of the second investor is low so that the Stackelberg advantage of the
¯rst investor dominates, which always results in a preemption game. In the other
scenario, initially a war of attrition prevails where it is preferred to wait for the
competitor to undertake the risky investment. During the time where this war of
attrition goes on it happens with positive probability that both ¯rms refrain from
investment. It can then be the case that so many bad signals arrive that the belief
in a good project again becomes so low that the war of attrition is ended and
that no ¯rm invests for the time being. On the other hand, it can happen that so
many positive signals in excess of bad signals arrive that at some point in time the
Stackelberg advantage starts to exceed the value of the information spillover. This
then implies that the war of attrition turns into a preemption game.
From the industrial organisation literature it is known that a monopoly is bad
for social welfare. Indeed, in our framework it is possible to ¯nd examples where
a duopoly does better than a monopoly in terms of ex ante expected total surplus.
However, within a duopoly it is also possible that in the case of a preemption
equilibrium the ¯rst investor is tempted by the Stackelberg advantage to undertake
the investment too soon from a social welfare perspective, i.e. when the environment
is too risky. Moreover, there are two investing ¯rms so that sunk costs are higher.
As a result it happens that welfare is lower than in the monopoly case. In this sense,
our analysis strengthens the results from e.g. Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
Finally, departing from the modelling framework of this chapter two interesting
topics for future research can be distinguished. Firstly, one could include the pos-
sibility for ¯rms to invest in the quantity and quality of the signals. This would
then give rise to an optimal R&D model, that also includes the problem of optimal
sampling. Secondly, it is interesting to allow for entry and exit in this model. This
would then lead to an analysis of the optimal number of ¯rms from a social welfare
perspective, thereby making it possible to compare with existing literature like e.g.
Mankiw and Whinston (1986).130 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 5.1
Let (­;F;(Ft)t¸0;P) be the ¯ltered probability space underlying the stochastic
process governing the arrival of signals. First notice that for each ! 2 ­ and i = 1;2,
the strategy (Gt
i;®t
i)t2[0;1) satis¯es the intertemporal consistency and ®-consistency
conditions of De¯nitions 4.4 and 4.2, respectively. Hence, the closed loop strategies
are well-de¯ned. Let t 2 [0;1). It will be shown that (Gt
i;®t
i)i=1;2 is a Nash
equilibrium for the game starting at t. Due to discounting, it is a dominant strategy
to invest with positive probability only at points in time when new information
arrives. Since pt has non-continuous sample paths, due to the Poisson arrivals of
signals, the function Gt(¢) has to be a step function. We consider three cases.
1. t = T t
M (i.e. pt ¸ pM)
Given that ¯rm j plays its closed loop strategy, ¯rm i has three possible
strategies. First, ¯rm i can play Gt
i(t) = 0, i.e. it does not invest. Then ¯rm
i's expected payo® equals F(pt). If ¯rm i invests with an isolated atom equal
to º > 0, then the expected payo® equals F(pt) + º(M(pt) ¡ F(pt)) ¸ F(pt).
Finally, suppose that ®t
i(t) = a > 0. Using the theory from Chapter 4 and the
probabilities in (4.2) and (4.7) one can see that, since ®t
j(t) = 1, the expected














= F(pt) + a(M(pt) ¡ F(pt)) ¸ F(pt):
So, maximising the expected payo® gives a = 1.
2. t < T t
P (i.e. pt < pP)
Given the strategy of ¯rm j, if ¯rm i does not invest, its value is W(pt). Since
TL ¸ TP, we know it is not optimal to invest yet. Hence, W(pt) > L(pt). If
¯rm i invests with an isolated atom equal to º > 0, then its expected payo®
equals W(pt)+º(L(pt)¡W(pt)) · W(pt). Investing with an interval of atoms,
i.e. ®t
i(t) = a > 0, gives an expected payo® equal to L(pt). Hence it is optimal
to set Gt
i(t) = 0.
3. t = T t
P < T t
M (i.e. pP · pt < pM)
Investing with probability zero, i.e. Gt
i(t) = 0 yields an expected payo® equal5: Strategic Investment and Information Spillovers 131
to F(pt), given that ¯rm j plays its strategy, i.e. Gt
i(t) = 1. If ¯rm i invests
with an isolated jump equal to º > 0, then
I P(both ¯rms invest simultaneously) = º®
t
j(t);
I P(¯rm i invests ¯rst) = º(1 ¡ ®
t
j(t));




L(t)¡M(t) the expected payo® for ¯rm i is given by
º®
t
j(t)M(pt) + º(1 ¡ ®
t
j(t))L(pt) + (1 ¡ º)F(pt) = F(pt):
Finally, if ¯rm i plays ®t








j(t)M(pt) + a(1 ¡ ®
t





Hence, in each case a unilateral deviation does not yield a higher expected payo®.
¤
B Proof of Lemma 5.1
It is easy to see that the war of attrition region K is ¯nite with cardinality, say, n.
Hence, the system in (5.12) gives rise to a function f : I R
n ! I R
n where the k-th
entry is given by
fk(x) = akxk + bk ¡ (1 ¡ xk)
¡
ckxk+1 + dkxk¡1 ¡ ek
¢
; k = 1;:::;n:
A solution for the system (5.12) is equivalent to x 2 I R
n such that f(x) = 0.
Let k 2 K and let x 2 I R
n such that xk = 1 be ¯xed. We have
fk(x) = ak + bk = M(k) ¡ L(k) ¡ F(k) + L(k) < 0; (5.16)
since we are in the attrition region. Furthermore, note that
bk ¡ ek =
¸k


















¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1 + ¸(1 ¡ ¸)(¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1)













rL(k) > 0:132 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
Using this observation we obtain that if x 2 I R
n is such that xk = 0,







¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k xk+1
³





¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k xk¡1
³




since M(k) · L(k) for all k · dkPe. Hence, for all k 2 K and all x 2 I R
n we have
xk = 0 ) fk(x) > 0 and xk = 1 ) fk(x) < 0. Since [0;1]n is a convex and compact
set and f(¢) is continuous on [0;1]n, there exists a stationary point x¤ 2 [0;1]n, i.e.
for all x 2 [0;1]n it holds that xf(x¤) · x¤f(x¤).
Let k 2 f1;:::;ng. Suppose that x¤
k > 0. Then there exists an " > 0 such
that x = x¤ ¡ "1 1k 2 [0;1]n, where 1 1k denotes the k-th unity vector. This gives








k < 1 there exists an " > 0 such that x = x¤ + "1 1k 2 [0;1]n. Since x¤
is a stationary point this yields fk(x¤) · 0. Hence, if 0 < x¤
k < 1 this implies that
fk(x¤) = 0. Now suppose that x¤
k = 0. Then fk(x¤) · 0, which contradicts (5.17).
Finally, suppose that x¤
k = 1. Then fk(x¤) ¸ 0, which contradicts (5.16). ¤
C Proof of Proposition 5.2
By Lemma 5.1 there exists an x 2 [0;1]n such that f(x) = 0. For all k 2 K, let
°(k) = xk. Furthermore, it is easy to see that (Gt
i;®t
i)i=1;2 satis¯es the intertemporal
and ®-consistency conditions for each t 2 [0;1).
We prove that for each subgame starting at t, the simple strategy (Gt
i;®t
i) is a
Nash equilibrium. The case where t is such that pt < pL is exactly the same as the
case where t < T t
P < T t
M in the proof of Proposition 5.1. The same holds true for
the case where t = T t
M. Consider the region for the war of attrition, i.e. t is such
that pt 2 [pL;pP). Then kt 2 K. Suppose that ¯rm i invests with an interval of
atoms and suppose ®t
i(t) = a. Then given that ¯rm j invests with an isolated jump5: Strategic Investment and Information Spillovers 133
equal to °(kt), we get in analogy of (4.2) and (4.7) that
I P(¯rm i invests ¯rst) = 1 ¡ °(kt);
I P(¯rm j invests ¯rst) = °(kt)(1 ¡ a);
I P(¯rms invest simultaneously) = a°(kt):
Hence, the expected payo® for ¯rm i is given by
a°j(kt)M(pt) + (1 ¡ °j(kt))L(pt) + °j(kt)(1 ¡ a)F(pt):
This expected payo® is maximised for a = 0. Hence, ¯rm i will not play an interval
of atoms. Suppose ¯rm i plays an isolated atom equal to º 2 [0;1]. Then its
expected payo® equals
ºV1(pt) + (1 ¡ º)V2(pt);
and is hence independent of º since, by de¯nition, °j(kt) is such that V1(pt) = V2(pt).
Therefore, any º 2 [0;1], and in particular º = °(kt), maximises the expected payo®.
¤
D Proof of Proposition 5.3
The proof follows Feller (1971, Section 14.6) and is probabilistic in nature. Note
that the process starts at t0 = 0 with k0 = 0 a.s. Arriving at k 6= 0 at time t > 0
can only be possible if a jump has occurred before t. Assume that the ¯rst jump
occurred at time t ¡ x. The conditional probability of the position k 6= 0 at time t
is denoted by Pk(t). It is the convolution of the probability that the process was at
k+1 at time x or at k¡1 at time x and the probability of an arrival of an l-signal or
an h-signal, respectively. Since the arrival of signals follows a Poisson process with
parameter ¹ and hence the inter-arrival times are exponentially distributed with











q1(k ¡ 1) =
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k
¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1; (5.19)
is the probability of reaching state k from state k ¡ 1 and
q2(k + 1) = ¸(1 ¡ ¸)
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k
¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1; (5.20)134 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
is the probability of reaching state k from state k+1. That is, Pk(t) is the convolution
of the distribution of reaching k + 1 or k ¡ 1 at time t ¡ x and the distribution of
the arrival of one signal in the interval (t ¡ x;t]. For k = 0, the probability of no
jump up to t, which equals 1 ¡
R t























[q1(¡1)¼¡1(°) + q2(1)¼1(°)]: (5.23)
By substituting eqs. (5.19) and (5.20) into eq. (5.22) one obtains the following
second order linear di®erence equation




¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k:
The roots of the characteristic equation of eq. (5.24) are
¯° =
¹ + ° ¡
p





¹ + ° +
p






¹ + ° ¡
p
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Note that for k ¸ 0 it holds that ¯k
° ! 0 as ° ! 1, but that ¾k
° ! 1 as ° ! 1.
Since ¼k(°) and hence Fk(°) are bounded as ° ! 1, we get for k ¸ 0 that B° = 0.






° k ¸ 0
1
¸(1¡¸)F0(°)¯¡k













° ¼0(°) k < 0;
(5.25)





(¹ + °)¸(1 ¡ ¸) ¡ ¹(1 + ¸2(1 ¡ ¸)2)
:
Hence, eq. (5.25) is well-de¯ned.
If at time t the process is at k ¸ 0, the ¯rst passage through k must have occurred
at time ¿ · t. In this case, the conditional probability of being at k again at time
t equals the probability of being at state 0 at time t ¡ ¿ times the probability of a




Fk(¿)P0(t ¡ ¿)d¿; (5.26)
where Fk(¢) is the distribution of the ¯rst passage time through k. The Laplace
transform of eq. (5.26) is given by
¼k(°) = fk(°)¼0(°):




°. Feller (1971) shows that for ° > 1, (° ¡
p
°2 ¡ 1)k is the
Laplace transform of the density k





change of scale and applying the mapping ° 7! ° + ¹ re°ects multiplication of the
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which proves the proposition. ¤136 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONSPart II
Bounded Rationality and Market
Evolution
137Chapter 6
Multi-Level Evolution in Cournot
Oligopoly
6.1 Introduction
The economic decisions that an individual has to make are often very complicated.
Each individual has to take into account not only her own objectives, actions and
possible strategies, but also the social environment in which he operates. In the
literature it has been argued that assuming rational behaviour by individuals, as
is standard in the neo-classical paradigm, is too strong an assumption. To quote
Young (1998): "This [rationality] is a rather extravagant and implausible model of
human behavior, especially in the complex, dynamic environments that economic
agents typically face". Furthermore, it is felt that the role of equilibrium in eco-
nomic models needs to be reconsidered. One may look at the equilibria arising in
neo-classical models as being the outcome of a dynamic process of interaction dur-
ing which evolution to an equilibrium is established. Evolution then works as a
way to select an equilibrium. The importance of equilibrium selection has also been
recognised by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). They stick however to the neo-classical
paradigm with rational individuals in an essentially static environment. Equilib-
rium selection then takes place by a rational procedure that can be described by a
homotopy. Lately it has been argued that the equilibrium selection process should
be seen as an evolutionary process and hence be modelled explicitly. The way this
has been done is to apply ideas from evolution theory in game theory (see e.g. May-
nard Smith (1982)). Evolution results from the actions of essentially non-rational
or boundedly rational agents. The main question is whether in the long-run evo-
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lution leads to a rational equilibrium, that is, do the equilibria arising in models
based on the neo-classical paradigm give a good description of the long-run in an
evolutionary setting. The ¯eld of evolutionary economics has grown rapidly during
the last decade. This development has been accompanied by an increasing interest
in experimental economics to study the evolution of economic behaviour.
There are several ways to include evolutionary ideas into economic theory. One
way, that stays close to standard non-cooperative game theory, is by looking at evo-
lutionary stable strategies (ESS). An ESS is a strategy that is robust against small
perturbations. As such it is a re¯nement of the Nash equilibrium concept (see e.g.
Van Damme (1994) or Weibull (1995)). The ESS concept, however, is a static one.
In the biological literature a dynamic process has been introduced called the replica-
tor dynamics (cf. Taylor and Jonker (1978) or Van Damme (1991)). The replicator
dynamics is a di®erential equation that is the result of an underlying game theo-
retic model. It describes the dynamics of the fractions of two di®erent populations
that in°uence each other's existence by interaction. One can think for example of
a predator-prey model. It can be shown that an ESS of the underlying game is
asymptotically stable for the replicator dynamics. The behavior of the populations
in the replicator dynamics is completely pre-programmed and deterministic.
If the behaviour of players is stochastically perturbed one can use the concept of
stochastic stability that has been introduced by Foster and Young (1990), Kandori
et al. (1993) and Young (1993). Intuitively, stochastically stable states are those
states that remain to be played after evolution has done its work by letting the
perturbations converge to zero. Taking this limit can be defended by the argument
that, as time goes along, players learn to understand their environment better which
decreases the probability of them making mistakes which results in less perturba-
tions. The stochastically stable states are the remaining states in the long-run that
can be said to have survived the process of evolution.
In oligopoly theory this idea has been applied by Vega-Redondo (1997). He
showed that when ¯rms imitate the ¯rm that makes the highest pro¯ts, combined
with experimentation or trial and error in a Cournot setting, the market converges
to the Walrasian equilibrium. The importance of imitation and trial and error
in evolutionary economic processes has already been stressed by Alchian (1950).
He claimed that pro¯t maximisation is not a meaningful criterion for selecting an
action in an essentially uncertain situation. Recently, an experimental study by
O®erman et al. (2002) shows that in a Cournot market where agents know the6: Multi-Level Evolution in Cournot Oligopoly 141
demand function, the cost function, as well as all quantities produced and pro¯ts
earned by the others, the market either settles in the Walrasian equilibrium or in
the cartel equilibrium. The latter results when ¯rms set quantities in such a way
that industry pro¯t is maximised. Hence, Vega-Redondo (1997) explains only part
of this experimental result.
This chapter presents a framework in which we allow for two levels of evolu-
tion. At the ¯rst level ¯rms can change their behaviour. The evolution of behaviour
leads to di®erent evolutionary paths at the second { quantity setting { level. We
show that the stochastically stable state of this two-stage evolutionary process is
either the collusive equilibrium resulting from cooperative behaviour or the Wal-
rasian equilibrium resulting from competitive behaviour. Therewith, this chapter
gives a theoretical explanation for the experimental results of O®erman et al. (2002).
Which way evolution goes { competition or cooperation { depends on the inclination
to cooperative behaviour within the group of ¯rms in the market. This inclination to
cooperation can be seen as an agreement on patience between ¯rms and is therefore
a representation of the social environment in which ¯rms operate. It is assumed
that the inclination to cooperate is exogenously given. The importance of the in-
terrelationships of the environment and the prevailing types of economic behaviour
which appear through a process of economic selection, has been stressed by Alchian
(1950). In the ultra-long run, the inclination to cooperative behaviour might also be
subject to evolution. For simplicity we don't investigate this venue. By allowing for
the simultaneous existence of more than one behavioural rule and by introducing a
meta-level where ¯rms evaluate their behaviour, this chapter extends the model of
Vega-Redondo (1997) in two ways that, to our knowledge, have not been pursued
so far in the existing literature.
In modelling the interaction on two levels, a Markov chain on the quantity-
setting level as well as a Markov chain on the behavioural level are de¯ned, where
the transition probabilities of the latter depend on the state of the quantity-setting
chain. It is di±cult to analyse the limit distribution of the large Markov chain that is
obtained by combining the two levels, for it would require an analysis of all possible
interrelationships between behavioural and quantity adaptation. Fortunately, one
can simplify the analysis and obtain an approximation of the stochastically stable
states of the entire process by using the theory of nearly-complete decomposable
systems developed by Simon and Ando (1961), Ando and Fisher (1963), and Courtois
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At both levels, the decision-making process of ¯rms is boundedly rational. At
the quantity-setting level, ¯rms are assumed to imitate in a prescribed way. This
corresponds to ¯rms using rules of thumb in conducting their day to day business.
At the behavioural level, ¯rms evaluate their strategy and change their behaviour if
the pro¯tability of their current behaviour is not satisfactory.
Although the use of multiple behavioural rules in stochastic evolutionary models
has not been explored in great depth, the idea has been applied in a (static and
deterministic) ESS setting, notably in the literature on indirect evolution (cf. GÄ uth
and Yaari (1992)). In this literature evolution works on preferences rather than on
strategies. For example, Bester and GÄ uth (1998) develop a model in which agents
can be either altruistic or spiteful. Given the player's preferences she plays a best
response. Altruism then leads to the cooperative outcome and spitefulness leads
to the competitive outcome. Possajennikov (2000) extends the Bester and GÄ uth
(1998) model and gives conditions under which either altruism or spitefulness is
evolutionary stable. This chapter gives a ¯rst application of the theory of nearly-
complete decomposable systems in evolutionary economics. In Chapter 7 a more
elaborate behavioural model is analysed.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2 the model is explained in de-
tail. First the quantity setting level is modelled. Afterwards, the behavioural level
is modelled and both levels are united in one stochastic dynamic system. In Sec-
tion 6.3 it is proved that under suitable conditions either cooperative or competitive
behaviour is stochastically stable. This leads to the conclusion that (approximately)
either the cartel equilibrium or the Walrasian equilibrium arises. Finally, Section 6.4
concludes.
6.2 The Model
Let be given a market for a homogeneous good with n ¯rms, indexed by In =
f1;2;:::;ng. Competition takes place by quantity setting. The pro¯t of ¯rm i,




¼(°i;°¡i) = P(°i + °¡i)°i ¡ C(°i);
where P : I R+ ! I R+ is the inverse demand function, which is assumed to be
strictly decreasing and C : I R+ ! I R+ is the cost function. It is assumed that
each ¯rm can choose from a ¯nite discrete set of possible production levels, ¡(±) :=6: Multi-Level Evolution in Cournot Oligopoly 143
f0;±;2±;:::;v±g, for some v 2 I N and ± > 0.
The behaviour of ¯rm i 2 In is denoted by µi 2 £ = f0;1g, where µi = 1 denotes
cooperative behaviour and µi = 0 denotes competitive behaviour. The state-space
is given by ­ = ¡(±)n £ £n. A typical element ! 2 ­ is denoted ! = (°;µ), where
° = (°1;:::;°n) 2 ¡(±)n and µ = (µ1;:::;µn) 2 £n. The cardinality of £n will be
denoted by N and the cardinality of ¡(±)n by m. Let §(S) denote the ordered set of
all permutations on a ¯nite set S. Then we de¯ne °(k) = §(¡(±)n)k, k = 1;:::;m,
and µ(I) = §(£n)I, I = 1;:::;N.
6.2.1 The Quantity Setting Level
Firms that behave cooperatively are assumed to imitate the exemplary ¯rm, i.e. the
¯rm that produces the output that generates the highest industry pro¯ts if all ¯rms
were to produce the same quantity. Therefore, these ¯rms are called exemplary imi-
tators. Given a vector of output levels ° 2 ¡(±)n their best-response correspondence
is given by
BE(°) =fq 2 ¡(±)j9j2In : q = °j;8k2In : ¼(q;(n ¡ 1)q)
¸ ¼(°k;(n ¡ 1)°k)g:
If a ¯rm acts competitively, it imitates the ¯rm that makes the highest pro¯t.
Firms behaving competitively are called pro¯t imitators. Given a vector of output
levels ° 2 ¡(±)n their best-response correspondence is given by
BP(°) =fq 2 ¡(±)j9j2In : q = °j;8k2In : ¼(q;°¡j)
¸ ¼(°k;°¡k)g:
Let µ(I) be a given permutation on £n. Firm i chooses an output level from
BE(°) if µ(I)i = 1. If µ(I)i = 0, ¯rm i chooses an element from BP(°). To do so,
¯rm i uses a probability distribution with full support, ´
°
E;i(¢) on BE(°) if µ(I)i = 1
and ´
°
P;i(¢) on BP(°) if µ(I)i = 0.
The market now works as follows. At any time t, t 2 I N, every ¯rm gets the
opportunity to adapt its output with probability p, 0 < p < 1. This probability can
be interpreted as the fraction of periods in which a ¯rm updates its quantity. Given
the vector of output levels °t¡1 2 ¡(±)n, °t
i 2 BP(°t¡1) if ¯rm i is a pro¯t imitator
and °t
i 2 BE(°t¡1) if ¯rm i is an exemplary imitator. These dynamics de¯ne a
Markov chain on ¡(±)n £ ¡(±)n, with transition matrix MI
0. The dynamic process
evolving according to this Markov chain is called the pure imitation dynamics.144 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
The actual quantity choice can be in°uenced by several aspects. For example,
a ¯rm can experiment and choose another quantity. Another possibility is that
¯rms make mistakes in their imitative behaviour. Finally, a ¯rm may be replaced
by a new ¯rm that has the same behaviour, but sets a di®erent quantity.1 Since
these e®ects are outside the model, we treat them as stochastic perturbations and
hence we assume that with probability " > 0 ¯rm i chooses any output level using a
probability distribution ºi(¢) with full support. Imitation and experimentation de¯ne
a Markov chain on ¡(±)n £ ¡(±)n with transition matrix MI












P;i (°(l)i) + p1 1(µ(I)i=1)´
°(k)
E;i (°(l)i)





where 1 1(¢) is the indicator function. It is reasonable to assume that as time passes
¯rms learn to use the rule of thumb given by exemplary or pro¯t imitation ever
better. For this reason we focus on the situation where the probability of mistakes







Since MI is an irreducible matrix, this Markov chain is ergodic and thus has a
unique invariant probability measure ¹I(¢). For further reference the k-th element
of the invariant measure will be denoted by ¹I
k, i.e. ¹I
k = ¹I(°(k)).
6.2.2 The Behavioural Level
It is reasonable to assume that each ¯rm knows ex ante that cooperation yields
higher pro¯ts than competition. Since anti-trust laws forbid explicit coordination
the question is whether there can be non-cooperative coordination on the coopera-
tive outcome. The idea is to model behavioural adaptation by using a reciprocal-like
argument. If a ¯rm acts cooperatively and sees that it leads to pro¯ts that are close
enough to the cartel pro¯t it will not change its behaviour. If however, cooperative
behaviour does not give enough pro¯t relative to competitive behaviour, the ¯rm
will change its behaviour to competition. Since it is impossible for ¯rms to observe
the behaviour of the other ¯rms, the behavioural decision needs to be based on ob-
servable data, i.e. quantities and pro¯ts. If all ¯rms behave perfectly cooperatively
1In the original, biological, literature this is called a mutation.6: Multi-Level Evolution in Cournot Oligopoly 145
and set the optimal cartel quantity, the total pro¯t realised in the market equals
the cartel pro¯t, denoted by ¼m. So the best a ¯rm can hope for is to earn the n-th
fraction of ¼m, which is the ¯rm's utopia pro¯t. The behavioural decision of the
¯rm will be based on the di®erence between this utopia pro¯t and the actual pro¯t
in the industry.
Since full cooperation yields more pro¯ts than anything else, it is assumed that
within the group of ¯rms there is a certain inclination to cooperative behaviour. This
inclination can be seen as a measure of patience of ¯rms to reach the cooperative
outcome. In this chapter we are not concerned about the evolution or origins of
this inclination but simply assume that it is re°ected by an exogenous and constant
parameter ~ ¸ > 0. A ¯rm will then behave cooperatively as long as the di®erence
between the utopia pro¯t and the actual realised industry pro¯t is not larger than ~ ¸.
Another way to look at ~ ¸ is to see it as a measure of the intensity of competition in
a market. The higher ~ ¸ the less ¯erce competition is. For a discussion on measures
of competition the reader is referred to Boone (2000).
Given a behavioural permutation µ(I) 2 £n and a quantity permutation °(k) 2






1 if ¼m ¡
P
j2In ¼(°(k)j;°(k)¡j) · ~ ¸
0 otherwise:
(6.1)
For each I = 1;:::;N, let b(I) be the number of ¯rms behaving cooperatively, i.e.
b(I) = jfi 2 Injµ(I)i = 1gj.
It is assumed that each period a ¯rm adapts its behaviour with probability 0 <
~ p < 1. Together with eq. (6.1) this yields a dynamic process that de¯nes a Markov
chain of pure behavioural adaptation dynamics.2 With probability ~ " > 0 each ¯rm
makes a mistake or experiments and chooses any behaviour using a probability
measure ~ ºi(¢) with full support. Given a vector of quantities °(k) 2 ¡(±)n, the
2The postulated types of behaviour might give the impression that exemplary imitating im-
plies solving a pro¯t maximisation problem, whereas pro¯t imitation does not. Therefore it may
seem that switching from cooperative to competitive behaviour implies loosing rationality since
exemplary imitators are more sophisticated. However, pro¯t imitation can in fact also be seen as
a form of pro¯t maximisation. The only di®erence is that it requires less computational burden.
Therefore, switching from cooperative to competitive behaviour merely implies that the ¯rm is not
willing any more to endure a heavier computational burden for behaviour that it considers not to
give the desired result.146 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
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~ p1 1(µ(J)i=µk(I)i) + (1 ¡ ~ p)1 1(µ(J)i=µ(I)i)
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+ ~ "~ ºi(µ(J)i)
o
:
As before, it is assumed that as time passes, ¯rms get a better grip on the market
situation and therefore the analysis is restricted to the dynamics where the experi-
mentation probability converges to zero. To that end de¯ne for each k = 1;:::;m








So, we consider the situation where evolution has forced the probability of mistakes
on both the quantity setting level and the behavioural level to be in¯nitely small,
but strictly positive.
To complete the model, we construct a Markov chain on ­ whose transition
matrix is denoted by Q. At the beginning of each period ¯rms simultaneously adapt
their behaviour and output level based on the present state of the world. A typical





Note that Q is a stochastic and irreducible matrix. The matrix Q is constructed by
making blocks of all permutations on £n. Within these blocks all permutations on
¡(±)n are stored. Hence, the coordinate kI implies the quantity vector °(k) in block
I, i.e. with behaviour vector µ(I). Since Q is irreducible the Markov chain has a
unique invariant distribution which is denoted by ¹(¢).
To facilitate the analysis in the next section de¯ne the stochastic and irreducible







MI(k;l) if I = J
0 if I 6= J:
Note that Q¤ is a block diagonal matrix with blocks Q¤
I = MI, I = 1;:::;N.





























Note that Q = Q¤ + ³C. For the results to be obtained in Section 6.3 to hold,
the interaction between the blocks Q¤
I should be relatively small. It is most natural
to achieve this by making assumptions on the probability of behavioural revision ~ p
relative to the probability of quantity revision p, i.e. it is assumed that ~ p is small
enough, which will be made precise in Proposition 6.2.
6.3 Analysis
In this section we prove that in the long-run the system settles down either in the
Walrasian equilibrium or in the cartel outcome. To do so we need some additional
notation.
De¯ne the cartel outcome qm to be the quantity that maximises industry pro¯ts.




m) ¸ P(nq)q ¡ C(q); 8q 2 I R+:
Let q¤









¸ P((n ¡ r)q
¤
r + rq
m)q ¡ C(q); 8q 2 I R+:
(6.3)
Furthermore, let I0 and I1 be such that µ(I0) = (0;:::;0) and µ(I1) = (1;:::;1).
Note that q¤
0 is the Walrasian output level q¤. It is assumed that the ¯nite grid is
such that qm;q¤
r 2 ¡(±)n for all r = 0;1;:::;n.
On the quantity setting level, denote the monomorphic state (q;:::;q) 2 ¡(±)n






q if µ(I)i = 0
q0 if µ(I)i = 1;
for all i 2 In. Furthermore, k¤
I is de¯ned to be the permutation on ¡(±)n such that
°(k¤
I) = °I(q¤
b(I);qm).148 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
The ¯rst proposition that is proved determines the limit distribution on the
quantity setting level for a Markov chain with transition matrix M I, I = 1;:::;N,
i.e. the limit distribution of block Q¤
I is determined. To prove the proposition two
lemmas are needed, the proofs of which can be found in the appendix. To simplify
notation, denote for each I = 1;:::;N,





¼(q;(n ¡ b(I) ¡ 1)q + b(I)q
0) > ¼(q








This set contains all monomorphic states and those bimorphic states where both the
exemplary imitators as well as the pro¯t imitators can not be better o®. The ¯rst
lemma determines the set of recurrent classes for the imitation dynamics.
Lemma 6.1 Let µ(I) 2 £n be a behaviour vector. The set of recurrent classes for
the pure imitation dynamics with transition matrix MI
0 is given by AI.
The next lemma is an extension of the claim in Vega-Redondo (1997, p. 381). It
claims that any deviation from q¤
b(I) yields less pro¯t for a pro¯t imitator.













b(I) + (n ¡ b(I) ¡ k)q + b(I)q
m)q ¡ C(q):
The ¯rst proposition can now be stated as follows.
Proposition 6.1 Let µ(I) 2 £n be a behaviour vector. The limit distribution ¹I(¢)




Proof. The theory used to prove the proposition is described in detail in Sec-
tion 2.3.1. For I 2 f1;:::;Ng such that I = I0 the result follows from Vega-
Redondo (1997). For I = I1 the result trivially follows (see also O®erman et al.
(2002)). Hence, let I 62 fI0;I1g.
In the following we use the idea of costs between two states °(k) and °(l). Let
d(°(k);°(l)) =
P
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i.e. c(°(k);°(l)) gives the minimum number of mutations from °(k) that is needed
for the imitation dynamics to have positive probability of reaching °(l). In the
remainder the argument of °(¢) is suppressed.
First, we build a °I(q¤
b(I);qm)-tree H¤, with minimal costs. Then it is shown
that for any state ° 6= °I(q¤
b(I);qm) and any °-tree H° the costs will be higher.
Young (1993) has shown that the minimum cost tree is among the °-trees where °
is an element of a recursive class of the pure imitation dynamics. Thus, following
Lemma 6.1 only the elements of AI need to be considered. So, take f°g 2 AI.
There are four possibilities.
1. ° = °(q), q 6= q¤
b(I), q 6= qm. This case can be subdivided in two parts.
(a) ¼(q;(n¡b(I)¡1)q+b(I)qm) ¸ ¼(qm;(n¡b(I)¡1)q+b(I)qm). Consider
the following sequence of events.
i. One exemplary imitator mutates to qm, while the other ¯rms cannot
revise their output. Denote the resulting by state by °0. This gives
cost c(°;°0) = 1.
ii. Next, all exemplary imitators get the opportunity to revise their
output. With positive probability they all choose qm.
iii. Finally, all pro¯t imitators may adapt their output level. With pos-
itive probability they all stay at q.
So, there is a path with positive probability that leads to state °(q;qm) 2
AI at cost 1.
(b) ¼(q;(n¡b(I)¡1)q+b(I)qm) < ¼(qm;(n¡b(I))q+(b(I)¡1)qm). Consider
the sequence of events where ¯rst one exemplary imitator mutates to
qm. Second, all exemplary imitators get the opportunity to update their
quantity. With positive probability they all choose qm. Finally, all pro¯t
imitators get the opportunity to update their quantity and with positive
probability they will also choose qm. Hence, it takes one mutation of
an exemplary imitator to qm to reach with positive probability the state
°(qm) 2 AI. Therefore, c(°;°(qm)) = 1.
2. ° = °(q;q0), q;q0 6= q¤
b(I), q;q0 6= qm. This case too can be subdivided in two
parts.
(a) ¼(q;(n¡b(I)¡1)q+b(I)qm) > ¼(qm;(n¡b(I))q+(b(I)¡1)qm). As before150 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
it takes one mutation of an exemplary imitator to qm to reach °(q;qm)
with positive probability.
(b) ¼(q;(n ¡ b(I) ¡ 1)q + b(I)qm) < ¼(qm;(n ¡ b(I))q + (b(I) ¡ 1)qm). State
°(qm) can be reached with positive probability using one mutation of an
exemplary imitator.
3. ° = °(q¤
b(I);q), q 6= qm. It takes one mutation of an exemplary imitator to
reach °I(q¤
b(I);qm) with positive probability.
4. ° = °(q;qm), q 6= q¤
b(I).3 It takes one mutation of a pro¯t imitator to q¤
b(I) to
reach °I(q¤
b(I);qm) with positive probability. When one pro¯t imitator mutates
to q¤
b(I) and when, after that, all pro¯t imitators revise their output, then, by
applying Lemma 6.2 with k = 1, one can see that all pro¯t imitators will
choose q¤
b(I) with positive probability, thus reaching °I(q¤
b(I);qm).
By tying all states of the form of case 1 and 2 to states of the form of case 4 and
tying all states of the form of cases 3 and 4 to °I(q¤
b(I);qm), we have constructed a
°I(q¤
b(I);qm)-tree H¤ with c(H¤) = jAIj ¡ 1.
As shown above, to leave any state ° 2 AInf°I(q¤
b(I);qm)g it takes at least one
mutation. Consider now °I(q¤
b(I);qm). Suppose that for two periods to come, no
exemplary imitator can revise its output. If one pro¯t imitator mutates to, say, q
and all pro¯t imitators afterwards get the opportunity to revise their output, then
by applying Lemma 6.2 with k = n ¡ b(I) ¡ 1, one can see that all pro¯t imitators
will choose q¤
b(I). So, it takes at least two mutations to leave °I(q¤
b(I);qm). Hence for
every ° 2 AInf°I(q¤
b(I);qm)g and any °-tree H° we have





I = 1. ¤
Since Q is an irreducible matrix, there is a unique invariant probability measure,
whose support gives the stochastically stable states. It is however very hard to cal-
culate the invariant probability measure explicitly or to derive any general result.
We therefore aggregate the dynamic process over the quantity-setting level, by using
the result of Proposition 6.1. For this aggregated Markov chain it is easy to derive
the unique invariant probability measure by applying the same techniques as before.
Then we use the theory of nearly-complete decomposability developed by e.g. Cour-
tois (1977) and explained in Section 2.3.2 to conclude that the invariant probability
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measure of the aggregated Markov chain is an approximation of order O(³) of the
invariant probability measure of the original Markov chain with transition matrix
Q. The states in the support of the approximate invariant measure are called the
stochastically stable states. These are the states that are observed approximately
most of the times in the long-run of the Markov chain governed by the transition
matrix Q.
Consider the Markov chain on £n £ £n with transition matrix ~ M, a typical

































Note that the matrix ~ M is indeed an aggregate version of Q where aggregation has
taken place over the quantity setting level using the invariant probability measures.
Furthermore, remark that ¸
k¤
I
IJ is the limit of a pure behavioural adaptation process
and a mutation process where the probability of a mutation converges to zero. Let
us ¯rst consider the pure behavioural adaptation process.
Lemma 6.3 For the set of recurrent states for the pure behavioural adaptation dy-
namics, denoted by ~ A, it holds that ~ A ½ fµ(I0);µ(I1)g.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is trivial. Note that ~ M(I;J) = ¸
k¤
I
IJ. Hence, we only
need to consider the quantity vectors that are stochastically stable in the quantity
setting level. Let µ 2 £nn ~ A. Suppose that all ¯rms may change behaviour, which
happens with positive probability. Then all ¯rms choose the same behaviour. So,
the system reaches either µ(I0) or µ(I1). ¤
Note that it can happen that ~ ¸ is so large that only µ(I1) is a recurrent state.
Conversely, ~ ¸ can be so small that µ(I0) is the only recurrent state.




















So, if the system is in the monomorphic state where all ¯rms are competitive and
set the Walrasian quantity, r01 is the minimum number of ¯rms needed to switch152 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
to cooperative behaviour and setting the cartel quantity to make cooperation more
pro¯table than competition. Conversely, let r10 be the minimum number of ¯rms
needed to switch from cooperation to competition to make competition more prof-






















I) denote the second largest eigenvalue of Q¤
I in absolute value.
The following proposition can now be proved.











then the unique invariant probability measure ¹(¢) of Q can be approximated by a
well de¯ned element ~ ¹(¢) 2 ¢(­) of order O(³). For ~ ¹(¢) it holds that
1. If r01 < r10, then ~ ¹k¤
I1 = 1;
2. If r01 > r10, then ~ ¹k¤
I0 = 1;
3. If r01 = r10, then 0 < ~ ¹k¤
I0 = 1 ¡ ~ ¹k¤
I1 < 1.
Proof. Section 2.3.2 shows that the conditions on ³ and the elementary divisors
of Q are su±cient for Q to be nearly-complete decomposable. This implies that
one can apply the theorems proved by Simon and Ando (1961) to approximate the
unique invariant probability measure ¹(¢) of Q by the invariant probability measure
of ~ M, ~ ¹(¢).
Since ~ M is an irreducible matrix the invariant probability measure ~ ¹(¢) is unique.
The procedure to prove the proposition is the same as in the proof of Proposition 6.1,
i.e. we build µ-trees and the ones with minimal costs get positive measure. Since
only the elements of ~ A are to be considered we only need to compare c(µ(I0);µ(I1))
and c(µ(I1);µ(I0)). The proof follows then trivially. Suppose that r01 < r10. Then
c(µ(I0);µ(I1)) = r01 < r10 = c(µ(I1);µ(I0)). Since we only need to consider the
stochastically stable states from the quantity setting level, we conclude that ~ ¹k¤
I1 = 1.
The other cases are proved in a similar way. ¤
Note that if ~ ¸ > ¼m, the system will always settle in the cooperative outcome.
The condition on ³ can always be satis¯ed by taking ~ p small enough. Linearity of6: Multi-Level Evolution in Cournot Oligopoly 153
the elementary divisors of Q can be obtained by an appropriate choice of the ~ ºi,
i = 1;:::;n.
Proposition 6.2 establishes that if r01 < r10, then the basin of attraction of cartel
is larger than the basin of attraction of competition. This implies that in the long-
run, only the cartel outcome will be observed a signi¯cant fraction of time. This
does not imply that the market will never be in the Walrasian equilibrium. On the
contrary, it is very well possible that the market settles in the Walrasian equilibrium
for prolonged periods of time. If r01 > r10, the reverse story holds. In the degenerate
case where r01 = r10, both the cartel outcome and the Walrasian equilibrium will
be observed a signi¯cant fraction of time in the long-run. The values of r01 and r10
critically depend on the value of ~ ¸. In general, these values cannot be calculated
analytically. Numerical methods can be used in such cases. Note that in the case
of a linear cost function, the values of r01 and r10 cannot be determined since all
¯rms make zero pro¯ts. This is due to the fact that the pro¯t imitators choose their
quantity such that the price equals the marginal costs. Therefore, a cartel will arise
if ¼m · ~ ¸ and a Walrasian equilibrium will arise otherwise.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we extended the model of Vega-Redondo (1997) in two ways. Multiple
behavioural rules are allowed and behavioural adaptation is introduced. This set-up
leads to the conclusion that either competition or cooperation is stochastically stable
(unless r01 = r10, in which case both are stochastically stable), depending on the
structure of the market and the inclination to cooperative behaviour. Competition
leads to the Walrasian equilibrium and cooperation leads to the cartel equilibrium.
This chapter can therefore be seen as providing a theoretical underpinning for some
of the experimental results found by O®erman et al. (2002).
In their experiment O®erman et al. (2002) randomly match individuals into
groups of three persons. Each person is given the inverse demand function and the
cost function. Individuals do not know to whom they are matched. In each round,
each individual chooses an output level given the information that she gets. O®er-
man et al. (2002) use three informational treatments. The one that corresponds to
our model is the treatment in which after each round every individual is informed
about the revenues, costs, pro¯ts, and quantities of all ¯rms in her group. Further-
more, the aggregate quantity as well as the market price of each person's group is154 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
given. Following Vega-Redondo (1997) one would expect that every group eventu-
ally settles at the Walrasian equilibrium. However, this is not the case. The cartel
equilibrium is also reached quite often in this experiment. According to the theory
presented in this chapter, the co-existence of both equilibria is the result of di®erent
levels of inclination to cooperative behaviour within the groups.
It is a natural further step to drop the assumption of a common inclination
to cooperative behaviour and replace it with individual levels. This could then
facilitate an analysis into the impact of these levels on the resulting market outcome.
Furthermore, the model might be extended with more behavioural rules. O®erman
et al. (2002) for instance pose several other plausible behavioural rules. In this
perspective, it would be interesting to distinguish between behavioural rules by
attaching costs of using the rules, for instance based on the level of information
that is available. If lots of information is available, pro¯t imitation is a feasible
behavioural rule that does not require much intellectual or computational skills.
Therefore, it can be seen as a cheap behavioural rule. If only aggregate quantities
are known, pro¯t imitation is not feasible any more. Fictitious play for instance,
still is. However, ¯ctitious play requires more skills and can therefore be regarded
as more expensive. It is conjectured by O®erman et al. (2002) that these costs are
in°uencing the resulting equilibria in di®erent information treatments. Finally, an
extension of this model could accommodate for entry and exit in the market. In
fact, Al¶ os-Ferrer et al. (1999) already extended the Vega-Redondo (1997) model in
this direction, that is, without the possibility of behavioural adaptation.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 6.1
Note that every element of AI is a recurrent class. We prove the converse claim.
Let ° 2 ¡(±)n be such that there is no A 2 AI satisfying ° 2 A. We will show that
there is a path from ° to a state in AI which has positive probability.
Take q 2 f°jj¼(°j;°¡j) = max
i2In
¼(°i;°¡i)g and denote any exemplary choice in
° by q0. With positive probability all pro¯t imitators choose q and all exemplary
imitators choose q0 next period. So, next period's state will be °(q;q0). There are
two possibilities.
1. q = q0; then f°(q;q0)g = f°(q)g 2 AI.6: Multi-Level Evolution in Cournot Oligopoly 155
2. q 6= q0. There are two cases4.
(a) ¼(q;(n ¡ b(I) ¡ 1)q + b(I)q0) ¸ ¼(q0;(n ¡ b(I))q + (b(I) ¡ 1)q0)
and ¼(q0;(n ¡ 1)q0) ¸ ¼(q;(n ¡ 1)q).







So, with positive probability state °(q;q0) is reached and f°(q;q0)g 2 AI.
(b) ¼(q;(n ¡ b(I) ¡ 1)q + b(I)q0) < ¼(q0;(n ¡ b(I))q + (b(I) ¡ 1)q0)
and ¼(q0;(n ¡ 1)q0) ¸ ¼(q;(n ¡ 1)q).
With positive probability, all ¯rms choose q0 leading to the monomorphic
state °(q0) 2 AI.
This proves the lemma. ¤
B Proof of Lemma 6.2
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b(I) + (n ¡ b(I) ¡ k)q + b(I)q
m)]q:
4Since q0 is an exemplary choice, ¼(q0;(n ¡ 1)q0) ¸ ¼(q;(n ¡ 1)q).156 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
Substracting C(q) ¡ C(q¤
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From eq. (6.3) it can be seen that the ¯rst term on the left hand side is as least as
large as the ¯rst term on the right hand side. ¤Chapter 7
Evolutionary Belief Updating in
Cournot Oligopoly
7.1 Introduction
The technique of nearly-complete decomposable systems has been used in Chap-
ter 6 to construct a dynamic evolutionary model that can explain why di®erent
oligopolistic markets can end up in di®erent types of equilibria. We modelled a
situation where ¯rms can behave either competitively or cooperatively. Depending
on the (exogenously given) intensity of competition we showed that the market ends
up in either the Walrasian or the cartel equilibrium.
In this chapter we take a di®erent approach to answer the same question. Again,
we will develop a nearly-complete decomposable system with dynamics at two lev-
els. At the quantity level ¯rms do not imitate as in Chapter 6 and most of the
evolutionary literature, but myopically maximise their pro¯t based on a conjecture
about the behaviour of the other ¯rms. At the behavioural level, ¯rms imitate the
conjecture of the ¯rm that makes the highest pro¯t.
The question under which conditions collusion or cartel formation in oligopolistic
markets is possible is an important issue in the theory of industrial organisation. It
is particularly interesting for anti-trust policies. There are several ways in which the
issue has been addressed in the literature. The static Cournot or Bertrand models
don't allow for a cooperative outcome. Experimental evidence, e.g. by Friedman
(1967), Axelrod (1984), and O®erman et al. (2002), suggests that cooperation or
cartel formation (tacit collusion) does arise in oligopolistic markets.
In the literature many contributions try to explain sustainability of tacit collusion
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(see also Chapter 1). For most of these models it holds that extensions to the
basic static model are needed in order to get cooperation as a possible equilibrium
outcome, e.g. by assuming incomplete information or asymmetries in the ¯rms'
technologies. There is, however, a very simple way of obtaining a collusive outcome
in the static model, namely by introducing conjectural variations, a concept that
dates back to Bowley (1924). This approach assumes that ¯rms take into account the
reaction of the market to their own quantity choice. For example, the standard best-
reply dynamics is compatible with conjectural variations stating that the market
does not respond to one's own actions. The problem is that conjectural variations
are essentially a dynamic concept, but are mostly used in a static environment. Kalai
and Stanford (1985) show that there are repeated game formulations of Cournot
markets that can result in beliefs in the spirit of conjectural variations without
abandoning full rationality. In a recent paper Friedman and Mezzetti (2002) show
how conjectural variations can be used in an oligopoly model. They consider a
di®erentiated product market with boundedly-rational, price-setting ¯rms that at
each point in time maximise their pro¯t over an in¯nite time horizon based on
a conjectural variation. These authors also study an adaptation process of the
conjectural variation where adaptation takes place if the observed price change is
substantially larger than the price change predicted by the conjectural variation.
They show that under certain conditions the Nash equilibrium always constitutes a
stable steady-state. Furthermore, as substitutability among ¯rms increases, a more
cooperative outcome can be sustained as a stable steady-state. In the limit (perfect
substitutability) this leads to full cooperation.
In Chapter 6 it has already been argued that an important step in the evolution
of economic thinking has been the interest of economists for the theory of evolution
applied to economic phenomena. Several contributions to the literature have set
o® the development of this ¯eld. First there is the concept of bounded rationality
introduced by Herbert Simon (cf. Simon (1957)). The bounded rationality approach
replaces the assumption of full rationality of economic agents. Secondly, in neo-
classical economics the objective of agents is to maximise some absolute quantity
(e.g. utility or pro¯t), whereas Alchian (1950) already pointed out that relative
payo®s are often of more interest.
As in Chapter 6, we use the concept of stochastic stability introduced by Fos-
ter and Young (1990) to analyse an oligopoly model with boundedly rational ¯rms
which are ultimately interested in relative pro¯ts. The ¯rst paper in industrial or-7: Evolutionary Belief Updating 159
ganisation which applies the concept of stochastic stability is Vega-Redondo (1997).
He considers a Cournot oligopolistic market where ¯rms choose their quantity level
by imitating the most successful ¯rm, i.e. the ¯rm that makes the highest pro¯t.
He shows that the unique stochastically stable state is given by the Walrasian equi-
librium. This model has been extended by Al¶ os-Ferrer et al. (1999) by allowing
for entry and exit. They ¯nd that if there are decreasing returns to scale, then
the market will eventually settle in a Walrasian equilibrium. In case of increasing
returns to scale, a monopoly will arise eventually.
As mentioned before, an experimental study by O®erman et al. (2002) shows that
not only the Walrasian equilibrium may survive in a Vega-Redondo framework, but
also the collusive (cartel) equilibrium. This experimental evidence seems to suggest
that the behavioural assumptions in Vega-Redondo (1997) are too restrictive. There
are attempts in the literature to construct models with more behavioural rules.
For example, Schipper (2001) models myopic optimisers (best-repliers) and pro¯t
imitators µ a la Vega-Redondo (1997). He ¯nds that the market eventually converges
to a situation where the myopic optimisers play a best-reply to the imitators and
the imitators play a semi-Walrasian quantity taking into account the existence of
the best-repliers. In this model, neither the Walrasian equilibrium nor the cartel
outcome is obtained. Kaarboe and Tieman (1999) use a similar model to show that
in supermodular games a Nash equilibrium is always selected in the limit.
In all the papers mentioned above agents either cannot change their behaviour,
or changing behaviour is modelled as an exogenous random process. The model
presented in this chapter gives more °exibility to the behavioural assumptions un-
derlying the results of these papers by endogenising the behavioural choice. A ¯rst
step, based on quantity as well as behavioural imitation, has been made in Chap-
ter 6. In the present chapter ¯rms base their quantity choice in a boundedly rational
way on observations from the past and on their conjectures about competitors' re-
actions to their behaviour. The latter aspect is modelled by using a variable that
measures the { supposed { immediate reaction of others to one's own actions. The
quantity dynamics is then modelled in such a way that a ¯rm chooses the quantity
that maximises pro¯t given the quantity choices of the previous period and its own
conjecture. Hence, at the quantity level, ¯rms are assumed to be myopic optimisers.
This quantity dynamics is extended with random noise to capture aspects of the
quantity choice that are not explained by the model. One can think for example of
experimentation by ¯rms which leads to a di®erent quantity choice than would be160 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
expected from myopic optimisation. The noise part can also be interpreted as ¯rms
making mistakes in their myopic optimisation process. It might also capture the
fact that a ¯rm is replaced by a new ¯rm that has the same conjecture, but starts
with another quantity choice. The last aspect re°ects what biologists call mutation.
It may happen that after some time a ¯rm realises that it is making less pro¯t
than its competitors. In such a case, its conjecture is apparently not correct. We
allow that ¯rms adapt their conjecture. They make this decision in a boundedly
rational way, namely by imitating the conjecture of the ¯rm that has the highest
pro¯t. This dynamics is called the conjecture dynamics. Here too a random noise
term is added to capture experiments, mistakes or mutations. We are interested
in the long-run outcome of the dynamics. It is natural to assume that over time
¯rms learn the market conditions better. This learning e®ect forces the noise level
to converge to zero as time proceeds.
The quantity dynamics and the conjecture dynamics, together with the noise
terms, lead to an ergodic Markov chain having a unique invariant probability mea-
sure. The stochastically stable states are the states in the support of this measure.
Due to the complexity of the dynamics it is not possible to get analytical results
on the stochastically stable states. However, by construction of the model we can
decompose the Markov chain in a chain that governs the quantity dynamics and
a chain that describes the conjecture dynamics. We show that, given the conjec-
tures, the quantity dynamics has a unique invariant probability measure. We then
aggregate the Markov chain over the quantity level using this measure and obtain
a Markov chain solely based on the conjecture dynamics. It is shown that this ag-
gregated Markov chain has a unique invariant probability measure. The theory of
nearly-complete decomposability as developed by Simon and Ando (1961), Ando
and Fisher (1963) and Courtois (1977) provides conditions under which the invari-
ant measure of the aggregated chain is an approximation of the invariant measure
of the original chain.
Following this path of analysis we obtain that the market will eventually settle
in the Walrasian equilibrium like in Vega-Redondo (1997). However, the market can
spend a considerable amount of time in the cartel equilibrium as we show by means
of a simulation
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 7.2 the model is formally intro-
duced. In Section 7.3 the main results are derived. We also present a simulation of
the model to illustrate the long-run e®ects. Section 7.4 concludes.7: Evolutionary Belief Updating 161
7.2 The Model
Let be given a dynamic market for a homogeneous good with n ¯rms, indexed by
In = f1;2;:::;ng. At each point in time, t 2 I N, competition takes place in a
Cournot fashion, i.e. by means of quantity setting. Inverse demand is given by a
smooth function P : I R+ ! I R+ satisfying P 0(¢) < 0. The production technology
is assumed to be the same for each ¯rm and is re°ected by a smooth cost function
C : I R+ ! I R+, satisfying C0(¢) > 0. If at time t 2 I N the vector of quantities is
given by q 2 I R
n
+, the pro¯t for ¯rm i 2 In at time t is given by
¼(qi;q¡i) = P(qi + Q¡i)qi ¡ C(qi);
where q¡i = (qj)j6=i and Q¡i =
P
j6=i qj.
Each ¯rm i 2 In chooses quantities from a ¯nite grid ¡i. De¯ne ¡ =
Q
i2In ¡i. For
further reference let q(k), k = 1;:::;m, be the k-th permutation of ¡. It is assumed
that in setting their quantities ¯rms conjecture that their change in quantity results
in an immediate change in the total quantity provided by their competitors. This can
also be seen to re°ect the ¯rm's conjecture of the competitiveness of the market.
Formally, ¯rm i 2 In conjectures a value for the partial derivative of Q¡i with
respect to qi. Using this conjecture, the ¯rm wants to maximise next period's pro¯t.
Therefore, he ¯rm is a myopic optimiser, which re°ect its bounded rationality. The








qi + P(qi + Q¡i) ¡ C
0(qi) = 0: (7.1)
As can be seen from eq. (7.1) we assume that there is only a ¯rst order conjecture
e®ect. Furthermore, we assume that it is linear. These assumptions add to the
¯rm's bounded rationality.1
To facilitate further analysis, the conjectures are parameterised by a vector ® 2
I R








Given a vector of conjectures an equilibrium for the market is given by q 2 I R
n
+ such
that for all i 2 In the ¯rst-order condition (7.1) is satis¯ed. Note that if all ¯rms
1The ¯rst-order and linearity assumptions are also made throughout the static literature on
conjectural variations. This seems incompatible with the assumption of fully rational ¯rms in
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i 2 In have a conjecture ®i = ¡1, the equilibrium coincides with the Walrasian
equilibrium. Furthermore, if all ¯rms have ®i = 2¡n
n or ®i = 1, the equilibrium
coincides with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium or the cartel equilibrium, respectively.
Therefore, the conjectures ®i = ¡1, ®i = 2¡n
n , and ®i = 1 will be called the
Walrasian, Cournot-Nash, and cartel conjectures, respectively.
Each ¯rm chooses its conjecture from a ¯nite grid ¤ on [¡1;1], where it is
assumed that ¤ ¾ f¡1; 2¡n
n ;1g. The bounds of this ¯nite grid represent the extreme
cases of full competition (® = ¡1) and cartel (® = 1). For further reference, let
®(I), I = 1;:::;N, be the I-th permutation of ¤n =
Q
i2In ¤.
The dynamics of the market takes place in discrete time and consists of both
a quantity dynamics and a conjecture dynamics. The quantity dynamics works as
follows. At the beginning of period t 2 I N, each ¯rm gets the opportunity to revise
its output with probability 0 < p < 1. The output is chosen so that it maximises
this period's pro¯t based on last period's quantities and the ¯rm's conjecture. That
is, ¯rm i 2 In seeks to ¯nd qt
i 2 ¡i so as to approximate as closely as possible the





i ), where for q¡i 2
Q
j6=i ¡j




0(q + Q¡i)(1 + ®i)
n
2
q + P(q + Q¡i) ¡ C
0(q)
¯ ¯ ¯:




i ) using a probability
measure ´i(¢) with full support. The dynamics described above constitutes the pure
quantity dynamics. Furthermore, each ¯rm experiments or makes a mistake with
probability " > 0 and chooses any quantity from ¡i using a probability measure ºi(¢)
with full support.
The conjecture dynamics takes place at the end of period t, when each ¯rm i
gets the opportunity to revise its conjecture with probability 0 < ~ p < 1. The idea
behind this revision is that once in a while a ¯rm analyses its past performance
and it assesses the correctness of its conjecture by looking at the performance of
the other ¯rms. It is assumed that each ¯rm can observe the individual quantity
choices of its competitors and therefore it can also deduce the conjectures that its
competitors use. It can then imitate the ¯rm that made the highest pro¯t in period
t. Since deriving the conjectures requires e®ort we assume that ¯rms change their
conjecture less often than their quantity choice which is re°ected in assuming that
~ p < p.2 For the main result of this chapter to hold it should even be such that ~ p is
2One could argue that since the ¯rm can derive its competitors' conjectures it can always7: Evolutionary Belief Updating 163
su±ciently small with respect to p. In Section 7.3 the notion of su±ciently small is
made more precise. Formally, ¯rm i's choice ®t
i is such that ®t
i 2 ~ B(®t¡1;qt), where
for given ® 2 ¤n and q 2 ¡,
~ B(®;q) = argmax
®i2¤
n
9j2In : ®j = ®i;8k2In : ¼(qj;q¡j) ¸ ¼(qk;q¡k)
o
:
If there are ties, ¯rm i chooses any element from ~ B(®t¡1;qt) using a probability
measure ~ ´i(¢) with full support. This dynamic process is called the pure conjecture
dynamics. As in the quantity dynamics we allow for mutation or experimentation.
So, each ¯rm chooses with probability ~ " > 0 any conjecture using a probability
measure ~ ºi(¢) with full support.
The quantity and conjecture dynamics yield a Markov chain on ¡ £ ¤n with
transition matrix Q";~ ". Since this chain is ergodic, there is a unique invariant prob-
ability measure. We are interested in the long-run behaviour of the dynamics when
evolution has forced the probability of mistakes to zero, because ¯rms learn to play
the game better as time evolves. That is, we are interested in the (unique) invariant







The support of ¹(¢) constitutes the set of stochastically stable states. In general, one
cannot determine ¹(¢) exactly, but we can approximate this measure by a measure
~ ¹(¢) by suitably aggregating Q.
To do so, ¯rst the quantity dynamics is considered. Let I 2 f1;:::;Ng with
the corresponding conjecture vector ®(I) be ¯xed for the moment. The quantity
dynamics gives rise to a Markov chain on ¡ with transition matrix M"
I, a typical






















where 1 1(¢) denotes the indicator function and the part between square brackets gives




Note that MI has a unique invariant probability measure ¹I(¢).
optimally react. However, it would have to gather more information than just quantity choices.
This requires e®ort and hence costs. Therefore, we assume that conjecture updating takes place
less often than the application of the rule of thumb of quantity adjustment with ¯xed conjecture.164 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
Turning to the conjecture dynamics, ¯x k 2 f1;:::;mg and the corresponding
quantity vector q(k). Let I;J 2 f1;:::;Ng. The transition probability from ®(I)






















where the part between square brackets gives the transition probabilities for the




We will decompose Q by taking the quantity dynamics for each vector of con-
jectures in separate blocks. In the remainder we often use the notation QkIlJ which
should be read as "the element in Q that corresponds to the k-th row in block I
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Note that Q = Q¤ + ³C. So, the transition matrix Q has been decomposed into a
block diagonal matrix Q¤, where each diagonal block is the transition matrix for the
quantity dynamics of a given vector of conjectures, and a matrix that re°ects the
conjecture dynamics. The constant ³ can be interpreted as the maximum degree
of coupling between subsystems MI. The main result of this chapter relies heavily
on ³ not being too large. Since the coupling between subsystems MI can only take
place via the conjecture dynamics, this implies that the conjecture dynamics should
occur su±ciently less frequent than the quantity dynamics.7: Evolutionary Belief Updating 165
7.3 Analysis
In this section the two main results of this chapter are stated and proved. The ¯rst
result determines the invariant probability measure of the Markov chain with tran-
sition matrix MI, for all I = 1;:::;N. These measures are then used to aggregate
the transition matrix Q and to obtain an approximation of its invariant probability
measure that can be calculated explicitly.
To state the ¯rst result, we need to assume that for any vector of conjectures
there is a unique equilibrium, i.e. a unique vector of quantities that solves eq. (7.1)
for all ¯rms.



















i ) = 0:
Let the permutation on ¡ that corresponds to q® be denoted by k(I), i.e. q(k(I)) =
q®. The following proposition states that for each vector of conjectures ®(I) the
unique stochastically stable state of the quantity dynamics is given by q®(I).
Theorem 7.1 Let I 2 f1;:::;Ng be given. Under Assumption 7.1, the unique





Proof. The proposition is proved using the theory developed by Milgrom and
Roberts (1991). First note that for all i 2 In, ¡i is a compact subset of I R+. De¯ne
for all i 2 In the (continuous) function ~ ¼i : I R+ £ I R
n¡1
+ ! I R+, given by
~ ¼i(qi;q¡i) = ¡
¯ ¯ ¯P
0(qi + Q¡i)(1 + ®i(I))
n
2
qi + P(qi + Q¡i) ¡ C
0(qi)
¯ ¯ ¯:
Consider the normal-form game hIn;(¡i)i2In;(~ ¼i)i2Ini. Let S ½ ¡, denote by Si the
projection of S on ¡i and de¯ne S¡i =
Q
j6=i Sj. For all i 2 In the set of undominated














k ¸ 2, where U1(S) = U(S). Note that since q®(I) is unique we have
U
1(¡) = fq
®(I)g:166 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
Following Milgrom and Roberts (1991) we say that fqtgt2I N is consistent with adaptive
learning if
8^ t2I N9¹ t>^ t8~ t¸¹ t : q
~ t 2 U
¡
fq
sj^ t · s < ~ tg
¢
:
Let ^ t 2 I N, take ¹ t = ^ t + 1 and let ~ t = ¹ t + k for some k 2 f0;1;2;:::g. Then
fq
sj^ t · s < ~ tg = fq
sjs = ^ t;:::;¹ t + k ¡ 1g:
Let fqtgt2I N be generated by the pure quantity dynamics, i.e. the quantity dynamics
without the experimentation (or mutation) part. Then we have by de¯nition




¡i ) ¸ ~ ¼i(y;q
~ t¡1
¡i ):
Furthermore, it holds that q
~ t¡1 2 fqsj¹ t · s < ~ tg. Hence, we can conclude that
fqtgt2I N is consistent with adaptive learning. From Milgrom and Roberts (1991,
Theorem 7) one obtains that kqt ¡ q®(I)k ! 0 as t ! 1. Since ¡ is ¯nite we have
9¹ t2I N8t¸¹ t : q
t = q
®(I):
So, fq®(I)g is the only recurrent state of the (mutation-free) pure quantity dynamics.
From Young (1993) we know that the stochastically stable states are among the
recurrent states of the mutation-free dynamics. Hence, ¹I(q®(I)) = 1. ¤
Given the result of Theorem 7.1 one can aggregate Q using ¹I(¢) in the following































Note that the transition matrix ~ Q is the limit of ergodic Markov chains with transi-
tion matrices ~ Q~ " with ~ Q~ "(I;J) = ¸~ "
k(I)(I;J). So, ~ Q has a unique invariant probability
measure ~ ¹(¢). Theorem 7.2 determines this measure and gives its relation with ¹(¢).
The proof of Theorem 7.2 uses the following two lemmas that are proved in the ap-
pendix. The ¯rst lemma establishes the set of recurrent states for the mutation-free
dynamics of ~ Q~ ". This is the dynamics without the experimentation part and is thus7: Evolutionary Belief Updating 167
equal for all ~ " > 0. From eq. (7.4) one can see that the transition probabilities for
this dynamics are equal to the transition probabilities of going from one vector of
conjectures ®(I) to another vector ®(J) given that the current quantity vector is
the equilibrium q®(I). So, the dynamics of ~ Q~ " is the pure conjecture dynamics if the
quantity dynamics gets su±cient time to settle in equilibrium. Let the transition
matrix for this aggregated pure conjecture dynamics be denoted by ~ Q0.
Lemma 7.1 The set A of recurrent states for the aggregated mutation-free conjec-





¯ ¯® 2 ¤
ª
:
The second lemma compares the equilibrium pro¯ts for di®erent conjectures. Sup-
pose that the market is in a monomorphic state, i.e. all ¯rms have the same con-
jecture. The question is what happens to equilibrium pro¯ts if k ¯rms deviate to
another conjecture. If n ¡ k ¯rms have a conjecture equal to ® and k ¯rms have a






























Lemma 7.2 plays a similar role as the claim in Vega-Redondo (1997, p. 381). The
main result in that paper is driven by the fact that if at least one ¯rm plays the
Walrasian quantity against the other ¯rms playing another quantity, the ¯rm with
the Walrasian quantity has a strictly higher pro¯t. In our model the dynamics is
more elaborate. Suppose that all ¯rms have the Walrasian conjecture and that the
quantity dynamics is in equilibrium, i.e. the Walrasian equilibrium. If at least one
player has another conjecture not only its own equilibrium quantity changes, but
also the equilibrium quantities of the ¯rms that still have the Walrasian conjecture.
Lemma 7.2 states that the ¯rms with the lower conjecture still have the highest
equilibrium pro¯t. This is intuitively clear form the ¯rst-order condition (7.1).
The ¯rms with the lower conjecture increase their production until the di®erence
between the price and the marginal costs reaches a lower, but positive, level than
the ¯rms with the higher conjecture. Therefore, the total pro¯t of having a lower
conjecture is higher. This happens because the ¯rms do not realise that in the future168 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
their behaviour will be imitated by other ¯rms which puts downward pressure on
industry pro¯ts.
Given the two lemmas we can prove the following proposition, in which ¸2(A) de-
notes the second largest eigenvalue in absolute value of matrix A, ®(1) = (¡1;:::;¡1)
and ®(N) = (1;:::;1).











then the unique invariant probability measure of the Markov chain on ¡ £ ¤n with
transition matrix Q can be approximated by the unique invariant probability measure
~ ¹(¢) of the Markov chain on ¤n with transition matrix ~ Q. This approximation is of
the order O(³). For ~ ¹(¢) it holds that ~ ¹(q®(1)) = 1.
Proof. The approximation result follows directly from Courtois (1977, Section 3.2).
The result on ~ ¹(¢) is obtained by using the techniques developed by Freidlin and
Wentzell (1984), which are explained in Section 2.3.1. De¯ne the costs between ®(I)












¢ and ~ Q0 is the transition matrix for the
(mutation-free) pure conjecture dynamics. The cost between ®(I) and ®(J) is the
minimum number of mutations from ®(I) that is needed for the pure conjecture
dynamics to have positive probability of reaching ®(J). Let ® 2 ¤n. For each







First, we build an ®(1)-tree H¤ with minimal costs. Then it is shown that for any
state ® 2 Anf®(1)g and any ®-tree H® the costs will be higher. From Freidlin and
Wentzell (1984, Lemma 6.3.1) one can then conclude that ®(1) is the unique element
in the support of ~ ¹(¢). Young (1993) has shown that the minimum cost tree is among
the ®-trees where ® is an element of a recurrent class of the mutation-free dynamics.
Thus, from Lemma 7.1 we know that we only need to consider the monomorphic
states in A. This implies that for all ®-trees H®, ® 2 A, we have c(H®) ¸ jAj ¡ 1,
since one always needs at least one experiment to leave a monomorphic state.7: Evolutionary Belief Updating 169
Consider ®(1) and the ®(1)-tree H¤ that is constructed in the following way. Let
® 2 Anf®(1)g. For all i 2 In we have ®i > ®i(1). Suppose that one ¯rm i exper-
iments to ®i(1) = ¡1, while the other ¯rms cannot revise their output. According
to Lemma 7.2 with k = 1 this ¯rm has a higher pro¯t in quantity equilibrium than
the other ¯rms. If one period later all other ¯rms j 6= i get the opportunity to re-
vise their conjectural variation (which happens with positive probability) they will
all choose ®j(1) = ¡1. Hence, one mutation su±ces to reach ®(1) and therefore
c(H¤) = jAj ¡ 1.
Conversely, let H® be an ®-tree for some ® 2 Anf®(1)g. Then somewhere in
this tree there is a path between ®(1) and a monomorphic state ®0 with ®0
i > ¡1
for all i 2 In. Suppose that starting from ®(1) one ¯rm i experiments to ®0
i. From
Lemma 7.2 with k = n ¡ 1 it is obtained that ¯rm i has a strictly lower pro¯t than
the other ¯rms in quantity equilibrium. So, to drive the system away from ®(1) to
®0 at least two mutations are needed. Hence, c(H®) > c(H¤). ¤
Theorem 7.2 gives a knife-edged result on the convergence of competition to the
Walrasian equilibrium. As we know from O®erman et al. (2002), however, both the
cartel equilibrium and the Walrasian equilibrium are played a signi¯cant amount of
time in an experimental setting. Our result is a long-run result. Given the aggre-
gation we conducted one can expect that the speed of convergence of the original
model is low, in particular when compared to the model in Vega-Redondo (1997).
Although the equilibrium pro¯ts of ¯rms with lower conjectures are higher, this does
not imply that their pro¯ts are also higher along paths to quantity equilibrium. To
illustrate that the market may spend considerable time in the cartel equilibrium we
simulated the model. Consider a market with 3 ¯rms, an inverse demand function
P(Q) = 100 ¡ Q, and a identical convex cost function C(q) = q2, for all ¯rms. We
take p = 0:8 and ~ p = 0:1. The mutation probabilities start at " = ~ " = 0:1. Along
the simulation run, we let " go down in 20 steps, where after each step the new
value of " is 70% of the old value. For ~ " we use a similar procedure in 10 steps. The
cartel outcome is given by qc = 12:5 with a cartel price pc = 62:5. The Walrasian
equilibrium is given by qW = 20 and pW = 40. The quantity grid consists of 16
values with equal an equal grid such that three quantity values are to the left of
qc and three are to the right of qW. The model runs for 3000 periods. We look at
the percentage of Walras and cartel prices in the ¯rst 500 periods and the last 500
periods. (cf. Figures 7.1 and 7.2). In the ¯rst 500 periods the cartel price arises in
9% of the cases, whereas the Walras price arises in 1% of the cases. In the last 500170 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
















Figure 7.1: Simulations of the price process for the ¯rst 500 periods.
periods these percentages are 64.2% and 0%, respectively. Hence, one can see that
the cartel outcome can be very persistent.














Figure 7.2: Simulations of the price process for the last 500 periods.
7.4 Discussion
The model presented in this chapter extends existing evolutionary models of e.g.
Vega-Redondo (1997), Schenk-Hopp¶ e (2000) and Schipper (2001) by allowing for
dynamics at two levels. We model quantity dynamics based on myopic optimisation
by ¯rms that includes the conjectured market response to the ¯rm's own quantity-7: Evolutionary Belief Updating 171
setting behaviour which is modelled by means of a conjecture parameter. At a
second level, we allow ¯rms to change or adapt their behaviour in the sense that
they can change their conjecture. This decision is also modelled to be boundedly
rational. Firms look at their competitors and imitate the behaviour of the most
successful ¯rm.
The main conclusion of Theorem 7.2 is that if behavioural adjustment takes
place at a su±ciently lower rate than quantity adjustment, the market ends up
in the Walrasian equilibrium in the long-run. To be more precise, the Walrasian
equilibrium is the only outcome that is observed a signi¯cant amount of time in the
long-run.
The main feature of our model that triggers the result is the fact that we model
an explicitly dynamic process where ¯rms learn from the past. This induces them
to adapt their behaviour if their pro¯t falls behind their competitors' pro¯ts. In
standard repeated games, time plays an implicit role. To quote Vives (1999): in
a "pure repeated game framework[...]history matters only because ¯rms threaten it
to matter". Therefore, a cartel outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium in such
models. The combination of time having an explicit role and boundedly rational
¯rms has huge consequences for the long-run outcome of market interaction since it
avoids folk theorem-like results and instead pins down a unique equilibrium outcome.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 7.1
Given a monomorphic state, the pure conjecture dynamics remains in the same
monomorphic state with probability one. So A ¾
©
f(®;:::;®)g
¯ ¯® 2 ¤
ª
. Con-
versely, let ® 2 ¤nnA. With positive probability all ¯rms may adjust their con-





¯ ¯® 2 ¤
ª
;
which proves the lemma. ¤172 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
B Proof of Lemma 7.2
Since all ¯rms are identical and solutions to the ¯rst-order conditions are unique,
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k ¸ q®0. There are two possible cases:
1. if C0(q®
k) ¸ C0(q®0
k ), then (7.5) immediately gives a contradiction;
2. if C0(q®
k) < C0(q®0








































¸ 1 and 1+®0
1+® < 1 this gives a
contradiction.
According to the mean-value theorem there exists a q 2 (q®
k;q®0




















































which proves the lemma. ¤Chapter 8
Bounded Rationality in a Finance
Economy with Incomplete markets
8.1 Introduction
In Chapters 6 and 7 we analysed the e®ects of bounded rationality in a partial equi-
librium model. In this chapter we turn to a general equilibrium model with incom-
plete ¯nancial markets. The main focus of this chapter is to describe a boundedly
rational price-adjustment process that converges to an equilibrium price vector. It
turns out that the simplicial algorithm for calculating stationary points of a con-
tinuous function on a polytope as developed by Talman and Yamamoto (1989) has
a nice interpretation that can be used to give a boundedly rational explanation for
price formation on ¯nancial markets.
The theory of general equilibrium with incomplete markets originates from the
classical general equilibrium theory and the theory of ¯nance. The general equilib-
rium approach dates back to Walras (1874), who gave the ¯rst systematic account
of general equilibrium. Existence of a general equilibrium was not proved, however,
until the nineteen ¯fties by Arrow and Debreu (1954). Textbook expositions can be
found in e.g. Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995). There
has been extensive criticism towards the static and deterministic nature of general
equilibrium theory, started notably by Hicks (1939).
The ¯rst general equilibrium model with time and uncertainty was developed
in Arrow (1953). This model, known as the Arrow{Debreu model, describes two
periods of time, today and the future. There is a ¯nite number of possible states
of the future, but which one will occur is unknown at present. It is assumed that
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agents can trade in both present as well as future commodities. An equilibrium
price vector is such that all markets clear. In that sense, the Arrow{Debreu model
is a straightforward generalisation of the standard general equilibrium model as
explained in Debreu (1959). A more elaborate model involving spot markets for
today's commodities and future markets for future goods has been explored by
Radner (1972).
The theory of ¯nancial economics has its roots in Fisher (1930). He presented
a model of a sequence economy in which there is a short-term bond that can be
used to redistribute income. The formalisation of incomplete markets dates back to
Diamond (1967). Markets are incomplete if not all possible future allocations can be
attained by trading on markets. Hence, the basic Arrow{Debreu and Radner models
assume complete markets. In this chapter the simplest general equilibrium model
with incomplete markets as is explained in e.g. Magill and Quinzii (1996) is consid-
ered. There are two periods of time (present and future), a ¯nite number of possible
future states, one consumption good and a number of ¯nancial securities that can
be used to transfer income from the present to the future. For the consumption
good there are spot markets, so at present one cannot trade the consumption good
for the future. The ¯nancial market is incomplete if not all possible income streams
for present and future can be attained by trading on ¯nancial markets.
Existence of equilibrium in a two-period general equilibrium model with multiple
consumption goods and (possibly) incomplete markets is proved in Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1986). They prove existence on the set of no-arbitrage prices. These
are prices such that it is impossible to create a portfolio of assets which generates
a non-negative income stream in the future and has non-positive costs at present.
The proof uses a ¯xed point argument for functions on compact sets. Therefore,
since the set of no-arbitrage prices can be unbounded, the proof of Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986) uses a compact truncation of this set. In this chapter we
present an existence proof for the one consumption good model that uses a stationary
point argument without truncating the set of no-arbitrage prices. Other existence
proofs use some transformation of the underlying model. Hens (1991) for example,
introduces an arti¯cial asset to translate the present to the future. The approach
taken by Hirsch et al. (1990) shows existence of equilibrium in a model with state
prices. Then it is argued that each equilibrium in the original model corresponds
one-to-one to an equilibrium in state prices.
Given that an equilibrium exists the question arises how to compute one. There8: Bounded Rationality in a Finance Economy 175
is a homotopy method introduced in Herings and Kubler (2002) that requires dif-
ferentiability assumptions on the utility functions. In this chapter we show that one
can use the simplicial approach developed by Talman and Yamamoto (1989), which
does not require additional assumptions to the ones needed to prove existence. Note
that the Talman and Yamamoto (1989) algorithm is de¯ned for functions on poly-
topes. The set of no-arbitrage prices for the model can however be an unbounded
polyhedron. Since it is shown that in equilibrium asset prices cannot be unbounded,
the algorithm uses an increasing sequence of polytopes and converges to an equilib-
rium in a ¯nite number of steps. There are simplicial algorithms for functions on
polyhedra, notably by Dai et al. (1991) and Dai and Talman (1993). These algo-
rithms cannot be applied, however, since they assume pointedness of the polyhedron
or linear functions, respectively.
Since a general equilibrium model can (and generally will) have multiple equilib-
ria, the method used to calculate an equilibrium should ideally also be an equilibrium
selection device. The homotopy method of Herings and Kubler (2002) does not qual-
ify as a selection method. The Talman and Yamamoto (1989) approach, however,
can be used as a selection device. It assumes a boundedly rational market maker
that maximises the market's turn-over. It does so by, given a starting vector of as-
set prices, collecting all demand and supply orders and by relatively increasing the
price of the asset that has the greatest excess demand. This continues until another
asset has the greatest excess demand. Then the price of this asset will be relatively
increased. This procedure eventually converges to an equilibrium. The demand and
supply orders of the agents represent the agents' valuations of their portfolios in the
di®erent states of the future.
The two period model can be given a more dynamic interpretation where the
present represents a point in time just after a fundamental change has taken place
in the economy that in°uences for example utility functions, endowments or future
payo®s to assets. The starting vector of asset prices for the market maker is then the
equilibrium price vector from just before the shock. Such an interpretation implicitly
assumes bounded rationality since the agents are one-period forward looking.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 8.2 the economic model is de-
scribed. In Section 8.3 we prove the existence of equilibrium and in Section 8.4 we
interpret the simplicial algorithm of Talman and Yamamoto (1989) as describing a
boundedly rational path of asset prices. In Section 8.5 the algorithm is presented in
some detail and illustrated by means of a numerical example.176 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
8.2 The Finance Economy
The General Equilibrium model with Incomplete markets (GEI) explicitly includes
incomplete ¯nancial markets in a general equilibrium framework. In this chapter the
simplest version is used. It consists of two time periods, t = 0;1, where t = 0 denotes
the present and t = 1 denotes the future. At t = 0 the state of nature is known to
be s = 0. The state of nature at t = 1 is unknown and denoted by s 2 f1;2;:::;Sg.
In the economy there are I 2 I N consumers, indexed by i = 1;:::;I. There is
one consumption good that can be interpreted as income. A consumption plan for
consumer i 2 f1;:::;Ig is a vector xi 2 I R
S+1
+ , where xi
s gives the consumption level
in state s 2 f0;1;:::;Sg.1
Each consumer i = 1;:::;I, is characterised by a vector of initial endowments,
!i 2 I R
S+1
+ , and a utility function ui : I R
S+1
+ ! I R. Denote aggregate initial endow-
ments by ! =
PI
i=1 !i. Regarding the initial endowments and utility functions we
make the following assumptions.
Assumption 8.1 The vector of aggregate initial endowments is strictly positive,
i.e.
! 2 I R
S+1
++ :
Assumption 8.2 For each agent i = 1;:::;I, the utility function ui satis¯es:
1. continuity on I R
S+1
+ ;
2. strict monotonicity on I R
S+1
+ ;
3. strict quasi-concavity on I R
S+1
+ .
Assumption 8.1 ensures that in each period and in each state of nature there is at
least one agent who has a positive amount of the consumption good. Assumption 8.2
ensures that the consumer's demand is a continuous function.
It is assumed that the market for the consumption good is a spot market. The
consumers can smoothen consumption by trading on the asset market. At the asset
market, J 2 I N ¯nancial contracts are traded, indexed by j = 1;:::;J. The future
payo®s of the assets are put together in a matrix
V = (V
1;:::;V
J) 2 I R
S£J;
1In general we denote for a vector x 2 I R
S+1, x = (x0;x1) 2 I R £ I R
S to separate x0 in period
t = 0 and x1 = (x1;:::;xS) in period t = 1.8: Bounded Rationality in a Finance Economy 177
where V j
s is the payo® of one unit of asset j in state s. The following assumption is
made with respect to V .
Assumption 8.3 There are no redundant assets, i.e. rank(V ) = J.
Actually, Assumption 8.3 can be made without loss of generality; if there are re-
dundant assets then a no-arbitrage argument guarantees that its price is uniquely
determined by the other assets. Let the marketed subspace be denoted by hV i =
Span(V ). That is, the marketed subspace consists of those income streams that
can be generated by trading on the asset market. If S = J, the marketed subspace
consists of all possible income streams, i.e. markets are complete. If J < S there is
idiosyncratic risk and markets are incomplete.




. Given a ¯-
nance economy E, agent i can trade assets by buying a portfolio zi 2 I R
J given the
(row)vector of prices q = (q0;q1) 2 I R
J+1, where q0 is the price for consumption in
period t = 0 and q1 = (q1;:::;qJ) is the vector of security prices with qj the price
of security j, j = 1;:::;J. Given a vector of prices q = (q0;q1) 2 I R
J+1, the budget




x 2 I R
S+1
+
¯ ¯ ¯9z2I RJ : q0(x0 ¡ !
i
0) · ¡q1z;x1 ¡ !
i
1 = V z
o
: (8.1)
Given the asset payo® matrix V we will restrict attention to asset prices that gen-
erate no arbitrage opportunities, i.e. asset prices q such that there is no portfolio
generating a semi-positive income stream. In other words, we only consider asset
prices that exclude the possibility of "free lunches". The importance of restrict-
ing ourselves to no-arbitrage prices becomes clear from the following well-known
theorem (cf. Magill and Quinzii (1996)).
Theorem 8.1 Let E be a ¯nance economy satisfying Assumption 8.2. Then the
following conditions are equivalent:
1. q 2 I R
J+1 permits no arbitrage opportunities;
2. 8i=1;:::;I : argmaxfui(xi)jxi 2 Bi(q)g 6= ;;
3. 9¼2I RS
++ : q1 = ¼V ;
4. Bi(q) is compact for all i = 1;:::;I.178 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
The vector ¼ 2 I R
S
++ can be interpreted as a vector of state prices. Condition 3
therefore states that a no-arbitrage price for security j equals the present value of
security j given the vector of state prices ¼. As a consequence of this theorem, in
the remainder we restrict ourselves to the set of no-arbitrage prices
Q = fq 2 I R
J+1jq0 > 0;9¼2I RS
++ : q1 = ¼V g: (8.2)
Under Assumption 8.2, Theorem 8.1 shows that the demand function xi(q), max-
imising agent i's utility function ui(x) on Bi(q), is well-de¯ned for all i = 1;:::;I,
and all q 2 Q. Since the budget correspondence Bi : Q ! I R
S+1
+ is upper- and
lower-semicontinuous, Berge's maximum theorem gives that xi(q) is continuous on
Q. Because the mapping zi 7! V zi + !i is continuous, one-to-one and onto, the
security demand function zi(q), determined by V zi(q) = xi
1(q)¡!i
1, is a continuous
function on Q.




















Note that since there are no initial endowments of asset j, j = 1;:::;J, excess
demand is given by
PI
i=1 zi
j(q). With respect to the excess demand function we can
derive the following result.
Lemma 8.1 Under Assumptions 8.1{8.3 the excess demand function f : Q ! I R
J
satis¯es the following properties:
1. continuity on Q;
2. homogeneity of degree 0;
3. (f0(q);V f1(q)) ¸ ¡! for all q 2 Q;
4. for all q 2 Q, qf(q) = 0 (Walras' law).
The proof of this lemma is elementary and therefore omitted.
A ¯nancial market equilibrium (FME) for a ¯nance economy E is a tuple
¡
(¹ xi; ¹ zi)i=1;:::;I; ¹ q
¢
with ¹ q 2 Q such that:
1. ¹ xi 2 argmaxfui(xi)jxi 2 Bi(¹ q)g for all i = 1;:::;I;
2. V ¹ zi = ¹ xi
1 ¡ !i
1 for all i = 1;:::;I;8: Bounded Rationality in a Finance Economy 179
3.
PI
i=1 ¹ zi = 0.
Note that the market-clearing conditions for the ¯nancial markets imply that the
goods market also clears, since there is only one consumption good.
8.3 Existence of Equilibrium
The proof of the existence of an FME is reminiscent to the proof of Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986). Existence is proved on the space of prices ¹ Q, where
¹ Q = fq 2 I R
J+1jq0 ¸ 0;9¼2I RS
+ : q1 = ¼V g:
Before proving a general existence theorem we present the following lemmata.
Lemma 8.2 Under Assumption 8.3 it holds that ¹ Q = cl(Q).
Proof. Since ¹ Q is a ¯nitely generated cone it is a closed set (cf. Rockafellar (1970,
Theorem 19.1)) and hence cl(Q) ½ ¹ Q.
Let ¹ q 2 ¹ Q. Then there exists a ¹ ¼ 2 I R
S
+ satisfying ¹ q1 = ¹ ¼V . Take any (¼º)º2I N
in I R
S




0 = maxf¹ q0; 1
ºg for all º 2 I N. De¯ne qº = (qº
0;qº
1), where qº
1 = ¼ºV . Clearly,
qº 2 Q for all º 2 I N and qº ! ¹ q since qº
0 ! ¹ q0 and qº
1 = ¼ºV ! ¹ ¼V = ¹ q1.
Consequently, (qº)º2I N is a sequence in Q converging to ¹ q. Hence, ¹ Q ½ cl(Q). ¤
An important result needed to prove existence of an FME is the existence of a
convergent sequence of state prices to the boundary.
Lemma 8.3 Let (qº)º2I N be a sequence in Q converging to ¹ q 2 @ ¹ Qnf0g. Then under
Assumption 8.3 there exists a sequence of state prices (¼º)º2I N in I R
S
++ converging to
some ¹ ¼ 2 I R
S




¹ Q1 = fq1 2 I R
Jj9¼12I RS
+ : q1 = ¼1V g:
Since ¹ Q1 is a ¯nitely generated cone it consists of all nonnegative linear combinations
of ¯nitely many directions fq1;:::;qmg ½ ¹ Q1. Hence, there exist corresponding
vectors ¼1;:::;¼m 2 I R
S
+ such that for all k = 1;:::;m, qk = ¼kV .
From Carath¶ eodory's theorem (cf. Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 17.1)) we know
that for every º 2 I N, the vector qº
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where ¸º










then ¼º 2 I R
S
+ and ¼ºV = qº
1, for all º 2 I N.
Since ¹ Q1 is ¯nitely generated, there exists a subsequence of (qº
1)º2I N generated
from the same subset K of linearly independent elements of fq1;:::;qmg. Without
loss of generality we take it to be the sequence itself. Since (qº
1)º2I N is convergent
and hence bounded, and fqkjk 2 Kg is a set of linearly independent vectors, we
have that ¸º
k, k 2 K, º 2 I N, is unique and thus bounded. Therefore, the sequence
(¼º)º2I N is bounded.
Since qº 2 Q for all º 2 I N, there exists a ~ ¼º 2 I R
S
++ (possibly unbounded) such
that qº
1 = ~ ¼ºV . Furthermore, since ¼º is bounded by, say, M > 0, for all º 2 I N,
there exists for all º 2 I N a convex combination ^ ¼º of ~ ¼º and ¼º that is bounded
by 2M, such that ^ ¼º 2 I R
S
++. Since (^ ¼º)º2I N is bounded there exists a convergent
subsequence with limit, say, ¹ ¼, that without loss of generality we take to be the
sequence itself. Clearly, ¹ q = ¹ ¼V and ¹ ¼ 2 I R
S
+.
Furthermore, when ¹ q0 > 0, ¹ ¼ 2 @I R
S
+, since if ¹ ¼ 2 I R
S
++, there would be a full-
dimensional ball around ¹ ¼ in the interior of I R
S
+. This ball would be mapped in a
ball of full dimension around ¹ q1, which contradicts ¹ q 2 @ ¹ Q when ¹ q0 > 0. ¤
The following lemma concerns the boundary behaviour of the excess demand
function.
Lemma 8.4 Let (qº)º2I N be a sequence in Q with lim
º!1qº = ¹ q 2 @ ¹ Qnf0g. Under










Since (f0;V f1) is bounded from below, this implies that (f0(qº);V f1(qº))º2I N has a
convergent sequence (w.l.o.g. we assume it is the sequence itself) with limit, say,
¹ f = ( ¹ f0;V ¹ f1).
For all º 2 I N, let ¼º 2 I R
S
++ be a supporting vector, i.e. qº
1 = ¼ºV . By
Lemma 8.3 we can choose ¼º, º 2 I N, such that (¼º)º2I N has a convergent subsequence
with lim
º!1¼º = ¹ ¼ 2 I R
S
+, satisfying ¹ q1 = ¹ ¼V .8: Bounded Rationality in a Finance Economy 181
We consider three cases. First, consider the case where ¹ q0 > 0 and ¹ q1 6= 0. Since
by Lemma 8.3 ¹ ¼ 2 @I R
S
+nf0g there is an s 2 f1;:::;Sg such that ¼º
s ! 0. Let
S = fsj¹ ¼s = 0g and Sc = fsj¹ ¼s > 0g. Since ¹ q1 6= 0 both sets are non-empty. Take
sc 2 Sc. Since !sc > 0, there exists an ic 2 f1;:::;Ig with !ic
sc > 0. For q 2 Q, this














Since (f0(qº);V f1(qº))º2I N is bounded from above and (fic
0 (qº);V fic
1 (qº))º2I N is bounded
from below by ¡!ic the sequence (fic
0 (qº);V fic
1 (qº))º2I N is bounded and therefore
there is a convergent subsequence with limit ¹ fic = ( ¹ fic
0 ;V ¹ fic
1 ). Let ¹ xic = ( ¹ fic
0 +
!ic
0 ;V ¹ fic
1 + !ic





(q) = fx 2 I R
S+1





Hence, ¹ q0¹ xic
0 + ¹ ¼¹ xic
1 = ¹ q0!ic
0 + ¹ ¼!ic
1 since uic is continuous and strictly monotonic.
Consider the bundle ~ xic = ¹ xic + e(s) for some s 2 S, where e(s) 2 I R
S+1 is the
s-th unit vector. Because of strict monotonicity it holds that uic(~ xic) > uic(¹ xic).
However, since ¹ ¼s = 0 we have
¹ q0~ x
ic
0 + ¹ ¼~ x
ic
1 = ¹ q0¹ x
ic
0 + ¹ ¼¹ x
ic
1 = ¹ q0!
ic
0 + ¹ ¼!
ic
1 :
Since ¹ ¼sc > 0 and !ic
sc > 0 it holds that ¹ ¼!ic
1 > 0 and hence ¹ q0~ xic
0 +¹ ¼~ xic
1 > 0. So there
exists s¤ 2 Sc satisfying ¹ q0~ xic
0 + ¹ ¼s¤~ xic
s¤ > 0 and thus ~ xic
0 > 0 or ~ xic
s¤ > 0. Suppose
¯rst that ~ xic














0 + ¹ ¼(~ x
ic
1 ¡ ±e1(s
¤)) = ¹ q0~ x
ic





0 + ¹ ¼!
ic
1 ¡ ¹ ¼s¤±
< ¹ q0!
ic




0 ! ¹ q0 and ¼º ! ¹ ¼ we also have
















Moreover, since xic(qº) ! ¹ xic and uic is continuous,
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So, for all º > maxfº1;º2g we have ~ xic ¡ ±e(s¤) 2 Bic(qº) and uic(~ xic ¡ ±e(s¤)) >
uic(xic(qº)), which contradicts xic(qº) being a best element in Bic(qº). Suppose now
that ~ xic
0 > 0. Using a similar reasoning as above we can show that there exists a
± > 0 such that


























So, for all º > maxfº1;º2g we have ~ xic ¡ ±e(0) 2 Bic(qº) and uic(~ xic ¡ ±e(0)) >
uic(xic(qº)), which contradicts xic(qº) being a best element in Bic(qº).
If ¹ q0 = 0, there exists an ic 2 f1;:::;Ig with !ic
0 > 0. Now the proof follows
along the same lines as above with some s¤ 2 Sc satisfying ¹ ¼s¤~ xic
s¤ > 0.
If ¹ q1 = 0, the set Sc is empty and ¹ q0~ xic
0 > 0. We can now look at the proof of
the ¯rst case and continue in a similar way as before. ¤
Since 0 2 @ ¹ Q there is a tangent hyperplane at 0, i.e. there exists ~ z 2 I R
J+1nf0g
such that q~ z ¸ 0 for all q 2 ¹ Q. Since ¹ Q is full-dimensional, it holds that q~ z > 0
for all q 2 Q. We show existence of FME by normalising asset prices to q~ z = 1, i.e.
on a hyperplane parallel to the tangent hyperplane in 0. One possible choice for ~ z
is the market portfolio zM which is de¯ned in the following way (cf. Herings and
Kubler (2000)). Decompose the vector of total initial endowments in ! = !M +!?,
where !M 2 hV i and !? 2 hV i?, the null-space of hV i. The market portfolio zM
is de¯ned to be the unique portfolio satisfying V z = !M. If !M >> 0 this implies
qzM ¸ 0 for all no-arbitrage prices q 2 ¹ Q.
In the remainder, we ¯x ~ z such that q~ z ¸ 0 for all q 2 ¹ Q. Denote the set of
normalised prices by ~ Q, i.e.
~ Q = fq 2 ¹ Qjq~ z = 1g:
Note that ~ Q can contain half-spaces and is hence not necessarily bounded. Based
on the previous lemma, however, one can show that f0 +e>V f1 becomes arbitrarily
large by moving to the boundary of ~ Q or by taking kqk1 large enough. Let in
the following d(q;A) denote the distance from q 2 ¹ Q to A ½ ¹ Q, i.e. d(q;A) =
inff±j9a2A : ka ¡ qk = ±g.
Lemma 8.5 Under Assumptions 8.1{8.3 it holds that for all M > 0 there exists
" > 0 and N > 0 such that for all q 2 ~ Q,8: Bounded Rationality in a Finance Economy 183
1. d(q;@ ~ Q) · " ) f0(q) + e>V f1(q) > M;
2. kqk1 ¸ N ) f0(q) + e>V f1(q) > M.
Proof. Suppose that 1) does not hold. Therefore, there exists an ¹ M > 0 such that
for all " > 0 there exists a q" 2 ~ Q with d(q";@ ~ Q) · " such that f0(q)+e>V f1(q) · ¹ M.
Let (qº)º2I N be a sequence in ~ Q with d(qº;@ ~ Q) · 1
º for all º 2 I N. In case (qº)º2I N
is bounded it has a convergent subsequence. Without loss of generality, lim
º!1qº = ~ q.
Since d(qº;@ ~ Q) · 1
º we have that ~ q 2 @ ~ Qnf0g. From Lemma 8.4 it follows that
f0(qº) + e>V f1(qº) ! 1. This implies that for all M > 0 there exists an ºM such
that for all º > ºM it holds that f0(qº) + e>V f1(qº) > M.
Let º > º ¹ M and take " = 1
º and q" = qº. Then it holds that d(q";@ ~ Q) · " and
f0(q") + e>V f1(q") > ¹ M which gives a contradiction.
In case (qº)º2I N is unbounded we are in case 2) with kqºk1 ! 1. So, suppose












Moreover, for all º 2 I N it holds that k~ qºk1 = 1. Hence, (~ qº)º2I N is bounded and
therefore has a convergent subsequence with limit, say, ~ q. Then ~ q~ z = lim
º!1~ qº~ z = 0,
i.e. ~ q 2 @ ¹ Q. Furthermore, k~ qk1 = 1 and hence ~ q 6= 0. From Lemma 8.4 we know
that f0(~ qº) + e>V f1(~ qº) ! 1. Since the budget correspondence is homogeneous of
degree 0, we also get f0(qº) + e>V f1(qº) ! 1, which gives a contradiction. ¤
With these lemmas in place, existence of an FME can be proved by using a direct
approach as opposed to the indirect proof of e.g. Magill and Quinzii (1996).
Theorem 8.2 Let E be a ¯nance economy satisfying Assumptions 8.1{8.3. Then
there exists an FME with asset price vector ¹ q 2 Q.
Proof. A vector of prices ¹ q 2 Q gives rise to an FME if and only if f(¹ q) = 0.
Take M > 0. According to Lemma 8.5 there exists " > 0 and N > 0 such that
d(q;@ ~ Q) · " ) f0(q) + e>V f1(q) > M and kqk1 ¸ N ) f0(q) + e>V f1(q) > M.




fq 2 ~ Qjd(q;@ ~ Q) ¸ ";kqk1 · Ng
´
½ ~ Q;
where conv(¢) denotes the convex hull. Obviously, ~ Q0 ½ Q is compact and convex.
Since the excess demand function f is continuous on ~ Q0 there exists a stationary184 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
point, i.e.
9¹ q2 ~ Q08q2 ~ Q0 : qf(¹ q) · ¹ qf(¹ q):
Note that for all q 2 ~ Q0 one obtains
qf(¹ q) · ¹ qf(¹ q) = 0;
because of Walras' law.
It is easy to see that ¹ q 2 ~ Q0n@ ~ Q0 and therefore that ¹ q 2 Q. For suppose ¹ q 2 @Q0
and take (q0;q1) =
(1;e>V )
~ z0+e>V ~ z1 2 ~ Q0.2 Then Lemma 8.5 shows that
q0f0(¹ q) + q1f1(¹ q) =
f0(¹ q) + e>V f1(¹ q)
~ z0 + e>V ~ z1
¸
M
~ z0 + e>V ~ z1
> 0;
which contradicts ¹ q being a stationary point. Hence, ¹ q 2 int( ~ Q0) ½ Q.
Since ¹ q is a stationary point it solves the linear programming problem maxfqf(¹ q)g
such that q~ z = 1. The dual of this problem is minf¸g such that ¸~ z = f(¹ q). Using
Walras' law we obtain,
0 = ¹ qf(¹ q) = ¸¹ q~ z = ¸
() ¸ = 0:
Hence, f(¹ q) = 0. ¤
8.4 A Boundedly Rational Path Towards Equilib-
rium
In this section we present a boundedly rational explanation for a path of points in
~ Q from an arbitrary starting point in ~ Q to an FME. First, we prove the existence
of such a path. Note that the set of prices ~ Q is a (possibly unbounded) polyhedron
generated by vertices fv1;:::;vng and directions fq1;:::;qmg. The recession cone
of ~ Q is given by
re( ~ Q) =
n
q 2 I R
J+1







Let q0 2 ~ Q be an arbitrary starting point in ~ Q and denote
~ Q1 = conv(fv
1;:::;v
ng);
2We can take " and N such that
(1;e
>V )
~ z0+e>V ~ z1 2 ~ Q0.8: Bounded Rationality in a Finance Economy 185
i.e. ~ Q1 is the convex hull of the vertices of ~ Q. It is assumed without loss of generality




q 2 ~ Q



















q 2 re( ~ Q)















(1 ¡ ¸)fq0g + ¸ ~ Q(1) if 0 · ¸ · 1;
~ Q(1) + (¸ ¡ 1)K if ¸ ¸ 1.
Note that for all ¸ ¸ 0 the set ~ Q(¸) is a polytope and that lim
¸!1
~ Q(¸) = ~ Q. In















































Figure 8.1: The expanding set ~ Q(¸).
By Lemma 8.5 we know that for all M > 0 there exists an N > 0 such that
kqk1 ¸ N ) f0(q) + e
>V f1(q) > M:
This implies that for all M > 0 there exists a ¸M > 0 such that for all stationary
points ¹ q of f on ~ Q it holds that ¹ q 2 ~ Q(¸M). Let ¸¤ = maxf1;¸Mg and de¯ne the186 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS









if q 2 ~ Q(¸);
proj ~ Q(¸)
³
proj ~ Q(¸)(q) + f(proj ~ Q(¸)(q))
´
if q 62 ~ Q(¸),
where projA(q) is the projection in k ¢ k2 on the set A. An important property of
this homotopy is stated in the following lemma, where (¸;q) 2 [0;¸¤] £ ~ Q(¸¤) is a
¯xed point of h if h(¸;q) = q.
Lemma 8.6 Let ¸ 2 [0;¸¤]. If (¸;q) is a ¯xed point of the homotopy h, then q is a
stationary point of f on ~ Q(¸). Moreover, if q 62 ~ Q(¸) then q is an FME.
Proof. Note that if q 62 ~ Q(¸), q cannot be a ¯xed point of h. We therefore consider
two cases. Firstly, if q 2 ~ Q(¸) and q +f(q) 2 ~ Q(¸), then f(q) = 0, i.e. q is an FME
and hence a stationary point.





0 ¡ q ¡ f(q))
>(q
0 ¡ q ¡ f(q));
is solved by q since q is a ¯xed point of h. Hence, for all q0 2 ~ Q(¸) we have that
(q
0 ¡ q ¡ f(q))
>(q






0 ¡ q) ¸ 2(q
0 ¡ q)f(q):
Take any q0 2 ~ Q(¸) and ^ q = ¹q0 + (1 ¡ ¹)q for 0 · ¹ · 1. Since ~ Q(¸) is convex we












0 ¡ q) ¸ (q
0 ¡ q)f(q):
Let ¹ # 0. Then 0 ¸ (q0 ¡ q)f(q), i.e.
q
0f(q) · qf(q):8: Bounded Rationality in a Finance Economy 187
So, q is a stationary point of f on ~ Q(¸). Furthermore, if q 62 @ ~ Q(¸) Walras' law
implies that f(q) = 0 and, hence, that q is an FME. ¤
By Browder's ¯xed point theorem (see Browder (1960)) it now follows immedi-
ately that there is a connected set in ~ Q(¸¤) of stationary points of f containing q0
and an FME ¹ q.
There are simplicial algorithms to follow the path of stationary points from q0
to ¹ q. The algorithm of Talman and Yamamoto (1989) results in a path that can be
interpreted as a boundedly rational path to equilibrium. The algorithm should ¯rst
be applied to ~ Q(1). If the algorithm terminates in ¹ q 2 ~ Q(1)n@ ~ Q(1), an FME has
been found. If it terminates at q 2 @ ~ Q(1), we extend the algorithm to ~ Q(¸), ¸ ¸ 1.
This procedure is repeated until an FME has been found.
The path starts in a price vector q0 that can be interpreted as the current ¯-
nancial market equilibrium. Suppose that a structural change takes place in the
economy, e.g. preferences, initial endowments or asset payo®s change. The result-
ing environment is the situation where ¸ = 0 and the set of possible prices equals
~ Q(0) = fq0g. If one interprets t = 0 as the start of a trading day and t = 1 to be
the end, then the price vector q0 can also be interpreted as the starting prices of
assets on the stock exchange, like for example the outcome of the call auction on
the NYSE that takes place at the start of each trading day.
In general, the market maker takes a position in trade and is hence also dealer.
In some ¯nancial markets, the market maker buys from the sellers and sells to the
buyers. In that case he wants to maximise the value of excess demand, since this
determines his pro¯t. Therefore, the market maker will start quoting prices in the
direction that maximises the value of excess demand. In response the investors give
asks and bids to the market maker. This continues until the asks and bids are
such that prices in another direction give a higher value of excess demand. In this
way, the set of prices expands, shrinks and expands again until an equilibrium price
vector has been found.
Since the market maker is unaware of the preferences of the agents it cannot
simply quote the equilibrium prices. Therefore, it takes the myopic approach to
quote prices that maximise excess demand. Along the adjustment path, the market
maker learns about preferences and initial endowments while ¸ moves from 0 to 1.
It need not be the case, however, that there is a one-to-one mapping between ¸ and
time. It can happen that the market maker ¯nds out that he has been moving prices
in the wrong direction. As a reaction he shrinks the set Q(¸) by decreasing ¸ and188 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
starts moving in another direction.
8.5 The Algorithm
The algorithm generates a path of piecewise linear approximations to the excess
demand function. The set ~ Q(1) is a J-dimensional polytope and can be written as
~ Q(1) = fq 2 I R
J+1jq~ z = 1;a
iq · bi;i = 1;:::;mg;
for some ai 2 I R
J+1nf0g and bi 2 I R, i = 1;:::;m.
Let I ½ f1;:::;mg. Then F(I) is de¯ned by
F(I) = fq 2 ~ Q(1)ja
iq = bi;i 2 Ig:
The set I = fI ½ f1;:::;mgjF(I) 6= ;g is the set of all index sets I for which F(I)
is a (J ¡ jIj)-dimensional face. Let q0 2 int( ~ Q(1)) be an arbitrary starting point.
For any I 2 I de¯ne
vF(I) = conv(fq
0g;F(I)):
The triangulation that is used in the algorithm is related to q0 and is such that every
set vF(I) is simplicially subdivided.3 Suppose that the algorithm is in q¤ 2 vF(I),
then q¤ lies in some t-dimensional simplex ¾(q1;:::;qt+1), where t = J ¡ jIj + 1
and qi 2 vF(I) for all i = 1;:::;t + 1. There exist unique ¸¤
1;:::;¸¤
t+1 ¸ 0, with
P¿+1
i=1 ¸¤
i = 1, such that q¤ =
Pt+1
j=1 ¸¤
jqj. The piecewise linear approximation of









Let ¸, 0 · ¸ · 1, be such that q¤ 2 @ ~ Q(¸). Then q¤ = (1 ¡ ¸)q0 + ¸q0, for some
q0 2 F(I). For all 1 = 1;:::;m, de¯ne bi(¸) = (1¡¸)aiq0+¸bi. The point q¤ is such
that it is a stationary point of ¹ f on ~ Q(¸), i.e. q¤ is a solution to the linear program
maxfq ¹ f(q
¤)ja
iq · bi(¸);i = 1;:::;m;q~ z = 1g:









i + ¯~ z = ¹ f(q
¤);¹ ¸ 0;¯ 2 I R
o
:
3See Talman and Yamamoto (1989, Section 5) for details on this triangulation.8: Bounded Rationality in a Finance Economy 189
This gives a solution ¹¤, ¯¤. Using the complementary slackness condition we get
the following:

























j = 1, and ¹¤
































This system has J +2 equations and J +3 variables. The value ¯¤ is a measure for
how much the solution for the piecewise linear approximation deviates from Walras'
law.
In each step of the algorithm a variable enters the basis. This is achieved by
making a linear programming pivot step in (8.3). Given that due to the pivot step a
variable leaves the basis, the question is how to determine which variable enters the








Assuming non-degeneracy, q¤ then lies in the interior of the facet ¿ of the simplex
¾(q1;:::;qt+1) opposite to the vertex qk. Now there are three possibilities. First,
suppose that ¿ 2 @vF(I) and ¿ 62 @ ~ Q(1). This happens if and only if ¿ ½ vF(I[fig)
for some i 62 I. So, we increase the dual dimension with one and ¹i enters the basis
via a pivot step in (8.3). The second case comprises ¿ 2 @ ~ Q(1). Then the algorithm
continues in ~ Q(2). The set ¿ is a facet of exactly one t-simplex ¾0 in the extension
of v(F(I)) in ~ Q(2). The vertex opposite to ¿ of ¾0 is, say, qk. The variable ¸k then
enters the basis. Finally, it can be that ¿ 62 @vF(I). Then there is a unique simplex
¾0 in vF(I) with vertex, say qk, opposite to the facet ¿. The variable ¸k then enters
the basis.
The second possibility is that ¹i leaves the basis for some i 2 I. So, the dual
dimension is decreased with one, i.e. the set I becomes Infig. Now there are190 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
two possibilities. If Infig = ; then ¹ f(q¤) = ¯¤~ z and the algorithm terminates.
The vector q¤ is an approximate equilibrium and the algorithm can be restarted
at q¤ with a smaller mesh in order to improve the accuracy of the approximation.
Otherwise, if Infig 6= ;, then de¯ne I0 = Infig. Since the primal dimension is
increased with one there exists a unique simplex ¾0 in vF(I0) having ¾ as a facet.
The vertex opposite to ¾ is, say, qk. The algorithm continues with entering ¸k in
the basis by means of a pivot step in (8.3).
The ¯rst step of the algorithm consists of solving the linear program
maxfqf(q
0)ja
iq · bi;i = 1;:::;m;q~ z = 1g:













This gives as solution ¹0 and ¯0. The set F(I0) is a vertex of ~ Q(1), where I0 = fi 2
f1;:::;mgj¹0
i > 0g. There is a unique one-dimensional simplex ¾(w1;w2) in vF(I0)
with vertices w1 = q0 and w2 6= w1. Then ¸2 enters the basis by means of a pivot
step in system (8.3).
As an example of this procedure consider the ¯nance economy E(u;!;V ) with



























and the initial endowments equal !1 = (1;3;3;3) and !2 = (4;1;1;1), respectively.
On the ¯nancial markets, two assets are traded, namely a riskless bond and a con-











It is easy to see that the set of no-arbitrage prices, Q, is given by
Q = f(q0;q1;q2)jq0 > 0;q2 > 0;q1 > q2g:8: Bounded Rationality in a Finance Economy 191
Taking ~ z = (1;1;1), we get that
~ Q = fq 2 I R
3ja
iq · 0;i = 1;2;3;q~ z = 1g;
where a1 = (¡1;0;0), a2 = (0;0;¡1), and a3 = (0;¡1;1). Since ~ Q is a polytope one
can set ~ Q(1) = ~ Q. The set ~ Q is the convex hull of the points (1;0;0), (0;1;0), and
(0;1=2;1=2).
We start the algorithm at the price vector q0 = (5
8; 1
4; 1
8). The grid size of the
simplicial subdivision is taken to be 1
8. De¯ne the matrix A = [a1 a2 a3 ¶],
where ¶ denotes the vector of ones. In the ¯rst step of the algorithm we solve the
linear program
minf¯jA(¹1;¹2;¹3;¯) = f(q
0);¹i ¸ 0;i = 1;2;3g;
where f(q0) = (¡3:02;8:4667;¡1:8333). This gives as solution ¹0 = (11:4867;10:3;0)
and ¯0 = 8:4667. This implies that I0 = f1;2g. The basic variables are ¸1;¹1;¹2,
and ¯. The coe±cient matrix corresponding to (8.3) equals
B =
2
6 6 6 6
4
3:02 ¡1 0 1
¡8:4667 0 0 1
1:8333 0 ¡1 1
1 0 0 0
3
7 7 7 7
5
:
The ¯rst one-dimensional simplex that is generated is the simplex ¾(w1;w2) 2
vF(I0), where w1 = q0 and w2 = 1
64(35;22;7). The algorithm proceeds by letting
¸2 enter the basis by means of a linear programming pivot step of (¡f(w2);1) into
the matrix B¡1. This means, the algorithm leaves q0 into the direction vF(I0)¡q0
towards vF(I0) = (0;1;0). By doing so one ¯nds that ¹2 leaves the basis. This
implies that the dimension of the dual space is reduced and a two-dimensional
simplex is generated in vF(f1g), namely ¾(w1;w2;w3), where w3 = 1
64(35;20;9).
One proceeds by entering ¸3 into the basis by performing a pivot step in B¡1. In
this way one obtains a sequence of two-dimensional adjacent simplices in vF(f1g)
until the algorithm terminates when ¹1 leaves the basis. This happens after, in
total, 12 iterations. The path of the algorithm is depicted in Figure 8.2.
The basic variables in the ¯nal simplex are ¸2, ¸3, ¸1, and ¯. The corresponding
simplex is given by ¾(w1;w2;w3), where w1 = 1
16(5;8;3), w2 = 1
64(15;34;15), and
w3 = 1
64(15;36;11). The corresponding values for ¸ are given by ¸1 = 0:1223,





i = (0:2439;0:5284;0:2267):192 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
q
0 






Figure 8.2: The path of prices (dotted line) generated by the algorithm.
The value of the excess demand function in ¹ q is given by f(¹ q) = (¡0:0174;0:0145;¡0:0151).
The approximate equilibrium values for consumption at t = 0 and the demand
for assets are given by ¹ x1
0 = 3:7494, ¹ x2
0 = 1:2332, ¹ z1 = (¡0:9794;¡0:6756), and
¹ z2 = (0:9939;0:6605), respectively. The accuracy of approximation can be improved
by restarting the algorithm in ¹ q and taking a smaller grid size for the simplicial







In many economic and strategic situations there exists no natural market mecha-
nism to value goods. Well-known examples are given by environmental externalities
or public goods. The standard way in neoclassical economics to address the prob-
lems that arise from missing markets is to create markets by government (e.g. for
pollution rights) to value the externality or public good. In reality, however, imple-
mentation of arti¯cial markets is often di±cult as a result of strategic considerations
by the agents involved.
A crucial aspect in dealing with market failures is the possibility of coordination
between di®erent groups of agents, taking into account strategic behaviour. In
practice this implies the formation of coalitions, often resulting from a process of
bargaining.
There is a rich literature on coalition formation using both noncooperative and
cooperative models. Usually, one applies the partition function form. The partition
function is a mapping that imposes a coalitional structure on the set of players.
That is, it gives the coalitional structure of the game. It can be given exogenously
or it can be determined endogenously in the model. Roughly speaking, one can
distinguish two main branches in noncooperative theory, namely simultaneous and
sequential games. Simultaneous games can be divided in open membership models
(e.g. Yi and Shin (2000)) and exclusive membership models (e.g. Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944) and Hart and Kurz (1983)). Yi (1997) studies an exclusive
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membership game in partition function form that can deal with (environmental)
externalities.
The branch of sequential games builds largely on the seminal bargaining paper of
Rubinstein (1982). The partition function approach has been applied here as well,
notably by Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999). A typical noncooperative game
in partition function form describes a situation in which players in turn propose a
coalition and a payo® division that the other players in turn can accept or reject.
In this way one obtains a partition of the grand coalition (possibly consisting partly
of singletons).
Cooperative models of coalition formation often use the partition function form
as well. The main problem that is addressed consists of how to divide payo®s given a
certain coalition structure. The most famous solution concepts are the bargaining set
(cf. Aumann and Maschler (1964)) and the related kernel (cf. Davis and Maschler
(1965)). Other solution concepts try to determine a coalition structure endogenously
together with a payo® division, like e.g. the Zhou bargaining set (cf. Zhou (1994)).
One of the main features of the partition function approach, regardless of its use
in either cooperative or noncooperative models, is that any partition of the set of
players is in principle admissible. In reality, however, it is often required that the
partition has a speci¯c form. In government formation this partition consists of one
coalition that forms the government and, in principal, has a majority in parliament.
Hence, several partitions are a priori ruled out. The other parties can operate as a
singleton or decide to coordinate the opposition and make agreements. In this case
there is an asymmetry between the government coalition and the partition of the
parties in the opposition.
Another important aspect of partition function form games is that players, in
deciding whether or not to join a coalition, are in°uenced by the actions of the
players outside that coalition. In a sequential model, for example, a player decides
on joining a coalition by taking into account what happens after his decision. In
real world situations it is often the other way around. Take the example of govern-
ment formation again. It is the opposition that reacts to the government coalition
that forms and not the government that reacts to the opposition. In other words,
the formation of a coalition creates certain spillovers to the players outside that
coalition.
In order to model these spillovers we propose a class of games, called spillover
games, that includes both the strategic and cooperative aspects that are linked with9: Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour 197
spillovers. Spillover games arise naturally from games in strategic form as is illus-
trated in Section 9.2. The approach that is used is reminiscent of the approach
that has been applied by Chandler and Tulkens (1997) and Helm (2001) to analyse
environmental externalities. In these papers, an economy is studied with environ-
mental externalities. This noncooperative game leads to a cooperative TU game
that is used to analyse divisions of the e®ects of the externality over the ¯rms. The
problem with applying the TU framework here is that it a priori assumes that ¯rms
agree on solving the externality problem together. However, there might be ¯rms
that ¯nd it bene¯cial not to cooperate. In large scale environmental conferences we
see the same behaviour. The USA refuses to abide to the Kyoto protocol, simply
because it is not seen to be bene¯cial by their government.
One of the main arguments of the anti-globalisation movement1 is that nation
states loose their sovereignty due to multinational corporations that manipulate
national governments. This claim only makes sense if nation states are not obliged
to solve economic and social problems together. Therefore, the TU framework is
not suited for analysing such problems.
A spillover game considers a situation where one coalition must be formed from
a certain set of winning coalitions (e.g. majority coalitions that could form a gov-
ernment) and where the coalition that forms creates spillovers for the other players.
Therefore, these games are well-suited to analyse problems like e.g. government
formation, environmental externalities and the construction of public networks. A
solution concept is proposed that gives an expected payo® to players which can
be interpreted as a power index. Furthermore, a probability measure is obtained
indicating the likelihood of the formation of each coalition.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 9.2 the class of spillover
games is introduced. Two typical examples of situations that can be modelled using
spillover games are presented: government formation and public-private connection
problems. In Section 9.3 we present some basic de¯nitions and results for the class
of spillover games. In Sections 9.4 and 9.5 the two examples mentioned before
are dealt with in detail and a sequential coalition formation procedure is proposed
that leads to a value that is an analogue of the Shapley value for TU games. In
Section 9.6 this Shapley value is used to analyse cartel formation in an oligopoly
market that is characterised by quantity competition. Finally, in Section 9.7 some
further extensions of the model are presented.
1See for example Barber (1995), Klein (1999), Hardt and Negri (2000) and Hertz (2002).198 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
9.2 The Model
In this section we introduce the class of spillover games. Its basic elements are best
understood if a spillover game is seen as resulting from an underlying noncooperative
game. So, let G = (N;fAigi2N;fuigi2N) be a game in strategic form, where N is the
set of players, Ai is the set of strategies for player i 2 N and ui :
Q
j2N Aj ! I R+ is
the (nonnegative) payo® function for player i 2 N. This game might arise from an
economy with externalities as is for example the case in Chandler and Tulkens (1997).
For each coalition S 2 2N, de¯ne AS =
Q
i2S Ai and uS =
P
i2S ui. Note that it
is implicitly assumed that utilities are transferable, e.g. that they are in monetary
terms. Furthermore, we de¯ne for each coalition S 2 2N the associated S-induced
game, which is given by the tuple GS =
¡
fSg [ NnS;fASg [ fAigi2NnS;fuSg [
fuigi2NnS
¢
. The S-induced game is a noncooperative game where coalition S acts
as one player against the singletons in NnS. Note that for all i 2 N, Gfig = G; = G.
For the sake of argument, assume for the moment that for each S 2 2N the
S-induced game has a unique Nash equilibrium payo®. Let xS 2 AS £
Q
i2NnS Ai
be a strategy pro¯le that supports the unique Nash equilibrium payo® in GS. Us-
ing these Nash equilibrium payo®s we can generate a cooperative game where for
each coalition S the value is given by v(S) = uS(xS). Note that v(N) equals the
maximum total payo® to the grand coalition and, hence, corresponds to a Pareto
optimal strategy pro¯le. Attached to the value for S is a vector of payo®s for the
agents not in S, zS, where for all i 2 NnS, zS
i = ui(xS). The vector zS captures
the spillovers that arise when coalition S forms. As we already mentioned in the
introduction, our main criticism on Chandler and Tulkens (1997) and Helm (2001)
is that the spillovers as captured by z do not play any role in their analysis.
In general, a spillover game is a tuple G = (N;W;v;z), where N = f1;:::;ng is
the set of players, W ½ 2N is a set of coalitions that can form and v and z are payo®
functions assigning a value to coalitions and to the players outside the coalition,
respectively.
One main feature of our model is the assumption that exactly one coalition will
form. Contrary to TU games, however, we do not impose that the resulting coalition
is the grand coalition. In the example of government formation, the grand coalition
would be a very extreme outcome.
The set W ½ 2N contains those coalitions which can actually form. An element
of W is called a winning coalition. In government formation, a natural choice for W9: Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour 199
is the collection of coalitions which have a majority in parliament.
We assume that W satis¯es the following properties:
² N 2 W;
² S ½ T;S 2 W ) T 2 W (monotonicity).
The ¯rst property ensures that the game is not trivial, in the sense that there is at
least one winning coalition. The second property states that if a group of players S
are winning, then a larger coalition T ¾ S is also winning.
The nonnegative payo® function v : 2N ! I R+ assigns to every coalition S ½ N
a value v(S). If S 2 W, then v(S) represents the total payo® to the members of S
in case S forms. For S = 2 W we simply impose v(S) = 0.
Suppose S forms. Then the members of S do not only generate a payo® to
themselves. Their cooperation also a®ects the players outside S. The payo®s to
the other players, which are called spillovers with respect to S, are given by the
vector zS 2 I R
NnS. Again, we simply put zS = 0 for S = 2 W. Note that whereas the
members of S still have the freedom to divide the amount v(S) among themselves,
the payo®s to the players outside S are individually ¯xed.
Spillovers with respect to S can be either bene¯cial or damaging to the players
in NnS. Spillovers are bene¯cial, or positive, if the total payo® to every coalition





i ¸ v(U); (9.1)
for all U ½ NnS. A game is a positive spillover game if spillovers are positive
for every winning coalition S 2 W. Likewise, spillovers are negative if the reverse
inequality holds in (9.1) and a game is a negative spillover game if spillovers are
negative for every winning coalition.
A set of winning coalitions W ½ 2N is called N-proper if S 2 W implies NnS = 2
W. In the context of coalition formation in politics, this property relates to the fact
that a coalition and its complement can not have a majority at the same time.
Example 9.1 Consider a parliament with four parties2: the communists (COM),
socialists (SOC), Christian democrats (CD) and liberals (LIB). The seats are divided
as follows:
party COM SOC CD LIB
share of seats 0:1 0:3 0:25 0:35
2This example is inspired by the model presented in Van der Rijt (2000).200 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
This gives rise to a spillover game with N = fCOM;SOC;CD;LIBg and
W = ffSOC;CDg;fSOC;LIBg;fCD;LIBg;fCOM;SOC;CDg;
fCOM;SOC;LIBg;fCOM;CD;LIBg;fSOC;CD;LIBg;Ng:
For the winning coalitions the payo®s look as follows (the ¯rst entry in the two-










Obviously, COM and LIB do not have much in common, which is re°ected by a
relatively low payo® to coalitions in which both are involved. The central position of
CD is re°ected by the relatively high spillover it experiences when a coalition forms
in which it is not involved. If all four parties get together, the result will not be
stable, which is re°ected by the low value for N.
Example 9.2 Consider a group of players that can be connected to some source.
If a player is connected to the source, he receives some ¯xed bene¯t. On the other
hand, by creating connections costs are incurred. Each player can construct a direct
link between the source and himself, or he can connect himself via other players.
There are two types of connections: public and private. If a player constructs a
public link, other players can use this link to get to the source. A private connection
can only be used by the player who constructs it.
When constructing a network, players can cooperate in order to reduce costs.
We assume that if a coalition forms, the players within that coalition construct an
optimal public network, which by de¯nition is open for use by other players. Once
this optimal public network for the coalition is constructed, the players outside can
decide whether or not to connect to the source, using the public network in place,9: Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour 201
possibly complemented with private connections. The corresponding payo®s to these
individual players are the spillovers that result from the formation of this coalition.
We call the resulting model a public-private connection (ppc) problem. Note that in
principle every coalition can form and hence, W = 2N.
Consider the ppc problem depicted in Figure 9.1, where * is the source, the bold
numbers indicate the players, the numbers between parentheses represent the bene¯ts





























Figure 9.1: A ppc problem
First, consider the grand coalition. The best this coalition can do is to build a
public network connecting all players to the source, creating links f¤;1g, f1;2g and
f2;3g. The net payo® equals 4 + 6 + 5 ¡ (3 + 2 + 2) = 8.
Next, consider coalition f2g3. It is optimal for this coalition to create f¤;1g
and f1;2g, giving player 2 a payo® of 6 ¡ (2 + 3) = 1. The construction of these
public links results in spillovers for players 1 and 3. Player 1 can use the public
network and does not have to create an extra private link, so his spillover equals his
bene¯t of 4. Player 3 can also use the public network, complemented with the private
connection f2;3g, giving him a spillover of 5 ¡ 2 = 3.
Next, consider f3g. Since every path to the source is more expensive than it is
bene¯cial, player 3 will not construct a network at all, giving him a payo® of 0.
Player 1 then has to construct a private link f¤;1g with spillover 1 and player 2,
who cannot use 1's private link, will have to construct f¤;1g and f1;2g privately,
giving him a spillover of 1 as well.
Doing this for every possible coalition, we obtain a spillover game (N;W;v;z)
3It may seem strange that a single player can build a public network. For the sake of expositional
clarity, we do not a priori exclude this possibility.202 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
with N = f1;2;3g, W = 2N and the following payo®s:
S ; f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f1;3g f2;3g N
v(S) 0 1 1 0 5 3 4 8
zS (1;1;0) (4;2) (4;3) (1;1) 3 4 4
9.3 Some Basic Results
In this section, we de¯ne and analyse some solutions for and properties of spillover
games. These notions (e.g. core, nucleolus, convexity) are based on their well-known
analogues for TU and NTU games. See also Section 2.7.
A payo® vector x 2 I R
N is individually rational if xi ¸ v(fig) for all i 2 N. The
S-imputation set of a spillover game G = (N;W;v;z) for S 2 W, IS(G), consists
of those individually rational payo® vectors in I R
N
+ which allocate v(S) among the
members of S, while giving the members of NnS their spillovers, i.e.,




xi = v(S);xNnS = z
S;8i2S : xi ¸ v(fig)g:





Note that individual rationality implies that every imputation vector is nonnegative.
A game is called imputation admissible if its imputation set is nonempty.
A payo® vector in the S-imputation set belongs to the S-core if for every coali-
tion, the total payo® to the members of that coalition exceeds its value. So, for
S 2 W we de¯ne the S-core by




















An S-imputation is stable in the sense that there is no other winning coalition T
that objects to the proposed allocation on the basis of it being able to obtain more
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where undom(A) = fx 2 Aj:9y2A : y ª xg. It follows immediately from the
de¯nitions that CS(G) ½ IS(G) for all S and C(G) ½ I(G).
Example 9.3 Consider the spillover game G = (N;W;v;z) with N = f1;2;3g,
W = ff1g;f1;2g;f1;3g;Ng and the following payo®s:
S f1g f1;2g f1;3g N
v(S) 1 5 2 6






Because the sum of the value and the spillovers is highest for f1;2g, the core
elements corresponding to this coalition cannot be dominated, so Cf1;2g(G) ½ C(G).
Also, we have Cf1;3g(G) ½ C(G), since the payo® to player 2 is strictly higher than
in the core elements corresponding to the other winning coalitions. The core cor-
responding to the grand coalition, however, does not fully belong to the core of the
game. For example, (1;4;1) is dominated by (1;4;3) 2 Cf1;2g(G) and (2;4;0) by
(2;5;0) 2 Cf1;3g. The core of this game is as follows:







For TU games, Bondareva (1993) and Shapley (1967) characterised nonemptiness of
the core by means of the concept of balancedness. We establish a similar result for
the class of W-stable spillover games. A game G = (N;W;v;z) is called W-stable if







The idea behind W-stability is that there can exist no two disjoint winning coalitions
with negative spillovers. For, if two such coalitions are present, the game would have204 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
no stable outcome in the sense that both these coalitions would want to form. Note
that positive spillover games and spillover games with N-proper W belong to the
class of W-stable games.
For S ½ N, we de¯ne eS to be the vector in I R
N with eS
i = 1 if i 2 N and eS
i = 0






















Suppose that coalition S 2 W forms, giving its members a total payo® of v(S).
Next, consider a winning coalition T and consider the situation where T forms. The
payo® to T would then be v(T), but some of its members would have to forego the
spillovers resulting from the formation of S. So, after subtracting these opportunity
costs, the net payo® to T equals the expression inside the brackets. A game is S-
balanced if dividing the net payo®s of all winning coalitions T in an S-balanced way
yields a lower payo® than v(S).
The standard de¯nition for a balanced map reads that a map ¸ : 2Nn; ! I R+ is











The Bondareva-Shapley theorem states that the core of a TU game is nonempty if
and only if the game is balanced. We can prove a similar result using S-balancedness.
Our de¯nition of an S-balanced map uses an inequality, whereas the standard bal-
ancedness de¯nition has an equality. Due to the presence of coalitional spillovers
equality is too strict an assumption to obtain a Bondareva-Shapley-like theorem.
Theorem 9.1 Let G = (N;W;v;z) be a W-stable spillover game. Then C(G) 6= ;
if and only if there exists an S 2 W such that G is S-balanced.9: Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour 205
Proof. Let S 2 W. Then
CS(G) 6= ;









xi ¸ v(T)g 6= ;







xi ¸ v(T);8i2S : xi ¸ 0;xNnS = z
Sg

































The last step follows directly from applying the duality theorem of linear program-
ming. Note that nonemptiness of the primal feasible set follows from W-stability
and that the dual feasible set is always nonempty. De¯ning ³i = ¹i ¡ Ãi for all






























































Since C(G) 6= ; if and only if there exists an S 2 W such that CS(G) 6= ;, the
assertion follows. ¤
A well-known solution concept for the class of TU games is the nucleolus. The
nucleolus has the appealing property that it lies in the core whenever the core is
nonempty. For spillover games, we establish a similar result.
The excess of coalition T ½ N for imputation x 2 I(G) is de¯ned by
E(T;x) = v(T) ¡
X
i2T
xi:206 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
If x is proposed as an allocation vector (corresponding to some winning coalition),
the excess of T measures to which extent T is satis¯ed with x: the lower the excess,
the more pleased T is with the proposed allocation. The idea behind the nucleolus
is to minimise the highest excesses in a hierarchical manner.
Let x;y 2 I R
t. Then we say that x is lexicographically smaller than y, or x ·L y,
if x = y or if there exists an s 2 f1;:::;tg such that xk = yk for all k 2 f1;:::;s¡1g
and xs < ys. For a ¯nite set A, we denote x ·¤
L y with x;y 2 I R
A, if x0 ·L y0 where
x0 (y0) is the vector in I R
jAj containing the elements of x (y) in decreasing order.
Let G = (N;W;v;z) be an imputation admissible game and let S 2 W be such
that IS(G) 6= ;. We de¯ne the S-nucleolus of G, ºS(G) to be the set of S-imputations
for which the excesses are lexicographically minimal, ie,
ºS(G) = fx 2 IS(G)j8y2I(G) : (E(T;x))T½N ·
¤
L (E(T;y))T½Ng:
Since IS(G) is compact and convex, there exists a unique lexicographic minimum.
The nucleolus of G, º(G), is the lexicographic minimum of all (well-de¯ned) S-
nucleoli, which is equivalent with
º(G) = fx 2 I(G)j8y2I(G) : (E(T;x))T½N ·
¤
L (E(T;y))T½Ng:
Because the imputation set is the ¯nite union of all S-imputation sets, the lexico-
graphic minimum exists. It need not be unique, however, since I(G) itself need not
be convex.
As stated before, the TU nucleolus always belongs to the core whenever this
set is nonempty. The same holds for spillover games, as shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 9.1 Let G = (N;W;v;z) be such that C(G) 6= ;. Then º(G) ½ C(G).
Proof. First note that since C(G) 6= ;, the game is imputation admissible and
º(G) is well-de¯ned. Let y 2 º(G) and let Sy 2 W be such that ºSy(G) = fyg.
Let x 2 C(G). Then the inequalities in the core de¯nition imply E(T;x) · 0 for
all T ½ N. But then we must also have E(T;y) · 0 for all T ½ N and hence,
y 2 CSy(G).
To show that y is undominated, suppose there exists a z 2
S
S2W CS(G) such that
z ª y. Then E(T;z) © E(T;y) for all T ½ N. This contradicts (E(T;z))T½N ¸¤
L
(E(T;y))T½N and hence, y 2 C(G). ¤9: Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour 207
A spillover game G = (N;W;v;z) is called superadditive if






for all S ½ T ½ N. If a game is superadditive, then it is bene¯cial to form a large
coalition: the payo® to S and TnS is larger if these coalitions merge rather than
stay separate. Note that if spillovers are positive, this condition is stronger than the
TU de¯nition v(T) ¸ v(S) + v(TnS), i.e. if spillovers are positive, the coalitions
have a bigger incentive not to merge.
A weaker version of superadditivity is individual superadditivity:






for all T ½ N;i 2 T.
G is convex if











for all S;T ½ N.
The game G is coalition merge or cm convex if











for all U ½ N;S ½ T ½ NnU. Coalition merge convexity can be interpreted in
terms of increasing marginal contributions: if a large coalition T decides to join U,
then its marginal contribution, being the value of the resulting coalition minus the
opportunity costs of staying separate, is larger than the marginal contribution (to
U) of a smaller coalition S.
Similarly, G is individual merge or im convex if











for all i 2 N;S ½ T ½ Nnfig.
Like their TU analogues, convexity and cm convexity turn out to be equivalent,
as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 9.2 Let G = (N;W;v;z) be a spillover game. Then G is convex if
and only if G is cm convex.208 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
Proof. \)" Let U ½ N;S ½ T ½ NnU. Take A = S [ U and B = T. Then,























\(" Let A;B ½ N. Take S = A \ B, T = B and U = AnB. Then,
v(A [ B) = v(T [ U)






















which proves the proposition. ¤
As in TU games, (cm) convexity is stronger than superadditivity.
Proposition 9.3 Let G = (N;W;v;z) be a convex game. Then G is superadditive.
Proof. Let A ½ B. Then,



















In a similar way, im convexity implies individual superadditivity. It follows
immediately from the de¯nitions that every cm convex game is im convex. The
reverse is not true, as is shown in the following example.
Example 9.4 Consider the spillover game of Example 9.3. This game is im convex.
However, it is not superadditive: take S = f1;2g and T = f1;2;3g, then v(T) =
6 < 5 + 3 = v(S) + zS
3 .
9.4 Sequential Government Formation
In this section, we model the process of government coalition formation. On the
basis of an example we introduce the concept of marginal vector for spillover games.9: Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour 209
Contrary to its TU counterpart, strategic considerations play an important role in
our de¯nition of a marginal vector.
Example 9.5 Recall Example 9.1. Suppose that coalition formation is performed in
a sequential way, where parties decide whether or not to join the coalition in order
of their shares of seats. First, the largest party, LIB, starts forming a coalition.
Since this party on itself is not winning, its payo® is zero. To keep it simple, we
assume that parties always join if the coalition in place is not yet winning. Hence,
the second largest party, SOC, joins, creating a winning coalition. Its payo® equals
the marginal contribution to the existing coalition, which equals 10-0=10. Next, the
third largest, CD has the choice whether to join or not. If it joins, its marginal
contribution is 18-10=8. If it does not join, the worst that can happen is that
coalition fCOM;SOC;LIBg forms, giving CD a payo® (spillover) of 6. Hence,
CD joins the existing coalition. Finally, COM decides not to join, giving it a
spillover of 1 rather than the marginal contribution of -2. So, the resulting coalition
will be fSOC;CD;LIBg with payo® vector (10;8;0;1).
The procedure described in the previous example to solve the coalition formation
problem resembles the well-known concept of marginal vector for TU games. The
crucial di®erence, however, is that contrary to the TU case, in our context players
do not have to join the existing coalition. As long as there is a winning coalition in
place and the worst that can happen if a player does not join is better than joining,
that player has the option to stay outside.
In order to de¯ne the concept of marginal vector, we need to introduce some
more notation. An ordering on the player set N is a bijection ¾ : f1;:::;ng ! N,
where ¾(k) = i means that player i 2 N is at position k. The set of all n! orderings
on N is denoted by ¦(N). The set of predecessors of player i 2 N according to
ordering ¾ 2 ¦(N) is denoted by P ¾
i = fj 2 N j¾¡1(j) < ¾¡1(i)g.
Let (N;W;v;z) be a spillover game. The marginal vector corresponding to ¾,
¾ 2 ¦(N), denoted by M¾(N;W;v;z), is de¯ned recursively. By S¾
k we denote the
current coalition after the ¯rst k players have entered and we initialise S¾
0 = ;. Let
k 2 f1;:::;ng. Player i = ¾(k) has to decide whether to join the current coalition
S¾















k¡1 [ fig) ¡ v(S
¾
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We assume that i does not join S¾
k¡1 if this latter coalition is already winning and
the worst that can happen to i if it stays outside, m¾




























According to this procedure, the coalition S¾ = S¾
n eventually forms and in the
resulting marginal vector, v(S¾) is divided among the members of S¾ and the players
in NnS¾ get their corresponding spillovers.
The solution that is computed in Example 9.5 is the marginal vector that corre-
sponds to the ordering based on the shares of the seats. Of course, this procedure
can be performed with all orderings on the parties, each leading to a marginal vector.









The Shapley value can be interpreted as an expected payo® vector if coalition for-
mation is performed by the marginal vector procedure and the orderings on the
players are equally likely. Note that the total payo® to the players according to
di®erent marginal vectors need not be the same. Contrary to each marginal vector
separately, the Shapley value is not \supported" by a single coalition, but it induces
a probability measure I P on all (winning) coalitions in a natural way:
I P(S) =
jf¾ 2 ¦(N)jS¾ = Sgj
n!
:
Example 9.6 In Example 9.5, the Shapley value can be obtained by calculating
all marginal vectors following a similar procedure for all permutations as has been





The induced probabilities are presented in the following table (winning coalitions not9: Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour 211












According to these probabilities on the coalitions, COM and LIB will be part of the
coalition with probability 2
3 and SOC and CD with probability 3
4, which re°ects the
latter two parties' centrality in the political spectrum.
The strategic element in our de¯nition of marginal vector is that a player can choose
not to join when it is in his interest to stay separate. We assume that players are
cautionary in that they only decide not to join when the worst that can happen
when doing so is better than the payo® if they join.4 This strategic element can
be extended in several ways. For example, one can assume that the players play a
sequential move extensive form game and the resulting marginal vector is the payo®
vector corresponding to a subgame perfect equilibrium. One would then have to
make some additional assumptions about what happens when indi®erences occur
and there are multiple equilibria. In our approach, we assume that player i decides
to join whenever m¾
i = c¾
i .
9.5 Public-Private Connection Problems
In this section, we analyse public-private connection problems as described in Ex-
ample 9.2. We address two main questions: which coalition will form and how
should the value of this coalition be divided among its members? In the TU model
of minimum cost spanning tree games, one simply assumes that the grand coalition
will form, but in our context, this seems an unnatural assumption because of the
presence of spillovers.
A public-private connection or ppc problem is a triple (N;¤;b;c), where N =
f1;:::;ng is a set of agents, * is a source, b : N ! I R+ is a nonnegative bene¯t
4This is quite standard practise in cooperative game theory. Usually, a non-cooperative game
is turned into a TU game by assigning values to coalitions based on the maximin principle, i.e. by
maximising the worst case scenario.212 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
function and c : EN¤ ! I R+ is a nonnegative cost function, where N¤ = N [ f¤g.
ES is de¯ned as the set of all edges between pairs of elements of S ½ N¤, so that
(S;ES) is the complete graph on S:
ES = ffi;jgji;j 2 S;i 6= jg:
The number b(i) represents the bene¯ts if player i 2 N is connected to * and c(fi;jg)
represents the costs if a link between i 2 N¤ and j 2 N¤ is formed.
Links can be created either publicly or privately, as described in Example 9.2.
To avoid unnecessary diversions, we simply assume that the optimal public network
for each coalition is unique.
A network of edges is a set K ½ EN¤. By N(K) ½ N we denote the set of
players that are connected to the source in network K.
A ppc problem (N;¤;b;c) gives rise to a public-private connection or ppc game



















for all S ½ N;i 2 NnS, where KS denotes the unique network K that maximises
(9.2), and IA(i) equals 1 if i 2 A and 0 if i = 2 A.
Although players outside S can use the public network created by S, a public-
private connection game need not be a positive spillover game. This is caused by
the assumption that only the players within the coalition that eventually forms can
cooperate, whereas the players outside can only build private links. As a result, the
costs of a particular connection may have to be paid more than once by the players
outside the coalition and consequently, they are worse o® than when they cooperate.
Public-private connection games are superadditive, as is shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 9.4 Let (N;¤;b;c) be a ppc problem. Then the corresponding game
(N;W;v;z) is superadditive.
Proof. Let S ½ T ½ N. Let KS be the optimal public network for S and for all
i 2 TnS, let L
NnS
i be the optimal private network for i, given that KS is present.9: Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour 213
































































Although public-private connection games are superadditive, they need not be




























Figure 9.2: A ppc problem
Example 9.7 Consider the ppc problem depicted in Figure 9.2. Let S = f1g, T =214 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
f1;3g and i = 2. Then for the corresponding game (N;W;v;z) we have










= 3 ¡ 1 ¡ 1
< 3 ¡ 1
= v(f1;2g) ¡ z
f2g
1






Hence, this game is not im-convex.
A minimum cost spanning tree or mcst problem (cf. Claus and Kleitman (1973),
Bird (1976)) is a triple (N;¤;c), where the symbols have the same interpretation
as in the ppc model. The main di®erence with ppc problems is that players have
to be connected to the source and the players inside a coalition S cannot use edges
adjacent to players outside S.
An mcst problem is usually modelled as a TU (cost) game (N;c), where c(S) is
the minimal costs that the members of coalition S have to make to be connected to







where S¤ = S [ f¤g. Since costs are nonnegative, the optimal network is a tree (as
is the case in ppc problems) and this tree is called the minimum cost spanning tree.
A solution of an mcst problem consists of an optimal tree and an allocation




i2N xi = c(N). Bird (1976) proposed that each player pays the
costs of the (unique) link that is adjacent to him and lies on the path between him
and the source in the mcst.
A solution of a ppc problem consists of a coalition S that will form, the corre-
sponding optimal public network for S and private networks for the players outside




i2S xi = v(S) and xi = zS
i for all i 2 NnS.
Let us return to the ppc problem in Example 9.2. Suppose that the grand
coalition forms. We have already seen that it is optimal for the grand coalition
to connect all its members to the source. Since the bene¯ts of a coalition do not
depend on the shape of the network that is formed as long as everyone is connected,
the optimal network, ff¤;1g;f1;2g;f2;3gg in this ppc problem is actually an mcst.9: Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour 215
So, one way to solve a ppc problem is to assume that construction costs are divided
using Bird's algorithm and everyone gets his own bene¯t. According to this Bird-
like procedure, player 1 receives 4¡3 = 1, player 2 gets 6¡2 = 4 and player 3 gets
5 ¡ 2 = 3.
This procedure, however, has some elementary °aws. Firstly, it is based on
the assumption that the grand coalition will form. Secondly, even if N forms, the
optimal network for N might not connect all players to the source, so Bird's rule
cannot be applied. Thirdly, even if all players are to be connected, players might
receive a negative payo® according to this procedure.
A more fundamental criticism of this Bird-like procedure is that it does not take
the spillovers into account. The strategic option of players not to participate in a
coalition undermines the Bird approach. Player 1 will never agree to the proposed
payo® vector (1;4;3), since he will be better o® leaving the grand coalition, which
will lead to a payo® (spillover) of 4. Knowing this, player 3 can argue that he should
at least receive 3, his spillover when player 2 forms a coalition on his own. Taking this
into account, the payo® vector (4;1;3) seems a more reasonable outcome. Because
player 2 on his own will form a network that also connects player 1 to the source,
the latter player occupies a position of power in this ppc problem, which should
somehow be re°ected in his payo®.
A payo® of (4;1;3), however, is not acceptable to player 2. He can argue that if
he were to refuse to build his optimal public network, it would then be optimal for
players 1 and 3 to work together, giving player 2 a spillover of 4.
By considering this kind of strategic threats of the players not to cooperate, any
seemingly reasonable proposal can be dismissed. As a result, it is not clear which
coalition will eventually form and what the corresponding payo®s will be.
This phenomenon of free-riding is well-known in the context of public goods.
Although it is socially optimal for all the players to cooperate in order to provide a
public good, the players separately have the strategic incentive not to do so.
One way to solve this problem is to apply the Shapley value, as de¯ned in the
previous section. In each marginal vector, the strategic aspects mentioned above are
taken into account. By averaging over all marginal vectors, the average in°uence of
these noncooperative considerations is re°ected in the payo®.
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Furthermore, I P(N) = 1, i.e. according to each marginal vector, the grand coalition
will form.
For each ppc game, the induced probability measure I P assigns weight 1 to the grand
coalition, as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 9.5 Let (N;W;v;z) be a ppc game. Then I P(N) = 1.























As is clear from the previous proposition, in our de¯nition of marginal vector,
the threat of not participating in the grand coalition is nowhere biting. This results
from our assumption that each player only takes into account the worst that can
happen if he stays out.
9.6 Cartel Formation in an Oligopolistic Market
In this section we show how to construct a spillover game out of an oligopolistic
market that is characterised by Cournot competition. The Shapley value that was
introduced in Section 9.4 is used to make predictions on the likelihood of the for-
mation of a cartel.
Consider a market with n ¯rms. The inverse demand function is given by P :
I R
n
+ ! I R+. The production technology of each ¯rm i, i = 1;:::;n, is represented
by the cost function Ci : I R+ ! I R+. The pro¯t function for ¯rm i is the function
¼i : I R
n
+ ! I R, which is de¯ned by
¼i(qi;q¡i) = P(q1;:::;qn)qi ¡ Ci(qi);
where (qi;q¡i) = (q1;:::;qi¡1;qi;qi+1;:::;qn). Simultaneously solving the pro¯t
maximisation problem for all ¯rms yields the Cournot{Nash equilibrium pro¯ts,
¹ ¼ = (¹ ¼1;:::; ¹ ¼n).9: Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour 217
The oligopolistic market can be turned into a spillover game G = (N;W;v;z) in
the following way. Let N = f1;:::;ng and W = 2N. The Cournot{Nash equilibrium
corresponds to a situation where S = ; with v(;) = 0 and z; = ¹ ¼. Subsequently,
let S = fig for some i 2 N. This still corresponds to a Cournot situation, i.e.
v(fig) = ¹ ¼i and zfig = ¹ ¼¡i.
For any coalition S consisting of more than one ¯rm, we assume that there are
economies of scale so that the coalition (or cartel) can produce the product at the
















S;qNnS)qj ¡ Cj(qj)g; j 62 S:
This gives the vector of equilibrium pro¯ts (¹ ¼S; ¹ ¼NnS) 2 I R £ I R
NnS, where ¹ ¼NnS =
(¹ ¼j)j62S, leading to the values v(S) = ¹ ¼S and zS = ¹ ¼NnS.













The Shapley value that has been introduced in Section 9.4 can be used to predict the
likelihood of certain cartels. Note, however, that the Shapley value only considers
one coalition that is formed. There is no a priori reason why there could not be two
or more cartels in one market. For n = 3 this problem does not arise.
As an example, consider a market with three ¯rms. The linear inverse demand
function is speci¯ed by P(q1;q2;q3) = b¡a(q1+q2+q3), a > 0, b > 0. It is assumed
that the cost functions have constant marginal costs, i.e. for ¯rm i it holds that
Ci(q) = ciq, 0 < c1 · c2 · c3. Additionally, it is assumed that b ¸ 3c1 ¡ c2 ¡ c3,
b ¸ 2c1 ¡ c3, and b ¸ c1.5 For this spillover game the appropriate values for v and
z are given in Table 9.1.
It is not clear a priori what will happen in a market like this. For b = 50, a = 1,
c1 = 5, c2 = 10, c3 = 15 the Shapley value is given by ©(G) ¼ (280;147;80). The
prediction for the possible cartels gives a clear cut answer, namely I P(N) = 1. So,
all ¯rms will collude.
















































Table 9.1: Values for v and z.
With the same values for b and a, and cost parameters c1 = 5, c2 = 6 and
c3 = 10 the Shapley value equals ©(G) ¼ (211;184;67) and the probability measure
on coalitions gives I P(f1;3g) = I P(f2;3g) = 1
6, and I P(N) = 2
3.
Finally, with constant marginal costs c1 = c2 = c3 = 10 one obtains ©(G) =
(100;100;100) and I P(f1g) = I P(f2g) = I P(f3g) = 1
3. Hence, in this case no cartel
will form. From the above examples one can deduce that apparently the magnitude
of the synergy e®ects of collusion are important. Consider for example the case
where ¯rms are symmetric. Take any permutation of N. From Table 9.1 one can
see that the ¯rst ¯rm is indi®erent between joining or not. It was assumed, in
de¯ning the Shapley value, that in case of indi®erence a player joins. The ¯rm that
arrives second has to compare its marginal contribution with the worst-case outside
option. Joining the coalition means that the third ¯rm gets an equal pro¯t to the
two ¯rms in the cartel (since ¯rms are symmetric). If marginal costs equal c the




16a . Hence, the second
¯rm will never join. Then the same holds for the third ¯rm.
A way to analyse the importance of the magnitude of synergy e®ects is to explic-
itly model them. This can be done for example by taking for coalition S the cost
function
CS(q) = ®
jSj¡1cq; 0 < ® < 1:
The parameter ® measures the cost reduction of adding an additional ¯rm to the
cartel.9: Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour 219
9.7 Extensions
In this section, we brie°y discuss some drawbacks of our spillover model and propose
some possible extensions that address these criticisms.
One of our main assumptions is that when a coalitions S forms, the players in
NnS stay separate. In the ppc example, this might not be wholly realistic. In many
situations, rival public networks can certainly be constructed. For example, in some
countries there are parallel, rival telephone networks, each of which is public. So,
another interesting way to tackle such a situation is to consider the possibility of
more than one coalition forming.
Also in the government formation example, it is a bit strange to assume that
the opposition is in no way organised. Coalitions of opposition parties might want
to cooperate, eg, in order to in°ict maximum damage on the government. Contrary
to the ppc example, however, in government formation there is always one coalition
with a special role.
To be more speci¯c, a more general approach that incorporates this aspect is to
model a spillover game as (N;W;p), where N and W are as before and p : W£2N !
I R is the payo® function where p(S;T) represents the payo® to coalition T ½ N if
S 2 W forms. In this framework, there is still a special coalition S that forms,
but the remaining players are not forced to work in singletons. This model is a
generalisation of our spillover model (N;W;v;z) with p(S;S) = v(S) for all S 2 W
and p(S;fig) = zS
i for all S 2 W;i 2 NnS.
The option to allow the formation of more than one coalition (possibly with one
\special" coalition) does not boil down to the model of games in partition function
form. As already explained in the introduction, in partition function form games
the formation of a coalition is in°uenced by how the agents outside that coalition
organise themselves, whereas in our spillover model, the in°uence is the other way
around: a coalition forms and the agents outside it just have to face the consequences
(spillovers).
Another part of our model that can be further elaborated upon are the strategic
aspects. As mentioned at the end of Section 9.4, where marginal vectors are dis-
cussed, the option of agents not to join the coalition can be implemented in several
ways. It depends on the situation at hand how sophisticated the players are or
are allowed to behave. Our de¯nition of marginal vector can easily be extended to
incorporate the various degrees of strategic insight attributed to the players.
So, some aspects of the spillover model should certainly be further developed220 INVESTMENT, EVOLUTION AND COALITIONS
and extended. However, our model captures some important phenomena that have
not yet been addressed in existing cooperative models.Bibliography
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1623{1654.Investeren onder onzekerheid,
marktevolutie en coalitie-spillovers
in een speltheoretisch perspectief
Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift behandelt een aantal onderwerpen uit de micro-economie vanuit een
speltheoretische invalshoek. Het proefschrift begint met een introductie waarin een
literatuuroverzicht wordt gegeven en de verschillende delen van het proefschrift met
elkaar in verband worden gebracht. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt het wiskundig gereedschap
dat wordt gebruikt geÄ ³ntroduceerd.
Sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog staat in de economische wetenschappen het neo-
klassieke paradigma van de rationele economische agent centraal. Binnen dit paradig-
ma wordt de mens als homo economicus beschouwd. Dit houdt in dat de economi-
sche analyse uitgaat van agenten die een doelstellingsfunctie optimaliseren gegeven
de beperkingen die de omgeving aan de agenten oplegt. Ook in de speltheorie staat
de rationele agent centraal.
Speltheorie is een wiskundige theorie die strategische interactie tussen agenten
(spelers) bestudeert. Iedere speler wordt veronderstelt zijn uitbetaling te maximalis-
eren, rekening houdend met de acties van de andere spelers. In de niet-coÄ operatieve
speltheorie wordt verondersteld dat spelers onderling geen bindende afspraken kun-
nen maken. Het bekendste evenwichtsconcept uit de niet-coÄ operatieve speltheorie is
het Nash-evenwicht. Dit evenwicht gaat er vanuit dat spelers hun stragie zo kiezen
dat een eenzijdige afwijking niet beter is, gegeven dat de andere spelers hun Nash
evenwichtsstrategie spelen.
Het berekenen van Nash evenwichten kan erg ingewikkeld zijn en vaak kan een
evenwicht alleen benaderd worden. Toch wordt verondersteld dat spelers de be-
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nodigde competenties hebben om evenwichten te berekenen en zich ernaar te gedra-
gen. In de afgelopen decennia is er steeds meer kritiek gekomen op deze veron-
derstelling, mede onder invloed van experimentele resultaten, wat heeft geleid tot
de ontwikkeling van modellen met "begrensde rationaliteit". In dergelijke modellen
worden spelers gezien als mensen met beperkte capaciteiten. Zo kan bijvoorbeeld
worden verondersteld dat agenten elkaar imiteren of dat spelers zijn "voorgepro-
grammeerd" tot het spelen van een bepaalde strategie.
Waar volledige rationaliteit menselijke capaciteiten overschat, lijkt begrensde ra-
tionaliteit de menselijke intelligentie juist weer te onderschatten. De vraag is dan
ook wanneer welke veronderstelling te gebruiken. In de eerste twee delen van het
proefschrift komt de tegenstelling tussen volledige en begrensde rationaliteit aan
de orde. In het eerste deel worden eenmalige beslissingen door bedrijven met be-
trekking tot belangrijke toekomstige investeringen geanalyseerd. Veel grote onderne-
mingen hebben afdelingen waar strategische plannen worden ontworpen voor dergeli-
jke onomkeerbare beslissingen. Derhalve lijkt de veronderstelling van volledige ra-
tionaliteit hier gerechtvaardigd. In het tweede deel worden alledaagse beslissingen
van bedrijven gemodelleerd. Het is aannemelijk dat bedrijven niet al hun computa-
tionele capaciteit gebruiken voor beslissingen die op korte termijn weer teruggedraaid
kunnen worden. Derhalve wordt in deel 2 gekozen voor een begrensde rationaliteits-
aanpak.
De investeringsproblemen uit het eerste deel zijn onder onzekerheid. In alle
hoofdstukken in dit deel wordt een bedrijf gemodelleerd als een entiteit die de
verwachte opbrengst maximaliseert. Daarmee bewegen deze hoofdstukken zich in het
standaard neo-klassieke paradigma waar economische agenten als rationeel worden
beschouwd. De drie hoofdstukken in dit deel behoren tot de literatuur van de reÄ ele
optietheorie. In deze literatuur wordt het investeringsproces van bedrijven geanaly-
seerd waarbij expliciet wordt gemodelleerd dat de winsten die een investeringsproject
in de toekomst genereert onzeker zijn. Door deze onzekerheid verandert de opti-
male investeringsbeslissing en is de standaard Netto Contante Waarde niet meer
richtinggevend. Het belang van investeringsbeslissingen werd reeds onderkend door
Schumpeter (1942). Hij argumenteerde dat investeringen in Onderzoek en Ontwikke-
ling, nieuwe producten en nieuwe markten de belangrijkste vormen van mededinging
en economische vooruitgang zijn. Het belang van strategische investeringen werd re-
centelijk onderstreept door de problemen waarin menig telecommunicatiebedrijf is
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In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een model geÄ ³ntroduceerd waarin een monopolist de moge-
lijkheid heeft om te investeren in een onomkeerbaar project. De kasstromen die
het project genereert kunnen ofwel hoog ofwel laag zijn. De werkelijke waarde van
de kasstromen is vooraf onbekend. De monopolist krijgt echter op stochastisch
bepaalde tijdstippen een signaal over de hoogte van de kasstromen. Deze informatie
is echter niet perfect. Na ieder signaal dat de monopolist ontvangt past hij zijn
inschatting van de winstgevendheid van het project aan, gebruikmakend van een
Bayesiaanse procedure. Het probleem dat wordt geanalyseerd is het bepalen van het
optimale moment van investeren. Er wordt aangetoond dat de monopolist langer
moet wachten met investeren dan wanneer de netto contante waarde methode wordt
toegepast. Tevens wordt gekeken naar de gevoeligheid van de investeringsbeslissing
met betrekking tot de parameters van het onderliggende model. Ook wordt een
maat gegeven voor het beoordelen van de kwaliteit van investeringsregels.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt het standaard reÄ ele optiemodel voor ¶ e¶ en bedrijf uitgebreid
tot twee identieke bedrijven. Er wordt een wiskundige methode voorgesteld om
dergelijke speltheoretische reÄ ele optiemodellen te analyseren. De toevoeging van
mededinging aan de investeringsbeslissing heeft vanuit theoretisch oogpunt belang-
rijke consequenties. Door de competitieve druk kan het namelijk niet meer mogelijk
zijn voor een bedrijf om zich te gedragen als een monopolist en te wachten tot het op-
timale moment om te investeren daar is. Voor dergelijke gevallen wordt aangetoond
dat er een symmetrisch evenwicht bestaat waarin ¶ e¶ en der bedrijven investeert precies
op het moment dat de bedrijven indi®erent zijn tussen het als eerste of als tweede
investeren. Bovendien is dit het enige symmetrische evenwicht als het stochastische
proces dat de kasstromen stuurt continue paden genereert. Middels simulaties wordt
het speltheoretisch reÄ ele optiemodel vergeleken met zowel het standaard reÄ ele op-
tiemodel als het standaard deterministisch speltheoretische investeringsmodel. Het
speltheoretisch reÄ ele optiemodel lijdt tot signi¯cant andere conlusies dan de andere
twee modellen. Met name de welvaartsvoorspelling van het hier gepresenteerde
model verschilt van de bekende modellen uit de literatuur.
Hoofdstuk 5 combineert de onzekerheidsstrucuur uit hoofdstuk 3 met het spelthe-
oretisch gereedschap uit hoofdstuk 4. Er zijn weer twee identieke bedrijven die in
hetzelfde onomkeerbare project kunnen investeren, waarbij het niveau van de te
genereren kasstromen onzeker is (hoog of laag). Beide bedrijven observeren signalen
die informatie geven over de winstgevendheid van het project. Aangenomen wordt
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een hoger verdisconteerd winstniveau heeft dan het andere bedrijf indien het project
hoge kasstromen blijkt te genereren. Anderzijds wordt aangenomen dat de werkelijke
waarde van het project publiekelijk bekend wordt zodra ¶ e¶ en van de beide bedrijven
investeert. Dit betekent dat het andere bedrijf een informatievoordeel heeft en pre-
cies weet wat de kasstromen zullen zijn indien het zelf gaat investeren. Ingeval het
winstvoordeel overheerst bestaat er een symmetrisch evenwicht waarin beide bedrij-
ven elkaar de loef proberen af te steken. Dit resulteert in het investeren van ¶ e¶ en der
bedrijven (in sommige gevallen het tegelijkertijd investeren van beide bedrijven) op
het moment dat men indi®erent is tussen investeren als eerste of als tweede. Indien
het informatievoordeel sterker is treedt een zogeheten "uitputtingsoorlog" op waar-
bij beide bedrijven met een bepaalde kans investeren, intussen hopend dat de ander
eerder investeert. Deze uitputtingsslag eindigt op het moment dat men indi®erent
is tussen investeren als eerste of als tweede alwaar ¶ e¶ en der bedrijven investeert. In
een welvaartsstudie wordt aangetoond dat door de onzekerheid over de rentabiliteit
van de investering een monopolie beter kan zijn uit het oogpunt van welvaart dan
een duopolie.
In deel 2 wordt de aanname dat economische agenten zich rationeel gedragen
losgelaten en wordt de invloed van gedrag op de evolutie van marketen en prij-
zen bestudeerd. Hiermee begeeft dit deel zich op het vlak van de begrensde ratio-
naliteit en de evolutionaire speltheorie. Gedeeltelijk zijn de hoofdstukken in dit deel
geÄ ³nspireerd op experimentele resultaten waarbij aannemelijk gemaakt wordt dat
een oligopolie ofwel convergeert naar volledige mededinging ofwel naar een kartel.
De hoofdstukken 6 en 7 postuleren een gedrag dat deze resultaten kan verklaren.
Hoofdstuk 6 beschouwt een oligopolistische markt met begrensd rationele bedrij-
ven, waarbij ze elkaar imiteren. Welk bedrijf geÄ ³miteerd wordt hangt af van het
gedrag van elk bedrijf. Er wordt aangenomen dat een onderneming ofwel competitief
is ofwel coÄ operatief. Als een bedrijf competitief is wordt verondersteld dat het bedrijf
dat de meeste winst heeft gemaakt in de vorige periode wordt geÄ ³miteerd. Indien
een onderneming coÄ operatief is wordt het bedrijf geÄ ³miteerd dat in de vorige periode
de hoogste winst voor de gehele markt zou hebben gegenereerd als ieder bedrijf
zich identiek had gedragen. Verder wordt aangenomen dat bedrijven een zekere
intentie tot coÄ operatie hebben, omdat men weet dat een kartel tot hogere winsten
leidt. Van tijd tot tijd passen bedrijven ook hun gedrag aan waarbij gelet wordt
op de mate waarin de markt coÄ operatief blijkt. Verder wordt verondersteld dat
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verstoringen gemodelleerd worden. De techniek met betrekking tot Markovketens
die een bijna-volledige decompositie toelaten wordt gebruikt om aan te tonen dat,
afhankelijk van de intentie tot coÄ operatie, de unieke stochastisch stabiele toestand
gegeven wordt door ofwel volledige mededinging ofwel een kartel.
Een variant op het leerproces van hoofdstuk 6 wordt gepresenteerd in hoofd-
stuk 7. Wederom wordt een oligopolistische markt als uitgangspunt genomen waar
competite plaatsvindt middels hoeveelheden. Het kiezen van de hoeveelheden vindt
nu echter niet plaats middels imitatie maar middels het oplossen van een statisch
winstmaximalisatieprobleem, waarbij ieder bedrijf een inschatting maakt van de
reactie van de markt op zijn hoeveelheidskeuze. Dit wordt gemodelleerd via een
"reactieparameter". Deze parameter wordt over de tijd aangepast door het imiteren
van het bedrijf dat de meeste winst maakt. Ook in dit hoofdstuk wordt veronder-
steld dat zowel de hoeveelheidskeuze als de keuze van de reactieparameter beÄ ³nvloed
kan worden door stochastische verstoringen. Aangetoond wordt, wederom met de
gebruikmaking van de theorie der Markov{ketens die een bijna-volledige decom-
positie toelaten, dat in dit model het volledige mededingingsevenwicht de unieke
stochastisch stabiele toestand is.
In hoofdstuk 8 wordt begrensde rationaliteit vanuit een ander perspectief be-
naderd. Hier wordt prijsvorming op onvolledige ¯nanciÄ ele markten bestudeerd.
Allereerst wordt een bewijs gegeven van het bestaan van een evenwicht in een
algemeen evenwichtsmodel met ¶ e¶ en consumptiegoed, twee periodes en onvolledige
¯nanciÄ ele markten. Het bewijs berust op een stationair punt argument, in tegen-
stelling tot de bekende bewijzen uit de literatuur. Vervolgens wordt, middels de vast-
puntstelling van Browder, bewezen dat er een samenhangende verzameling bestaat
die een willekeurige prijsvector verbindt met een evenwichtsprijsvector. Er wordt
aamgetoond dat dit traject van vaste punten benaderd kan worden middels het
simpliciaal algoritme van Talman en Yamamoto (1989) voor het vinden van een
stationair punt van een continue functie op een polytoop. Vervolgens wordt bear-
gumenteerd dat het pad dat door dit algoritme gegenereerd wordt consistent is met
een markt-maker die op een begrensd rationele wijze zijn winst maximaliseert.
In deel 3, hoofdstuk 9, wordt een alternatief aangedragen voor het bekende
coÄ operatieve model met zijdelingse betalingen uit de speltheorie, de zogenaamde
Transferable Utility (TU) spelen. Waar in de eerdere delen voornamelijk technieken
uit de niet-coÄ operatieve theorie worden gebruikt, wordt hier gekeken naar de coÄ ope-
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groep van agenten, een coalitie, een waarde wordt toegekend (net als in TU spe-
len) en waarbij alle spelers die niet in de coalitie zitten ook een uitbetaling krijgen.
Dit zijn de "spillovers" van de coalitie. Men kan hier bijvoorbeeld denken aan een
regeringscoalitie waaraan ook de oppositiepartijen een bepaalde waarde ontlenen.
Voor dit model wordt een begrippenapparaat ontwikkeld en wordt een oplossings-
concept voorgesteld, namelijk een variant op de welbekende Shapley-waarde voor
TU spelen. De Shapley-waarde voor spillover spelen houdt expliciet rekening met
het feit dat het voor een speler beter kan zijn niet aan een coalitie deel te nemen en
zelfstandig te blijven. Het model wordt toegepast op het gebied van de regerings-
formatie, publiek-private netwerken en kartelformatie in oligopolistische markten.